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ABSTRACT to thesis e n t i t l e d "The consequences of goods perishing 
subsequent to a contract having been entered i n t o for t h e i r sale" 
The thesis comprises three Parts, together with a preface and an 
addendum. Each of the Parts focuses upon one of the three i n t e r - r e l a t e d 
concepts applicable where there i s a post-contract perishing of goods. 
The concepts of "perishing", " r i s k " and " f r u s t r a t i o n " are separately 
analysed so as to i d e n t i f y t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l characteristics and i n order 
that facets of t h e i r i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p may emerge. 
Part One, which deals with the meaning of "perishing", i s more 
descriptive i n nature than the other two Parts, f o r , when considered i n 
i s o l a t i o n , the issues raised i n that Part are r e l a t i v e l y straightforward. 
I t i s only when those same issues are re-considered, i n the context of 
the concepts of r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n , that t h e i r significance becomes 
apparent. I n Part Two, an analysis i s made of the meaning of " r i s k " 
and instances of the d i v i s i b i l i t y of r i s k are examined. D i f f e r e n t views 
of the mishaps provided for by the statutory term " r i s k " are assessed and, 
as part of that exercise, the meaning of "perished" i s re-appraised. An 
analysis i s made, i n Part Three, of the rules which provide for f r u s t r a t i o n 
of a contract of sale and for the consequences r e s u l t i n g from such 
f r u s t r a t i o n . An attempt i s made to i d e n t i f y instances i n which a contract 
of sale may be frustrated even though property, or r i s k , or, indeed, both 
property and r i s k , have passed to the buyer prior to the goods perishing. 
In the addendum to the thesis an opportunity i s taken to re-examine 
the concepts of "perishing", " r i s k " and " f r u s t r a t i o n " i n a context i n 
which, the separate concepts having already been analysed and de t a i l e d 
statutory and common law provisions scrut i n i s e d , there i s freedom to 
bring together strands which have emerged from the various Parts of the 
thesis. This opportunity i s taken i n an attempt t o f i x the relationship 
between the concepts. 
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PREFACE 
As indicated i n i t s t i t l e , t h i s thesis sets out to explore the con-
sequences of goods perishing subsequent to a contract having been entered 
i n t o for t h e i r sale. From the outset, i t has been determined t h a t : 
a) statutory and common law provisions r e l a t i n g to a pre-contract 
perishing of goods w i l l be referred to only where they assist i n the 
understanding of the consequences of a post-contract perishing; 
b) events other than the perishing of goods which may render per-
formance of a contract of sale impossible w i l l , s i m i l a r l y , be considered 
only to the extent that they reveal the existence of special rules 
applicable to the s i t u a t i o n i n which goods perish or where they bring 
such rules i n t o a sharper focus than would be the case i f there were 
to be no reference t o those other instances of i m p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Attention i s focused upon the narrow area of a post-contract 
perishing of goods because of the special opportunities i t provides f o r 
an analysis of the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p of fundamental concepts w i t h i n the 
rules applicable to contracts of sale. In p a r t i c u l a r , the notion of 
"perishing" provides a l i n k between the related concepts of r i s k and 
f r u s t r a t i o n and the s i t u a t i o n i n which goods perish thus creates a forum 
i n which the operation of these concepts can be examined and t h e i r nature 
revealed. When goods which form the subject matter of a contract of sale 
perish, subsequent to the making of the contract, two rel a t e d , but 
separate, questions need to be answered. The parties w i l l wish to know 
which of them must bear the loss of the items destroyed or damaged. They 
w i l l also be concerned as to the status of the agreement they have made 
and w i l l wish t o be advised whether or not the contract has survived the 
perishing of the goods. I f i t has not, they w i l l further wish to be 
advised of the consequences of the untimely termination of t h e i r bargain. 
The answers to these questions are determined by the application of the 
rules r e l a t i n g to r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n . Not only w i l l a post-contract 
- 3 -
perishing of goods raise these problems and introduce these concepts, i t 
w i l l do so uniquely. Where a contract for the sale of goods i s f r u s t r a t e d 
by supervening i l l e g a l i t y , for example, the parties w i l l need to determine 
only the f a c t that performance of the contract i s discharged and the con-
sequences of such discharge. No question of r i s k arises, f o r the goods, 
and the wealth they represent, w i l l continue to e x i s t . I t i s , then, i n 
the event of a post-contract perishing of goods that the nature of the 
pr i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g to r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n ought to reveal themselves 
most sharply. 
I t w i l l become apparent t h a t the concept of risk, and the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of events which w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a "perishing" are i n t e r r e l a t e d . I n t o t h i s 
f a b r i c of 'relationships must also be woven the doctrine of f r u s t r a t i o n , 
for the Legislature and the Courts have thought i t appropriate to refe r 
t o the concept of r i s k when framing rules and p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g t o 
f r u s t r a t i o n . Thus, not only do the rules of r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n apply i n 
the same s i t u a t i o n , t h a t i n which goods perish, but, i n a d d i t i o n , one set 
of rules has been incorporated i n t o the other. This has not, however, 
resulted i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which bath sets of rules have been subsumed 
i n t o one and much of the uncertainty to be found i n t h i s area r e s u l t s 
from t h i s f a c t . The complexity of these i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s 
heightened by the lack of st a t u t o r y and, o f t e n , J u d i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n s . A l l 
too often, the app l i c a t i o n of rules i s assumed rather than questioned 
and determined and p r i n c i p l e s are hidden, or even l o s t , i n judgments 
which refer t o an outcome without adequate reference to the reasons or 
reasoning leading to t h i s outcome. 
In t h i s t h e s i s , then, an attempt w i l l be made to i d e n t i f y the nature 
of the rules which apply where goods perish subsequent to a contract of 
sale and to analyse aspects of t h e i r i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p . To t h i s end, 
the thesis has been divided i n t o three Parts. 
- 4 -
In Part One an attempt i s made to determine the circumstances i n 
which goods w i l l be taken to have perished, Part Two seeks to i d e n t i f y 
the nature of the concept of r i s k and i n Part Three rules r e l a t i n g to 
f r u s t r a t i o n are examined i n a s e t t i n g provided by one instance of 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y , that a r i s i n g out of a post-contract perishing of goods. 
Whilst the material contained i n t h i s thesis has, to f a c i l i t a t e analysis, 
been separated i n t o these three Parts, i t w i l l become apparent that the 
Parts are not intended to be discrete. I t may assist the reader i n his 
progress through t h i s thesis i f he i s aware that i t has been w r i t t e n i n 
the expectation that i t w i l l reveal possible answers to what may 
i n i t i a l l y appear to be f a i r l y straightforward questions: 
a) what does i t mean to say that a party to a sale of goods 
contract "has risk"? 
b) when w i l l a sale of goods contract be f r u s t r a t e d by reason of 
the goods perishing and what are the consequences of the contract 
being f r u s t r a t e d as a r e s u l t of such an event? 
F i n a l l y , and somewhat t e n t a t i v e l y , an opportunity w i l l be taken, i n an 
addendum to the thes i s , to r e f l e c t upon the material contained w i t h i n the 
thesis and, i n the l i g h t of that material, to suggest possible r e l a t i o n -
ships between the terms "perish" and " r i s k " . 
- 5 -
PART ONE 
THE MEANING OF "PERISHED" 
- 6 -
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-contract s i t u a t i o n much may tu r n on whether or not goods 
which form the subject matter of a contract of sale have perished. 
( Section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides t h a t where "... there i s an 
agreement for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods and subsequently the goods, 
without any f a u l t on the part of the s e l l e r or buyer, perish before the 
r i s k passes t o the buyer, the agreement i s avoided" and, quite c l e a r l y , 
applies only where goods "perish". Conversely, section 2(5)(c) Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 provides t h a t the Act "... s h a l l 
not apply .... (c) t o any contract t o which section seven of the Sale of Goods 
1 Act 1979 (which avoids contracts f o r the sale of s p e c i f i c goods which 
perish before the r i s k has passed to the buyer) applies, or to any other 
contract f o r the sale, or for the sale and delivery of s p e c i f i c goods, 
» where the contract i s f r u s t r a t e d by reason of the f a c t t h a t the goods 
have perished". As a r e s u l t of t h i s section none of the provisions of the 
1943 Act can apply t o a contract for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods which 
( have "perished". 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the goods being considered to have "perished" 
i s , i n the case of the above provisions, manifest. There are other 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which a f i n d i n g that the goods have "perished" may be equally 
s i g n i f i c a n t , though the need for such a f i n d i n g may, i n i t i a l l y , be less 
obvious. Thus, for example, i t may be that the concept of r i s k , as 
Equally i n the event of a pre-contract mishap section 6 Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 provides that where "there i s a contract for the sale of s p e c i f i c 
goods and the goods without the knowledge of the s e l l e r have perished at 
the time when the contract i s made, the contract i s void" and, again, 
applies only where the goods have "perished". 
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re f e r r e d t o i n the 1979 Act, r e l a t e s only to the s i t u a t i o n i n which 
goods "perish". This p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l be explored i n Part Two. 
When do goods "perish"? Neither the Sale of Goods Act 1979 nor the 
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 provides a s t a t u t o r y answer to 
t h i s question, for neither provides a d e f i n i t i o n of the term, despite 
2 
the f a c t t h a t both statutes contain a d e f i n i t i o n section. Given the 
absence of a s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n one must t u r n to case-law f o r guidance, 
but one must proceed with caution. Most of the cases i n which con-
s i d e r a t i o n has been given t o t h i s problem were not such as t o concern the 
Court w i t h the respective r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s t o the 
contract of sale, they are e i t h e r insurance cases or cases i n which the 
Court was c a l l e d upon to determine whether f r e i g h t was payable on a 
cargo which had been damaged or which had deteriorated during a voyage. 
The case which i s most often r e l i e d upon as an authority'' i n t h i s area, 
4 
Asfar v. Blundell , was, f o r example, an action against insurers i n which 
the Court was asked to determine whether f r e i g h t was payable and whether 
or not there had been a t o t a l loss of the cargo so as to activate an 
insurance p o l i c y . The cases have thus been concerned with one, or more, 
of three r e l a t e d , but independent, questions: 
1) have the goods "perished" or "ceased t o e x i s t " f o r the 
purposes of a contract for t h e i r sale? 
2) have the goods arrived at t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n so as to render 
the shipper or charterer l i a b l e to pay f r e i g h t ? 
3) have the goods been t o t a l l y l o s t f o r the purposes of 
insurance? 
Section 61 Sale of Goods Act 1979; Section 3 Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943. 
^See, for example: Atiyah "The Sale of Goods"(4th ed), page 41; 
Greig, "Sale of Goods", page 213; "Benjamin's Sale of Goods", page 75; 
"Chitty on Contracts, Specific Contracts", page 370. 
/"1896 7 1 Q.B. 123. 
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Can the answers to questions 2 and 3 be of assistance when seeking an 
answer to question 1? Most academic w r i t e r s , with varying degrees of 
^ enthusiasm^ have concluded that they are. 
An analysis of case-law w i l l now be made to permit answers to be 
suggested to three questions: 
1) When w i l l physical deterioration/destruction cause goods to 
perish? 
2) Can goods perish i f they have never existed? 
3) Can goods be taken to have perished even though they continue 
1 to e x i s t and have not been subject to physical d e t e r i o r a t i o n / 
destruction? 
Contrast, for example, Greig, "Sale of Goods", page 213 and 
Atiyah "The Sale of Goods (4th ed), page 41. 
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SECTION A; 
WHEN WILL PHYSICAL DETERIORATION/DESTRUCTION CAUSE GOODS TO PERISH? 
I t i s clear that goods which have been so completely destroyed as 
to no longer ex i s t i n specie must be taken to have perished. In some 
cases i t has been suggested that t h i s t e s t , of t o t a l destruction, i s 
the only one which can be used to determine whether goods have perished. 
The sole question, i t i s argued, i s whether or not the goods s t i l l 
correspond with the contract description. In Barr v. Gibson^ the Court 
was faced with a s i t u a t i o n i n which a deed had been executed f o r the 
sale of a ship i n ignorance of the fact t h a t , at t h a t time, the ship was 
aground and could not, i n p r a c t i c a l terms, be r e - f l o a t e d . Was there a 
sale? Parke B. held that "We are of the opinion the ship did con-
tinue to be capable of being transferred .... though she might be l o s t 
w i t h i n the meaning of a contract of insurance". 7 The Court refused t o 
consider the u t i l i t y of the goods as a relevant fa c t o r ; "She was s t i l l a 
ship though at the time incapable of being b e n e f i c i a l l y employed 
7 8 
as such". Similarly i n Horn v. Minister of Food Morris J., when con-
sidering whether potatoes which had rot t e d i n a clamp had perished f o r 
g 
the purposes of Section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1893, said, o b i t e r , " i t 
would be wrong ... to say that they did not answer t o the description of 
'potatoes', however grave was the det e r i o r a t i o n of t h e i r condition". 
Can i t be then, that "perished" means "destroyed"? Support for t h i s 
6(1838) 3 M + W 390; 150 E.R. 1196. 
7150 E.R. 1200. 
8 /~1948_7 2 A l l E.R. 1036. 
9 at 1039. 
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proposition can be found, i n a d i f f e r e n t context, i n the rules which 
allow the High Court to make an order for re-sale. Rule 4(1) Order 29 
R.S.C. provides: "The Court may .... make an order for the sale .... of 
any property (other than land) .... which i s of a perishable nature or 
l i k e l y to deteriorate i f kept ...". The 'or' i s s i g n i f i c a n t , goods may 
be sold by the Court i f perishable or l i k e l y to deterior a t e , i t would 
seem that perishable means, i n t h i s context, something other than having 
a propensity to become u n f i t or unmerchantable and, presumably, means being 
of such a nature that the goods may do more than "deteriorate", they may 
cease to ex i s t i n specie. 
A U t i l i t y Test 
Despite the above a u t h o r i t i e s , there has been a growing tendency for 
the courts to take i n t o account the u t i l i t y of the goods i n order t o 
determine whether they have ceased to e x i s t . I n Cologan v. London 
Assurance Lord Ellenborough asserted that "there i s a t o t a l loss of the 
thing i f , by any of the p e r i l s insured against, i t i s rendered of no use 
whatsoever although i t might not be e n t i r e l y annihilated"."''''' This i s a 
u t i l i t y t e s t i n i t s crudest form. I f the goods have some u t i l i t y , 
however marginal, the goods e x i s t ; i f , on the other hand, the goods have 
no u t i l i t y then they have ceased to ex i s t for the purposes of insurance 
even though they continue to ex i s t i n specie. The t e s t i s an unhappy 
one, c e r t a i n l y i n the sale of goods context, and, i n that context, would 
seem to have no clear conceptual base. The t e s t refers to the u t i l i t y of 
the goods but ignores the contractually contemplated purpose and, 
accordingly, places undue emphasis on an i r r e l e v a n t , r e s i dual, u t i l i t y . 
(1816) 5 H + S 447; 105 E.R. 1114. 
105 E.R. at 1117, 1118. 
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Perishing/Merchantability 
In Asfar v. Blundell the Court of Appeal was required to determine 
whether there was a t o t a l loss of dates which had been submerged i n 
water and impregnated with sewage. The dates were not t o t a l l y destroyed, 
nor were they lacking i n u t i l i t y , f o r they were of considerable value f o r 
the purpose of d i s t i l l a t i o n i n t o s p i r i t . The Court of Appeal held that no 
f r e i g h t was payable and th a t there was a t o t a l loss of the subject matter 
of the insurance,, Lord Esher M.R. asserted: "There i s a p e r f e c t l y 
well-known t e s t which has for many years been applied to such cases as 
the present, th a t t e s t i s whether, as a matter of business, the nature of 
12 
the thing has a l t e r e d . " A l l four judges concerned with the case r e l i e d 
upon the f a c t that the goods were no longer merchantable. Mathew J., who 
gave judgment a t f i r s t i n s t a n c e 1 3 asserted t h a t : "Total destruction i s 
14 
not necessary, destruction of the merchantable character i s s u f f i c i e n t , " 
Lord Esher M.R., who delivered the leading Judgment i n the Court of 
Appeal, maintained t h a t : ".„.<,. the question for determination i s 
whether the thing insured, the o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e of commerce, has become 
a t o t a l loss. I f i t i s so changed i n i t s nature by the p e r i l s of the sea 
as t o become an unmerchantable t h i n g , which no buyer would buy and no 
honest s e l l e r would s e l l , there i s a t o t a l l o s s . " 1 3 Lopes L.J. was of 
the same opinion: "The f i r s t point taken was t h a t there was no t o t a l 
loss of the dates. But ... they had c l e a r l y l o s t any merchantable 
character as dates. In my judgement i t i s i d l e t o suggest that there 
was not a t o t a l loss of the d a t e s . " 1 6 Kay L.J. expressly approved the 
4 /~1896_7 1 Q.B. 123. 
12 
""at 127. 
1 3 /~1895_7 2 Q.B. 196. 
1 4 a t 201. 
1 3 /"1896_7 1 Q.B. 123, 128. 
1 6 a t 130. 
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17 statement made, at f i r s t instance, by Mathew J. 
What, then, i s the t e s t to emerge from t h i s case? Does "perished" 
mean "rendered unmerchantable"? Perhaps the answer to t h i s question l i e s 
i n the answer to another; i s the term "unmerchantable", as used i n the 
t e s t established i n As far v. Blundell, the same term as that used i n 
section 14(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979? 1 8 In Canada A t l a n t i c Grain Export 
19 20 Co. v. Ei l e r s Wright J. said: 
" I t seems to follow that i f goods are sold under a description 
which they f u l f i l , and i f goods under that description are 
reasonably capable i n ordinary use of several purposes they are 
of merchantable q u a l i t y w i t h i n section 14 sub-section 2 of the 
Act i f they are*reasonably capable of being used for one or more 
such purposes, even i f u n f i t for that one of those purposes 
which the p a r t i c u l a r buyer intended. No doubt i t i s too wide 
to say that they must be of use for some purpose, because that 
purpose might be foreign to t h e i r ordinary user. Thus i n 
Asfar v. Blundell .... dates were held to be unmerchantable 
as dates because they had been submerged i n the Thames and 
became impregnated with sewage, though they were of considerable 
value for d i s t i l l a t i o n i n t o vinegar." 
21 
Simil a r l y i n Cammell Laird and Co. v. The Manqaneze Bronze and Brass Co. 
22 
Lord Wright asserted: 
"What sub-section 2 now means by 'merchantable q u a l i t y ' i s that 
goods i n the form i n which they were tendered were of no use for any 
purpose for which such goods would normally be used and hence not 
saleable under that description ... i t i s immaterial to consider 
i f i t could be sold as scrap; thus i n Asfar v. Blundell dates 
were held to be unmerchantable as dates because they had been 
submerged i n the Thames and had become impregnated with sewage 
and were useless as dates, though they were of considerable 
value for d i s t i l l a t i o n i n t o vinegar." 
Clearly i n both cases, the term "unmerchantable" as used i n the t e s t 
advocated i n Asfar v. Blundell i s equated with the use of that term i n 
1 7 a t 132. 
18 
Section 14(2) provides t h a t : "Where the s e l l e r s e l l s goods i n the course 
of a business there i s an implied condition that the goods supplied under 
the contract are of merchantable q u a l i t y 
1 9(1929) 35 Com Cas 90. 
20 
^ U a t 102, 103. 
2 1 /"1934_7 A.C. 402. 
22 
" a t 430. 
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section 14(2) Sale of Goods Act. Does t h i s mean that i f goods are 
unmerchantable f o r the purposes of section 14(2), they have "perished" 
w i t h i n the meaning of, say, section 7? I t i s submitted that such a con-
clusion would embrace too l i b e r a l an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these cases. To 
assert t h a t goods which are unmerchantable w i t h i n the Asfar v. Blundell 
t e s t w i l l be unmerchantable for the purpose of section 14(2) i s not to 
assert the converse, that goods which are unmerchantable f o r the purposes 
of section 14(2) w i l l have "perished" as a r e s u l t of the t e s t advocated 
i n Asfar v. Bl u n d e l l . 
I f , indeed, a court was prepared t o accept that goods which had been 
rendered unmerchantable f o r the purposes of section 14(2) had "perished" 
fo r the purposes of section 7 of the Act, strange consequences would 
ensue. Any s e l l e r who agreed to s e l l s p e c i f i c goods would not be l i a b l e 
t o the buyer f o r breach of section 14(2) i f the goods were, without f a u l t , 
rendered unmerchantable p r i o r t o r i s k passing, f o r section 7 of the Act 
would avoid the contract. A f a u l t notion would thus be imported i n t o 
l i a b i l i t y for breach of a contract f o r the sale of s p e c i f i c goods. I f , 
however, the goods were unascertained the s e l l e r would be l i a b l e , f o r 
section 7 r e l a t e s only t o agreements for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods. 
S i m i l a r l y , the s e l l e r would remain l i a b l e i f the goods he i s s e l l i n g had 
always been unmerchantable, for i n such uses there could hardly be a 
"perishing". I n such circumstances f a u l t would be i r r e l e v a n t i n 
establishing l i a b i l i t y for breach. 
Rendered Unmerchantable/Change of I d e n t i t y 
None of the judges involved i n Asfar v. Blundell ac t u a l l y r e f e r to 
"merchantable q u a l i t y " , the term used i n section 14(2) Sale of Goods Act 
1893. Mathew J., Lopes L.J. and Kay L.J. refer to the goods being no 
23 
longer of "merchantable character" and Lord Esher M.R. refers t o "an 
2 3 /"1895_7 2 Q.B. 196, 201; /"1896_7 1 Q.B. 123, 130 and 132. 
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24 unmerchantable t h i n g " . The term "merchantable q u a l i t y " \i/as i n use at 
25 
t h a t time, i n Mody v. Greqson, fo r example, W i l l i s J. asserted t h a t 
"the defendants promised the p l a i n t i f f s ... that the same ... should be of 
26 
merchantable q u a l i t y " . Can any conclusions be drawn from the apparent 
reluctance of the judges i n Asfar v. Blundell to adopt the term 
"merchantable quality"? I t i s submitted that very l i t t l e should be 
drawn from the f a c t that there i s no d i r e c t reference to t h i s term, for 
i t appears that at t h a t time (and, indeed, at the present time) terms such 
as "merchantable" and "of merchantable q u a l i t y " were regarded as i n t e r -
27 
changeable. In Jones v. Just f o r example, the Court, when applying 
the implied term, referred not to "merchantable q u a l i t y " but to the r e q u i r e -
28 
ment that there be a "merchantable a r t i c l e " . 
More weight should, perhaps, be given to Lord Esher's conclusion 
12 
t h a t "as a matter of business, the nature of the t h i n g has been altered',' 
f o r i t would seem tha t Lord Esher i s r e f e r r i n g not to q u a l i t y but rather 
t o i d e n t i t y . Lord Justice Kay, w h i l s t admitting t h a t "the substance of 
the dates s t i l l remained and t h a t they had not been changed i n t o anything 
but dates i n a peculiar c o n d i t i o n , questioned whether "the law requires 
the nature of the thing insured to be so far changed as was suggested i n 
29 
argument". Quite c l e a r l y Kay L.J., accepting t h a t there had been 
2 4 /"1896_7 1 Q.B. 123, 128. 
2 5(1868) 19 L.T. 458. 
2 6 a t 459. 
2 7(1868) 18 L.T. 208. 
at 209. 
12 
at 127. 
2 9 /"1896 7 1 Q.8. 123, 132. 
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some change i n the nature of the goods, also recognised t h a t there i s a 
requirement t h a t the goods should change i n nature. I t i s submitted that 
i t i s t h i s requirement t h a t i s at the centre of the t e s t established i n 
Asfar v. Bl u n d e l l . I t would seem t h a t the goods w i l l have perished, under 
t h i s t e s t , when they have been rendered so unmerchantable as to have under-
gone, i n a commercial sense, a change of nature/identity» I t would follow 
t h a t the f a c t t h a t the goods have been rendered unmerchantable w i l l not, 
i n i t s e l f , mean tha t they have perished. 
The t e s t t o be used when est a b l i s h i n g whether or not goods have 
7 
perished would, therefore, seem to remain t h a t advocated i n Barr v. Gibson. 
The goods have perished i f they do not e x i s t " i n specie" and i f they do 
e x i s t " i n specie" they have not perished, even though they may be subject 
to serious defects i n q u a l i t y . The judgment i n Asfar v. Blundell may 
thus be seen as important i n so f a r as i t provides f o r a more l i b e r a l 
approach, than t h a t adopted i n Barr v. Gibson, when determining whether 
the goods do e x i s t i n specie. Since Asfar v. Blundell the t e s t i s now a 
commercial as w e l l as a physical one. Support f o r the proposition that 
the t e s t remains one of i d e n t i t y may be found i n the judgment of Kennedy 
J. i n Hansen v. Dunn,31^ for i n the course of his judgment Kennedy J. 
stated, i n r e l a t i o n t o the consignment i n question: 
" I t s condition was, no doubt, bad, but I do not f e e l myself 
j u s t i f i e d i n holding t h a t i t did not a r r i v e ' i n specie' as maize, 
according to the t e s t stated by Lord Esher i n Asfar v. Blundell."31 
Further support l i e s i n the decisions arrived a t i n Francis v. 
32 33 Boulton and Palace Shipping Company v. S p l l l e r s and Bakers. In Francis v. 
7150 E.R. 1200. 
3 0(1906) 22 TLR 458. 
3 1 a t 459. 
3 2(1895) 12 TLR 75. 
3 3The Times May 18 1908. 
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Boulton a Thames l i g h t e r carrying r i c e sank and was covered for two t i d e s . 
When the l i g h t e r was raised and the cargo r e t r i e v e d the r i c e was k i l n 
d r i e d at the cost of £68 and sold f o r £111. The Court, i n holding t h a t 
there had been no t o t a l loss, distinguished Asfar v. Blundell on the 
basis that the r i c e was "capable of being conditioned and that when k i l n 
d r i e d i t was sold as r i c e and fetched about a t h i r d of i t s sound value" 
In Palace Shipping Co. v. S p i l l e r s and Bakers a consignment of wheat was 
so damaged by sea-water th a t i t became swollen and discoloured, l o s t i t s 
gluten and gave o f f an offensive smell. I t was sold by the purchasers 
f o r less than one-quarter of the expected p r i c e , though when k i l n - d r i e d 
i t was l a t e r sold for h a l f the market p r i c e . Mr. Justice Walker, accepting 
th a t the wheat could no longer be used for making bread, applied the t e s t 
"Was the wheat damaged wheat or had the whole nature of the a r t i c l e 
a l t e r e d ? " 3 3 He decided that the k i l n - d r i e d wheat, which could be used f o r 
c a t t l e feed was damaged wheat but t h a t i t had not ceased t o be wheat. I n 
both cases the goods were c l e a r l y unmerchantable under the contract 
d e s c r i p t i o n , but they had not perished f o r , i n each case, the defect i n 
qu a l i t y was not such as to change the nature of the goods. The wheat was 
"damaged wheat" and the r i c e "was so l d as r i c e " whereas the dates i n 
Asfar v. Blundell had, for commercial purposes, ceased t o be dates and 
had only a "scrap value" ( a l b e i t a considerable one). 
I t i s submitted t h a t only where the i d e n t i t y of the goods has changed 
w i l l the goods be taken to have perished. The judgment of Cooper J. i n 
Rendell v. T u r n b u l l 3 ^ appears at f i r s t to contradict t h i s conclusion but, 
on closer analysis, the case can be r e a d i l y reconciled w i t h the " i d e n t i t y " 
at page 75. 
3 3The Times May 18 1908, 
3 5(1908) 27 NZLR 1067. 
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proposition. The facts of the case are straightforward, there was an 
agreement to s e l l a s p e c i f i c batch of "table potatoes" which, at the time 
of delivery were found to be u n f i t for human food. Had they perished for 
the purposes of the New Zealand equivalent of section 7 Sale of Goods 
Act? Cooper J. asserted that "the fact that the potatoes existed 
' i n specie' does not prevent the section applying" 3** and thus seemed to 
suggest that the t e s t was one of q u a l i t y rather than i d e n t i t y , and that 
the goods could be taken to have perished even though t h e i r nature had not 
changed. He went on, however, to say: 3^ "They were sold as 'table 
potatoes' and both parties believed them to be table potatoes, and I am 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t , although t o outward appearances they were 'table potatoes' 
they had .... ceased to be ' table potatoes'. Through t h i s condition 
/"a second growth 7 ... they had as 'table potatoes' perished." He found, 
i n e f f e c t , that the words "table potatoes" implied " f i t t o be eaten" and 
that the contract description thereby incorporated a statement r e l a t i n g 
to the q u a l i t y of the goods. The goods perished not because they were 
unmerchantable but because the defect i n q u a l i t y which caused them to be 
unmerchantable also took them outside the contract description. 
The fact that the t e s t remains one of i d e n t i t y rather than q u a l i t y 
has often escaped notice. Thus, for example, Asfar v. Blundell i s t o be 
found i n the English and Empire Digest under an entry which reads: "Goods 
unmerchantable under o r i g i n a l description - No f r e i g h t payable". 3 7 This, 
i t i s submitted, i s c l e a r l y not the rule and the entry should read: "Goods 
so unmerchantable as to no longer comply with the o r i g i n a l description -
No f r e i g h t payable". 
at 1072. 
Replacement Volume 41 (published 1965), page 572. 
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A Suggested Test 
I t has been submitted that goods perish when they are physically 
destroyed or have deteriorated to such an extent as t o have changed t h e i r 
nature. Goods which have deteriorated but have not changed i n nature have 
not perished. In the l i g h t of the decision of the House of Lords i n 
38 
Ash.tnqton Piggeries v, Christopher H i l l which drew a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the application of section 13 Sale of Goods Act 1893 ( r e l a t i n g to the 
i d e n t i t y of the goods) and section 14 of the Act ( r e l a t i n g t o the qua l i t y 
of the goods), the t e s t to be used when establishing whether goods have 
physically perished may be expressed i n a d i f f e r e n t way. I f the q u a l i t y 
of the goods has deteriorated t o such an extent t h a t the s e l l e r would 
be l i a b l e ,to the buyer under section 13 Sale of Goods Act 1979*9(but for 
the fact that he may be relieved of his l i a b i l i t y as a r e s u l t of the contract 
being rendered void by section 6 Sale of Goods Act 1979 or avoided by 
section 7 of the Act, or as a r e s u l t of the buyer being taken t o have 
acquired the r i s k of the p a r t i c u l a r d e s t r u c t i o n / d e t e r i o r a t i o n ) , the goods 
w i l l not e x i s t " i n specie" and w i l l have perished. On the other hand, i f 
the de t e r i o r a t i o n i n qu a l i t y i s not such as to cause a breach of section 
13 of the Act, the goods must c l e a r l y s t i l l e x i s t " i n specie" and have 
not perished. 
When determining whether there would be a breach of section 13 of 
the Act i t would be permissable to take i n t o account "Commercial expectations" 
"The te s t of description, at least where commodities are concerned, 
i s intended to be a broader, more commonsense, t e s t of a mercantile 
character. The question whether that i s what the buyer bargained 
for has to be answered according to such tests as men i n the market 
would apply, leaving more delicate questions of condition, or 
q u a l i t y , to be determined under other clauses of the contract or 
sections of the Act." (per Lord Wilberforce, Ashinqton Piggeries v. 
Christopher Hill^O) 
3 8 /J 1911 7 1 A l l E.R. 847. 
39 
which provides that where "there i s a contract for the sale of goods by 
description, there i s an implied condition that the goods w i l l correspond 
with the description". 
40 
/• 1971_/ 1 A l l E.R. 847, 872. 
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Recovery/Restoration Possible 
A problem i s raised i n the s i t u a t i o n i n which recovery or 
r e s t o r a t i o n of goods, which are " l o s t " or have de t e r i o r a t e d , i s com-
mercially out of the question but i s not physically impossible. Have the 
goods perished i n these circumstances? As most of the reported cases 
involve marine insurance or f r e i g h t a consideration o f t h i s area may be 
i n s t r u c t i v e . I n a contract of marine insurance there may be an actual 
t o t a l loss or a constructive t o t a l loss and the difference between the 
two r e f l e c t s the d i s t i n c t i o n between physical and commercial i m p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Section 57(1) Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that there i s an actual 
t o t a l loss where "the subject matter insured i s destroyed, or so damaged 
as to cease t o be a thing of the kind insured, or where the assured i s 
i r r e t r i e v a b l y deprived thereof". With the possible exception of an actual 
t o t a l loss which has resulted from the assured being " i r r e t r i e v a b l y 
deprived" of the subject matter of the insurance, i t seems clear t h a t where 
there i s an actual t o t a l loss there i s both a commercial and a physical 
perishing of the goods. Section 60 Marine Insurance Act 1906, however, 
defines a constructive t o t a l loss as a loss occasioned where "the subject 
matter insured i s reasonably abandoned on account of i t s actual t o t a l 
loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because i t could not be preserved 
from actual t o t a l loss without an expenditure which would exceed i t s value 
when the expenditure had been incurred". Quite c l e a r l y there can be a 
constructive t o t a l loss where goods are physically capable of being 
recovered. I t i s conceivable that t h i s approach would be adopted by a court 
c a l l e d upon to determine whether goods which may be recovered/restored 
have perished for the purposes of sale. 
This s i t u a t i o n was anticipated i n an i n t e r e s t i n g problem posed by counsel 
41 
i n Barr v. Gibson, "Suppose", he asked the Court, " t h i s had been a ship 
(1838) 150 E.R. 1196, 1198. 
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at the bottom of the ocean, and the water being very clear i t could be 
d i s t i n c t l y seen". I f one adds to t h i s supposition the f u r t h e r supposition 
that the vessel could be recovered, but only a t enormous expense, one 
creates a taxing problem. Has the vessel perished f o r the purposes of a 
contract of sale? To ask t h i s question i s not simply to ask whether a 
court would be prepared t o release the s e l l e r from his o b l i g a t i o n s , for 
i t i s not doubted t h a t , i n appropriate circumstances, the contract could be 
declared void or f r u s t r a t e d (depending upon the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
time of sinking and the time of making the contract) on the basis that 
the parties "never agreed t o be bound i n a fundamentally d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n 
42 
which has now unexpectedly emerged". The question r e l a t e s rather to the 
consequences of any f r u s t r a t i o n f o r , the goods being s p e c i f i c , i t would be 
necessary to determine whether or not the goods have perished i n order to 
ascertain the rules t o be used to es t a b l i s h the consequences of the 
f r u s t r a t i o n . I t would seem t h a t there are two possible approaches. The 
Court could conclude t h a t the goods have not perished and t h a t the basis 
of the f r u s t r a t i o n i s , quite simply, the f a c t t h a t the manner of per-
formance i s so changed as to be r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o that contemplated 
by the p a r t i e s . The other p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the Court would adopt the 
approach used i n insurance cases and conclude that where there i s a con-
s t r u c t i v e t o t a l loss there i s also a perishing of the goods. The f i r s t 
approach a t t r a c t s the provisions of the law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
43 
Act 1943, the second does not. 
An adoption of the constructive t o t a l loss approach, i n cases 
involving issues r e l a t i n g to the contract of sale, would raise the 
i n e v i t a b l e question of the point of time at which the goods would be taken 
^ p e r Viscount Simon, B r i t i s h Movietonews Ltd. v. London and D i s t r i c t 
Cinemas Ltd. /~1952_7A.C. 166, 185. 
43 See section 2(5)(c) Law Reform Frustrated Contracts Act. 
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to have perished. Would goods perish when they have so deteriorated as 
to have changed i n nature, even though at t h a t time the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
re s t o r a t i o n has not been considered, or would they perish when they have 
been changed i n nature and the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s t o r a t i o n has been con-
sidered and, l e g i t i m a t e l y , rejected? The question i s not merely academic 
f o r , i f r i s k has passed to the buyer during the i n t e r v a l between change i n 
nature and r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s t o r a t i o n , section 7 Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 w i l l only apply i f the Court concludes that the goods had 
perished p r i o r t o r i s k passing. Perhaps the question of perishing can 
only be determined a f t e r a lapse of time but the provisions of the 
section, containing the requirement t h a t the goods perish, are deemed t o 
have taken, immediate e f f e c t . I f so, one could not esta b l i s h whether the 
goods had perished u n t i l the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s t o r a t i o n had been con-
sidered and rejected as not possible. The provisions of section 7 would, 
however r be re t r o s p e c t i v e l y activated so that the contract was avoided a t 
the time of the incident which caused the goods to be ' l o s t ' or t o change 
i n nature. 
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SECTION B: 
CAN GOODS PERISH IF THEY HAVE NEVER EXISTED? 
The word "perished" would seem to indicate an existence which has 
terminated. Can goods be said to have perished i f they have never 
existed? Were i t not for the provision of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
and the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, t h i s question would 
appear to have more philosophical than legal importance. These provisions 
do, however, e x i s t and courts have been asked to provide an answer to 
t h i s very question. 
Authority for an Affirmative Answer 
44 
In Howell v. Coupland there was an agreement to s e l l 200 tons of 
potatoes to be grown on land belonging t o the defendant. S u f f i c i e n t 
acreage was sown to produce the crop but an appearance of b l i g h t resulted 
i n crop f a i l u r e . The Court granted a declaration that the s e l l e r was 
relieved of his obligations to deliver though i t i s not clear whether the 
Court did so on the basis that the goods had perished. Blackburn J. 
assumed that the goods had perished and that the contract was subject t o 
45 
the r u l i n g i n Taylor v. Caldwell. The other members of the Court, 
Archibald J. and Quain J., agreed that the case was w i t h i n the rule i n 
Taylor v. Caldwell but did not expressly refer t o a "perishing" of the 
goods. Archibald J. l a i d emphasis on the fact that the goods should be 
46 47 " i n existence", w h i l s t Quain J. r e l i e d upon the notion of vis major. 
44 
45 
Law Rep. 9 Q.B. 462. 
at 465, 466. 
46 at 467, 
47 at 466, 
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As Archibald J. and Quain J. both referred to Taylor v. Caldwell, the 
f a c t that they did not ref e r to the goods having "perished" may not be 
48 
s i g n i f i c a n t , for Glanville Williams asserts that the word "perish" i n 
section 7 Sale of Goods Act i s a reference to the rule i n Taylor v. 
Caldu/ell. Reliance upon the r u l e , therefore, i s possibly a recognition 
that there has been a "perishing". 
49 
Howell v. Coupland was considered, on appeal, by a f u l l court of 
the Court of Appeal which affirmed the decision of the Div i s i o n a l Court 
on the basis that there was an implied term t h a t before the time fix e d 
for performance the goods should be i n existence. Only one member of the 
Court, Mellish L.J., spoke of the goods "perishing", asserting that 
" i f the thing perishes before the time for performance, the vendor i s 
excused from performance"."^ Recognising that there was "a d i s t i n c t i o n " 
which could be drawn between goods which have perished and goods which 
have never existed he doubted that there was "any r e a l difference i n 
p r i n c i p l e " " ^ i n such cases. At that time he was probably correct. 
Whilst none of the other members of the Court referred t o a "perishing" 
they a l l c l e a r l y r e l i e d upon the rule i n Taylor v. Caldwell. 
Did Howell v. Coupland establish that goods can perish even though 
they have never existed? Eight judges considered the case and a l l 
arrived at the same decision. A l l , d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , r e l i e d upon the 
decision i n Taylor v. Caldwell but only two referred d i r e c t l y to a 
"perishing". Glanville Williams concludes that " i t was held i n Howell v. 
Coupland that goods that f a i l to materialise 'perish' for the purposes of 
4 8"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943", page 89. 
A 9(1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258. 
5 0 a t 262. 
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48 the r u l e " , ( i . e . the r u l e i n Taylor v. Caldwell). I t i s submitted 
that i t i s correct t o say that the goods were held t o have perished f o r 
the purposes of the rule i n Taylor v. Caldwell and, i f one accepts t h a t 
section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 gives s t a t u t o r y e f f e c t t o t h i s r u l e i t 
i s possible that Howell v. Coupland i s also a u t h o r i t y f o r the proposition 
t h a t such goods "perish" for the purposes of tha t s e c t i o n . 
Authority f o r a Negative Answer 
In McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission^^ there was a sale of 
a ship which not only d i d not e x i s t , but never had existed. The Court 
considered the provisions of section I I V i c t o r i a n Goods Act 1928, which 
corresponds with section 6 Sale of Goods Act 1979 and provides "Where 
there i s a contract f o r the sale of s p e c i f i c goods and the goods without 
the knowledge of the s e l l e r have perished at the time when the contract i s 
made the contract i s void",. Dixon J. and Fullgar J., i n a j o i n t judgment, 
asserted t h a t " i t seems clear that the section has no app l i c a t i o n t o the 
facts of the present case. Here the goods never existed and the s e l l e r 
52 
ought to have known th a t they did not e x i s t " . The t h i r d judge, 
McTiernan J., did not consider the po i n t . The basis of the decision i s 
not c l e a r . Did the Court decide that section I I (section 6) has no 
appl i c a t i o n where the goods have never existed or did they decide that 
the section could not apply where the goods have never existed and the 
s e l l e r should have been aware of th i s ? The determining factor may have 
been the fa c t that the goods had never existed but, equally, i t may have 
4 8"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943", page 89. 
5 1(1951) 84 C.L.R. 377. 
52 at 410. 
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been the f a c t t h a t the vendor should have been aware of the non-
existence. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine whether the Court denied the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a constructive perishing or admitted the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
constructive notice. 
In re W a i t e ^ Atkin L.J., r e f e r r i n g to the decision i n Howell v. 
Coupland, suggested th a t " i n as much as we are now bound by the p l a i n 
language of the code I do not th i n k that decisions i n cases before 1893 
54 
are of much value". Lord Atkin suggested th a t Howell v. Coupland was 
covered, not by section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1893, but by section 5(2) of 
the Act or, perhaps, by common law p r i n c i p l e s retained by section 61(2) 
of the A c t . ^ I n Sainsbury v. S t r e e t ^ MacKenna J. adopted t h i s view and 
asserted that sections 6 and 7 of the Act "are, i n my opinion, dealing 
with goods e x i s t i p g " . ^ 
Lord Atkin's r e j e c t i o n of pre-Sale of Goods Act au t h o r i t y i s i n 
l i n e w i t h the approach t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of co d i f y i n g statutes 
58 
suggested by Lord Herscheil i n Bank of England v. vaqliano Bros.: 
" I t h i n k the proper course i s i n the f i r s t instance t o examine the language 
of the st a t u t e and to ask what i s i t s natural meaning, uninfluenced by 
any considerations derived from the previous state of the law, and not t o 
s t a r t with i n q u i r i n g how the law previously stood, and. then, assuming 
t h a t i t was probably intended t o leave i t unaltered, t o see i f the words 
of the enactment w i l l bear an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n conformity with t h i s view". 
5 3 /"1927_7 1 Ch. 606. 
54 
^ a t 631. 
5 5 a t 631; see now sections 5(2) and 62(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
5 6 /"1972 7 3 A l l E.R. 1127. 
5 7 a t 1133. 
5 8 /"1891 7 A.C. 107, 144 and 145. 
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I t may, however, be u n r e a l i s t i c to expect that a Court w i l l not be pre-
pared t o seek guidance from pre-1893 case-law when i n t e r p r e t i n g the pro-
visions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Academic w r i t e r s , c e r t a i n l y , have 
59 been reluctant to ignore the 'old' law. Professor A.L. Diamond points out 
that the 15th e d i t i o n of Chalmers "Sale of Goods Act" refers t o 863 
cases decided be Fore the 1B93 Act was passed. Ihe figures for Atiyah's 
"The Sale of Goods" (3rd ed) and Fridman's "Sale of Goods" are 438 and 
490, respectively. 
Perhaps the best argument i n support of a r e j e c t i o n of the approach 
favoured i n Howell v. Coupland i s the fact that the case pre-dates not only 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893 but also the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act 1943. • The provisions of the 1943 Act have so i n t e n s i f i e d the importance 
of determining whether spe c i f i c goods have perished as to surely discourage 
any modern court from seeking guidance from judges who expressed t h e i r 
views i n a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l context and could not have appreciated the 
ramifications of those views being interpreted i n a d i f f e r e n t context. 
31 M.L.R. 384. 
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SECTION C: 
CAN GOODS BE TAKEN TO HAVE PERISHED EVEN THOUGH THEY CONTINUE TO EXIST 
AND HAVE NOT BEEN SUBJECT TO PHYSICAL DETERIORATION/DESTRUCTION? 
Stolen Goods/Goods Taken by Mistake 
In Barrow Lane and Ballard Ltd. v. P h i l l i p P h i l l i p s and Company Ltd.^ 
a contract was made for the sale of a s p e c i f i c parcel of goods l y i n g at 
a wharf. Unknown to the s e l l e r 109 bags out of a t o t a l consignment of 
700 had been stolen at the time of the contract, other bags were stolen 
a f t e r the making of the contract and, u l t i m a t e l y , only 150 were delivered. 
The Court considered the application of section 6 Sale of Goods Act 1893 
and, i n so doing, faced two problems. One problem resulted from the fact 
that the goods had not ceased to e x i s t , they had been misappropriated 
but, no doubt, continued t o ex i s t at the time of the contract and, indeed, 
were p o t e n t i a l l y recoverable at tha t time. The other problem arose from 
the f a c t that only some of the goods contracted for had been stolen at the 
time of the making of the contract. The f i r s t problem was disposed of 
very easily by Wright J. who asserted t h a t "the goods have ceased to 
exi s t for a l l purposes relevant t o the contract".^ The second problem 
caused more heartsearching but Wright J., concluding that a l l the goods 
had perished as a r e s u l t of the disappearance of some, ultimately 
determined that the contract was void as a r e s u l t of section 6 Sale of 
Goods Act 1893. The disposal of the f i r s t of the two problems faced by 
the Court raises i n t e r e s t i n g questions. What, for example, would be the 
e f f e c t of a recovery of stolen goods i n such a situation? 
6 0 /"1929_7 1 K.B. 574. 
6 1 a t 583. 
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I f goods have perished at the time of making the contract section 6 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 w i l l render the contract void, i n which case a 
subsequent recovery of the goods would be of no account f o r , the contract 
being a n u l l i t y , i t cannot revive. The problem i s to be found, however, 
i n determining the time at which the goods perish. Wright J. was uncertain 
i n h i s treatment of the problem, asserting t h a t the goods had perished 
because "they had been stolen and taken away and cannot be followed or 
discovered anywhere".^ Section 6 Sale of Goods Act 1979 imposes a t e s t 
which i s "frozen" i n time; the question to be determined i s whether the 
goods had perished at the time of the making of the contract. Can i t be 
that the t e s t i s frozen i n time but the p r i n c i p a l component of the question, 
the requirement t h a t the goods have perished, can only be determined with 
hindsight? Such a s i t u a t i o n i s not unknown to the law. The common law 
actus reus of murder, f o r example, requires death w i t h i n a year and a day 
of the i n j u r y being i n f l i c t e d . The other requirements of the actus reus 
may be immediately determined but the requirement of death may only be 
determined a f t e r the passage of time. A death w i t h i n a year and a day 
w i l l r e s u l t i n a murder having been committed, a death a f t e r t h a t time w i l l 
not. S i m i l a r l y , i t may be t h a t the question of perishing of goods can 
only be determined a f t e r the passage of time. I f the goods are not recovered 
they have perished and had perished when sto l e n . Conversely, goods which 
are recovered have not perished and had not perished when sto l e n . I f 
t h i s approach i s to be adopted the obvious problem arises of determining 
the point of time at which i t can be accepted t h a t the goods cannot be 
"followed or discovered". 
I t may be t h a t , on grounds of c e r t a i n t y , a c o u r t 
would conclude that stolen goods "perish" as soon as they are sto l e n . 
at 583. 
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I f so,.further problems a r i s e . Consider the fol l o w i n g s i t u a t i o n : 
X, a r e t a i l e r , has two antique vases i n his shop. Y buys one but, 
by mistake, takes delivery of the other. Q then telephones X and agrees 
to buy the vase mistakenly taken by Y. I s there a contract between X 
and Q? The vase has not been stolen but i t has, nevertheless, ceased to 
e x i s t f o r the purposes of the contract u n t i l returned. Y has no c r i m i n a l 
i n t e n t and w i l l probably r e t u r n the vase to X, but he may not. I f Y does 
r e t u r n the vase to X, perhaps a matter of minutes a f t e r the 'sale' to Q, 
would Q be able to avoid l i a b i l i t y on the contract on the basis t h a t the 
agreement i s subject t o section 6 Sale of Goods Act 1979? Common sense 
indicates that such a proposition cannot be supported. What, however, i f 
the contract i s not set aside and Y does not r e t u r n the vase? 
I f , faced by problems such as t h i s , courts were prepared to accept t h a t 
goods perish only when i t has been determined that they cannot be recovered 
r i s k may, i n the case of a post-contract t h e f t , pass to the buyer, under 
the terms of the contract, between t h e f t and determination of non-
r e c o v e r a b i l i t y . The contract would not then be f r u s t r a t e d by section 7. 
Would a court be prepared to impose such a burden upon the purchaser? 
Requisitioned Goods 
The statement made by Wright J. i n Barrow Lane and Ballard Ltd. v. 
P h i l l i p P h i l l i p s and Company Ltd. th a t goods have perished i f they "have 
ceased to e x i s t for a l l purposes relevant t o the contract" i s very wide. 
Such an approach would suggest that goods have perished where, f o r example, 
they have been r e q u i s i t i o n e d . Most academic w r i t e r s would, however, 
disagree. Cheshire and F i f o o t assert, i n r e l a t i o n t o section 7 Sale of 
Goods Act, that "unless the goods have perished section 7 does not 
apply. I f the contract i s f r u s t r a t e d by some other event, as where the 
goods are requisitioned by the Government a f t e r the agreement has been made 
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the section i s excluded". Re Shipton Anderson and Co. and Harrison 
Bros, and Co.^ i s c i t e d as a u t h o r i t y . T r e i t e l asserts that "The Act 
of 1943 i s only excluded where the cause of f r u s t r a t i o n i s the 
perishing of the goods. Thus the Act applies where the contract i s 
64 
fru s t r a t e d by i l l e g a l i t y or r e q u i s i t i o n " . Sutton and Shannon, 
r e f e r r i n g to the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act 1943, claim that " i t i s only cases where the contract i s f r u s t r a t e d 
by reason of the fa c t that the goods have perished that are excluded from 
the operation of the Act. A contract for the sale even of spec i f i c goods 
may be frus t r a t e d by other events, such as ... the goods being 
requisitioned by the Government. To a l l such cases the Act w i l l 
presumably a p p l y " . ^ Atiyah states that "Perishing of spec i f i c goods 
i s the only instance of f r u s t r a t i o n provided for by the Act / " i . e . the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 7 but there i s no doubt that at Common Law a 
contract for the sale of sp e c i f i c goods may be f r u s t r a t e d by any event 
which destroys the whole basis of the c o n t r a c t " . ^ Again, Atiyah c i t e s 
as authority re Shipton Anderson and Co. and Harrison Bros, and Co. 
What was decided i n re Shipton Anderson and Co. and Harrison Bros, 
and Co.? The Court, called upon to consider a sale of sp e c i f i c goods 
which had been subsequently requisitioned by H.M. Government, held that 
the s e l l e r was excused from performance. Lord Reading C.J., delivering 
the leading judgement, reviewed the rule i n Taylor v. Caldwell and went on 
to say: " I t i s to be observed that i n that r u l e stress i s l a i d upon the 
Cheshire and Fifoot's "Law of Contract" (8th ed) 562. 
/"1915 7 3 K.B. 676. 
T r e i t a l "Law of Contract" (3rd ed) 778. 
"Sutton and Shannon on Contracts" (7th ed) 385. 
'"TheSale of Goods" (4th ed) 167. 
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perishing before breach of the thin g which was the foundation of the 
contract. The p r i n c i p l e of the case seems to me equally applicable to 
th a t now under consideration, where by reason of the l a w f u l act of the 
Executive, the t h i n g , i n a sense, has perished. Certainly i t i s no 
longer i n the power of the s e l l e r s to perform t h e i r c o n t r a c t " . ^ Darling 
J. and Lush J. agreed with the judgment of Lord Reading C.J., but made 
no express reference to the goods having perished. I t i s clear that 
Lord Reading C.J. was aware of a d i s t i n c t i o n between a physical perishing 
and a r e q u i s i t i o n which no longer permits a delivery of the goods to the 
buyer. His handling of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s , however, uncertain. He 
speaks of perishing " i n a sense" and would appear t o "hedge" with his 
f i n a l sentence: "Certainly i t i s no longer i n the power of the s e l l e r s 
t o perform t h e i r contract". 
The majority of academic w r i t e r s c l e a r l y adopt the view t h a t there 
has, i n t h i s case, been no perishing of goods, but there are some who 
would disagree. G l a n v i l l e Williams asserts when r e f e r r i n g t o re Shipton 
Anderson, that "a s p e c i f i c parcel of wheat which had been sold f o r 
de l i v e r y was held t o 'perish' when i t was req u i s i t i o n e d by the Government 
68 — before delivery".- Macleod suggests th a t "the term /'perished 7 . . . . 
would ... seem to include those s i t u a t i o n s where the goods are unavailable 
to the parties for the completion of the contract for some reason which i s 
69 
beyond the c o n t r o l of the p a r t i e s " . Indeed, Macleod goes fu r t h e r than 
t h i s and maintains that i t may not be going too far "to suggest t h a t the 
goods have perished where, subject t o the de minimus r u l e , any part of 
6 7 /"1915_7 3 K.B. 676, 682. 
6 8"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" 89. 
69„ Sale and Hire Purchase" 253. 
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them are continually unavailable to the parties for the performance of 
the c o n t r a c t " . ^ 
I t must be noted that i n re Shipton Anderson the Court was not faced 
with the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 
and the question of the sp e c i f i c goods having perished would not have 
appeared s i g n i f i c a n t . Nevertheless i t i s clear that the requisitioned 
goods had, i n the words of Wright J. i n Barrow Lane and Ballard v. P h i l l i p 
P h i l l i p s and Company Ltd., 'beased to e x i s t for a l l purposes relevant to the 
contract" and i t would seem u n r e a l i s t i c t o impose upon contracting parties 
rules which d i f f e r according to whether the goods which form the subject 
matter of the contract have been stolen or requisitioned. I t i s submitted 
that re Shipton Anderson i s not authority for the proposition that 
requisitioned goods have perished, the equivocal judgement of Lord Reading 
C.J. i s too weak a base for such a conclusion. I t i s also submitted, 
however, that the case i s not clear authority for the proposition that 
requisitioned goods have not perished. 
By analogy with Barrow Lane and Ballard v. P h i l l i p P h i l l i p s and Co. 
Ltd. i t would seem possible to suggest that goods perish whenever they 
have "ceased to e x i s t " for a l l purposes relevant t o the contract". I f 
t h i s proposition can be accepted i t would seem that there i s a perishing 
of goods whenever they have been rendered unavailable to the s e l l e r . 
There would, of course, remain sit u a t i o n s i n which the contract could be 
frustr a t e d by reason other than that of the goods having perished. I f , 
for example, the contract were to be rendered i l l e g a l , the goods could 
not be taken to have ceased to ex i s t for the purposes of the contract, 
even though the contract would be f r u s t r a t e d . The f r u s t r a t i n g event 
would relate to the contract i t s e l f rather than to the subject matter of 
7 0 a t 254. 
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the contract and would be, so as to apeak, a f r u s t r a t i n g event which 
operated i n personam rather than i n rem. 
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PART TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF RISK 
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SECTION A: 
WHERE RISK PASSES PRIOR TO PROPERTY AND POSSESSION 
Given that the goods, which form the subject matter of the contract 
of sale, have perished, the question of who bears the loss i s one which 
needs t c be determined. Central t o that question are the associated 
problems of establishing what i s meant by loss and of determining whether 
that term has a constant meaning i n a l l circumstances. The key to these 
issues i s the concept of r i s k , a concept which, together with those of 
ownership and possession, forms the t r i l o g y of concepts attaching to a 
contract of sale. Sometimes one party, either s e l l e r or buyer, w i l l own 
the goods, possess them and have the r i s k of t h e i r destruction or 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n , the contract being either completely executory or com-
ple t e l y executed. Often one party, the buyer, w i l l own the goods and 
have the r i s k of destruction w h i l s t the other has possession of the goods. 
I t can happen that the buyer can own the goods wh i l s t the s e l l e r possesses 
them and has r i s k . I n each of these sit u a t i o n s one thing i s constant, he 
who has r i s k has either ownership or possession. In one s i t u a t i o n , 
however, the concept of r i s k can be isolated from i t s companions and 
subjected to scrutiny, the s i t u a t i o n being that i n which the s e l l e r has 
ownership and possession w h i l s t the buyer has r i s k . I t i s i n t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n , where r i s k i s a l l that the buyer has "acquired" under the con-
t r a c t , that the concept of r i s k and the attendant notion of loss should 
reveal t h e i r true nature. 
I t i s not usual for r i s k to pass p r i o r to ownership and. possession 
but the s i t u a t i o n i s not uncommon. In c . i . f . contracts, for example, 
"the property may pass either on shipment or on tender / of documents 7, 
the r i s k generally passes on shipment" 1 and, apparently, "the present 
"*"per Lord Porter, Comptoir D'Achat et De Vente du Boeren Bond Beige 
S/A v. Luis de Ridder Limitada (The Juliana) /~1949 /A.C. 293, 309. 
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s i t u a t i o n under a c . i . f . contract i s that r i s k very commonly passes 
2 
before property" . Section 20(1) Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that 
the goods remain at the s e l l e r ' s r i s k u n t i l property i s transferred, 
whereupon they are at the buyer's r i s k , "unless otherwise agreed". Quite 
c l e a r l y , therefore, r i s k can pass to the buyer, i n advance of property, 
as a r e s u l t of agreement between the p a r t i e s , which agreement may be 
implied by the Court? The second sub-section of section 20 incorporates 
another s i t u a t i o n i n which the draftsman envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r i s k passing ahead of ownership and possession. I t provides t h a t : 
" where delivery has been delayed through the f a u l t of either buyer 
or s e l l e r the goods are at the r i s k of the party i n f a u l t as regards any 
loss which might not have occurred but for such f a u l t " . I t w i l l be noted 
that t h i s sub-section results i n only one aspect of r i s k passing, r i s k of 
loss which would not otherwise have occurred. The r i s k of other loss would 
be determined, subject t o contrary agreement, by the normal r u l e , res 
p e r i t domino. In a l l of these s i t u a t i o n s , as a r e s u l t of agreement, com-
mercial practice or f a u l t , r i s k may pass to the buyer ahead of property 
and possession. What follows from the fact that the buyer has acquired 
r i s k i n goods which he neither possesses nor owns? 
Is the Buyer with Risk under an Obligation to pay the Contract Price i f 
the Goods Perish? 
Is the buyer, where r i s k has passed prior to property and possession, 
l i a b l e to the s e l l e r for the price of the goods i f the goods perish? 
Academic opinion i s d i f f i c u l t to gauge f o r , often, w r i t e r s tend to assert 
Benjamin, "Sale of Goods" 1557. 
3E.g. Sterns v. Wickers Ltd. /"1923 7 1 K.B. 78. 
The question of the d i v i s i b i l i t y of r i s k i s one which w i l l be. discussed 
l a t e r i n t h i s Part, see Section C. 
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merely that the buyer must bear "the loss". Those who consider the nature 
of t h i s l i a b i l i t y universally accept or, perhaps, assume that i f the r i s k 
has passed to the buyer he must, i f the goods perish, pay to the s e l l e r the 
agreed contract price'' and that that sum constitutes the s e l l e r ' s loss. 
No attempt i s made to distinguish between those sit u a t i o n s i n which 
property has passed to the buyer and those i n which i t has not and the 
clear inference i s that the buyer must pay the contract price, because he 
has r i s k , whether or not he has property i n the goods. 
There i s some, l i m i t e d , j u d i c i a l support for t h i s assumption. In 
Martineau v. Kitchinq^ Blackburn J. considered the s i t u a t i o n i n which 
property and possession remains with the s e l l e r w h i l s t r i s k i s with the 
buyer. assume that i t /"property 7 had not passed. I f the 
agreement between the parties was 'though they /"the goods 7 s h a l l 
not be yours, I s t i p u l a t e and agree that i f I keep them beyond, the month 
the r i s k s h a l l be upon you 1; and then the goods perish; to say that the 
buyer could set up t h i s defence and say, 'Although I s t i p u l a t e d that the 
r i s k should be mine, yet inasmuch as an accident has happened which 
destroyed them, I w i l l have no part of t h i s r i s k , but w i l l throw i t 
e n t i r e l y upon you because the property d i d not pass to me' i s a proposition 
which, stated i n t h i s way, appears to be absolutely a reductio ad absurdum; 
and that i s r e a l l y what the argument amounts t o . I f the parties have 
stipulated t h a t , i f af t e r the two months the goods remain i n the s e l l e r ' s 
warehouse, they s h a l l , nevertheless, remain there at the buyer's r i s k , i t 
would be a manifest absurdity to say that he i s not to pay for them." I t 
i s submitted that i t may we l l be absurd to deny, i n such circumstances, 
that the buyer, bearing the r i s k , must suffer the loss. I t may, however, 
E.g. Atiyah "The Sale of Goods" 4th ed. page 161; Anson "Law of Contract" 
23rd ed. page 480; Sealey "Risk i n the Law of Sale" 1972 31 C.L.J. 225. 
6(1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 436. 
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not follow t h a t because he has the r i s k , and must suf f e r the loss, the 
buyer must pay the contract p r i c e . 
In Castle v. P l a y f o r d 7 the Court of Exchequer Chamber appeared to 
determine that the o b l i g a t i o n to pay the price does arise when the 
s e l l e r ' s goods perish w h i l s t at the buyer's r i s k . The case involved the 
loss of a consignment of i c e , the price of which was to be determined, by 
weighing, upon a r r i v a l at i t s d e s t i n a t i o n . The pleadings requested the 
• 
Court t o award the s e l l e r the "value" of the cargo, which may be a 
request that the Court should award the contract p r i c e . Certainly 
Martin B., at f i r s t instance, would appear to equate "value" with price 
when r e f e r r i n g t o the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the terms of the contract 
"accelerate the defendants' l i a b i l i t y t o pay the value of the goods" i n 
9 
the event of a perishing of the subject matter. I n the Court of 
Exchequer Chamber, however, the Court was less c e r t a i n i n i t s use of the 
term "value". Cockburn C.J. construed the contract as meaning th a t "the 
defendant undertook that i f the cargo should be shippe-d and the b i l l s of 
lading transferred to him, he would pay f o r i t according to a c e r t a i n 
r a t e ; and i f i t perished he would pay for i t according to what might be a 
f a i r estimation of i t s value at the time i t went down"."^ Blackburn J. 
asserted that "when the ship went down there would be so much ice on board, 
and, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , upon an ordinary voyage so much would have melted; 
and what the defendant has taken upon himself to pay i s the amount which, 
i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , would have been payable for the i c e " . The two seem t o 
7(1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 98. 
8See L.R. 5 Ex. 165. 
9L.R. 5 Ex. 165, 168. 
1 0(1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 98, 99. 
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be t a l k i n g of d i f f e r e n t r e l i e f f o r the p l a i n t i f f . Blackburn J. i s 
c l e a r l y asserting that the defendant was l i a b l e t o pay a sum equal to an 
estimation of the contract p r i c e . Cockburn C.J., on the other hand, refers 
t o the buyer's o b l i g a t i o n t o pay, to the s e l l e r , a sum equal to the value 
of the ice "when the ship went down", not, i t w i l l be noted, a sum equal to 
the estimated p r i c e , which price was to have been determined only upon 
a r r i v a l . I t would appear that w h i l s t Blackburn J. was of the opinion t h a t 
the buyer should pay the p r i c e , Cockburn C.J. concluded t h a t the buyer 
should compensate the s e l l e r for his actual loss, the loss to be assessed 
on the basis of, say, the replacement value of the consignment. As, 
however, both Cockburn C.J. and Blackburn J. gave judgement f o r the 
p l a i n t i f f and as the r e l i e f requested was ambiguous, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
determine the actual nature of the award. 
Another case i n which i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o ascertain the nature of the 
sum awarded i s Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden.^ As a r e s u l t of the 
proviso t o section 20 Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now section 20(2)) the 
purchaser had acquired r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o goods of the s e l l e r which had 
perished. The s e l l e r claimed the contract price or, as an a l t e r n a t i v e , 
damages for f a i l u r e to take d e l i v e r y and i t i s not clear from the judg-
12 
ment whether the sum awarded represented the price or damages for breach. 
Even i f the sum awarded by Sellers J., i n Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden, 
was the contract price the case would s t i l l be dubious au t h o r i t y f o r a 
x ± /~1949_7 1 A l l E.R. 435. 
12 
The f a c t that Sellers J. considered the s e l l e r s duty t o mitigate ( a t 
page 438) i s of no assistance f o r , w h i l s t there i s normally no 
ob l i g a t i o n to mitigate when suing for the p r i c e , the proviso to section 20, 
imposing l i a b i l i t y on the party at f a u l t for "any loss which might not 
have occurred but for such f a u l t " , c l e a r l y incorporates a s i m i l a r notion 
i n t o any claim brought i n reliance upon the proviso, whether the claim 
be for the price or for some other sum. 
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general proposition that the price can be recovered where the buyer has 
r i s k , but not property, i n goods which have perished. The award of the 
price might merely r e f l e c t the unwillingness of a court t o permit a buyer, 
who has, i n breach of contract, defaulted i n taking delivery of the goods, 
to r e s i s t a claim for the price by r e l y i n g upon the fact that property 
has not, as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of his own defa u l t , passed to him. Such s 
notion was introduced by Blackburn J. i n Martineau v. Kitchinq:^ 
"As a general rule res p e r i t domino, the old C i v i l law 
maximj i s a maxim of our law, and when you can show that the 
property passed, the r i s k of the loss prima facie i s on the 
person i n whom the property i s But the two are not 
inseparable By the C i v i l law i t always was considered 
that i f there was any weighing, or anything of the sort which 
prevented the contract from being perfecta emptio, whenever 
that was occasioned by one of the parties i n mora, and i t 
was his default he s h a l l have the r i s k j u s t as i f 
there was emptio perfecta when the weighing i s delayed i n 
consequence of the interference of the buyer so that property 
did not pass because the non-completion of the bargain 
and sale, which would absolutely transfer the property, was 
owing to the delay of the purchaser, the purchaser should bear 
the r i s k j u s t as i f property had passed."13 
In Martineau v. Kitchinq the p l a i n t i f f s e l l e r had, on 21st March 1870, 
delivered t o the buyer a notice s t a t i n g "please remove the following 
sugars now l y i n g here at your r i s k ". The f i r e , which destroyed 
the sugar, did not break out u n t i l 24th A p r i l 1870 and Blackburn J. drew 
att e n t i o n t o "another reason which i n t h i s case would c l e a r l y apply -
the delay i n weighing i s quite as much the f a u l t of the purchaser as of 
the s e l l e r s .... i t i s the buyer, i n e f f e c t who requests that .... the 
weighing should be postponed for a time. Therefore i t i s i n consequence 
14 
of his delay that the weighing does not take place". Perhaps both 
6(1872) L.R. 7Q.B. 436. 
1 3 A t pages 454, 456. 
1 4Page 456. 
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Martineau v. Kitchinq and Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden should be 
regarded as cases i n which, w h i l s t property had not passed to the buyer, 
the courts were prepared to apply something analogous t o an estoppel to 
prevent the buyer r e l y i n g upon t h i s . Such an "estoppel" would, presumably, 
apply only where, as i n these cases, the delay i n t r a n s f e r r i n g property 
was d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the f a u l t of the buyer, whether such f a u l t 
amounted to a breach of c o n t r a c t ^ or not."^ The e f f e c t of the "estoppel" 
would be that the s e l l e r could, i n such circumstances, recover the price 
even though property had not passed. 
The nature of the award made i n both Castle v. Playford and 
Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden may be d i f f i c u l t t o determine, i n 
Bevinqton and Morris v. Dale and Co. Ltd.,"*"7 another p o t e n t i a l authority 
i n t h i s area, circumstances conspired so as to render the nature of the sum 
awarded by the Court not so much d i f f i c u l t t o determine as a matter of no 
account. The purchaser had received, on sale or return terms, goods 
which were stolen from him pr i o r t o the passing of property. Accepting 
the existence of a trade custom that r i s k passed to the buyer as soon as he 
received the goods, the Court found for the p l a i n t i f f s e l l e r and determined 
that the purchaser must bear the loss. When considering the nature of 
that loss, however, the Court found, unfortunately, that the cost of 
replacement was i d e n t i c a l t o the invoiced price and, as a r e s u l t , gave no 
consideration to the basis for determining the amount of the award. 
There are few other cases d i r e c t l y on the point. In Sterns v. Wickers 3 
the Court of Appeal was faced with a s i t u a t i o n i n which goods had 
deteriorated prior to property passing but subsequent to the buyer's 
^As i n Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden. 
^As i n Martineau v. Kitchinq. 
1 7(1902) 7 Com. Cas. 112. 
3/~1923 7 1 K.B. 78. 
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acq u i s i t i o n of r i s k . The Court was, however, only called upon to determine 
whether or not the buyer could sue for the de t e r i o r a t i o n i n q u a l i t y i n the 
goods which were delivered to him. The fact that the r i s k had passed 
simply resulted i n the buyer losing his r i g h t t o sue and, the goods not havi 
perished, the s e l l e r ' s remedy i n such a s i t u a t i o n was not considered. 
18 
Simil a r l y i n I n g l i s v. Stock, where there was a loss of goods forming an 
undivided portion of a larger consignment, the nature of the s e l l e r ' s 
remedy was not at issue. The Court, which accepted that r i s k had passed 
to the buyer pr i o r to property, was p r i m a r i l y concerned to establish 
whether or not the buyer had an insurable i n t e r e s t i n the goods which had 
perished. The defendant insurance company, which contended that neither 
property nor r i s k had passed to the buyer, argued th a t the buyer could not 
have an insurable i n t e r e s t at the time of the loss. This was the only 
defence r e l i e d upon and the extent of the buyer's i n t e r e s t , i f an insurable 
i n t e r e s t was found t o e x i s t , was not raised. 
The cases i n which the courts have actually considered the con-
sequences of the s e l l e r ' s goods perishing whilst i n his possession, at the 
r i s k of the buyer, thus provide meagre authority for the proposition that 
the buyer i s l i a b l e to pay the pric e . The true nature of the sums awarded 
i n both Castle v. Playford and Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden i s a matter 
for conjecture and the problem of determining the sum t o be awarded i n 
Bevington and Morris v. Dale and Co. Ltd. was s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d by a con-
venient finding of f a c t . Martineau v. Kitchinq, together, possibly, with 
Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden, may be authority for the proposition 
that the price can be recovered, where the s e l l e r has retained property i n , 
and possession of, the goods, only i f the retention of property was 
inadvertent and due to the default of the buyer. Short of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y 
(1885) 10 App. Cas. 263. 
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there i s l i t t l e support for the notion that the s e l l e r may recover the 
contract price from a buyer who has acquired nothing under the contract 
other than the r i s k of destruction. 
L i a b i l i t y t o pay the Contract Price: An H i s t o r i c a l Perspective 
I t may, perhaps, be i n s t r u c t i v e , at t h i s stage } to determine the 
origins and trace the development of the action available to a s e l l e r 
of goods for recovery of the p r i c e . I n i t i a l l y the action lay i n Debt 
which, at f i r s t , lay only when the goods had been delivered to the buyer. 
"In the action of debt 'the defendant was conceived of as having i n his 
possession something belonging to the p l a i n t i f f which he might not 
19 
reasonably keep but ought to surrender'. Now i t i s clear that i f A 
had sold, or l e n t , or deposited goods to or with B for a fixe d sum, and A 
wished to be paid that sum, the action of debt would l i e . I t i s equally 
clear that t i l l the possession of the goods had been handed over no such 
20 
action could be brought". By Henry VI's reign, however, i t had 
become possible for the s e l l e r to sue i n debt upon an agreement to s e l l a 
21 
s p e c i f i c c h a t t e l . Holdsworth sees i n t h i s the o r i g i n of the notion that 
i n a contract of sale of s p e c i f i c goods property passes at the time of 
22 23 making the contract. As a r e s u l t of Slade's case the action of Debt 
24 
was v i r t u a l l y superceded by Indebitatus Assumpsit. In 1696 i t was held 
that t h i s action would only l i e where Debt would l i e , being available, 
19H.L.R. v i 260. 
?n 
Sir William Holdsworth: "A History of English Law" v o l . I l l page 420. 
2 1See Y.B. 20 Hy v . i . T r i n . p i . 4. 
2 2"A History of English Law" Vol. I l l page 355. 
2 3(1602) 4 Co. Rep. 
24 
Bovey v. Castleman 1 Ltd. Rayen 67. 
- 44 -
therefore, only where the goods had been delivered or, i f they had not, 
where property i n them had passed. 
The p o s i t i o n was s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same at the time of the passing 
2S 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1893. In Colley v. Overseas Exporters 
McCardie J., reviewing the pre-1893 law, i d e n t i f i e d only two s i t u a t i o n s 
i n which the s e l l e r could recover the p r i c e . The f i r s t was provided f o r 
by the indebitatus count f o r goods sold and delivered which, according 
26 
to Bullen and Leake: "Precedents of Pleading" was pleaded thus: 
"Money payable by the defendant to the p l a i n t i f f f o r goods sold and 
delivered by the p l a i n t i f f t o the defendant". I t had been established, 
27 
I n Boulter v. Arnott , t h a t t h i s count would not l i e before delivery of 
the goods t o the buyer. Quite c l e a r l y a s e l l e r could not have brought 
such an action where the goods t o be transferred had perished p r i o r to 
d e l i v e r y . The only other s i t u a t i o n i n which the pri c e could be recovered 
was provided for by the indebitatus count f o r goods bargained and sold, 
pleaded as fol l o w s : "Money payable by the defendant to the p l a i n t i f f 
28 
fo r goods bargained and sold by the p l a i n t i f f t o the defendant." "This 
count was applicable where upon a sale of goods the property had passed 
to the purchaser and the contract had been completed i n a l l respects except 
d e l i v e r y , and the delivery was not a part of the consideration f o r the 
price or a condition precedent to i t s payment. I f the property had not 
29 
passed the count would not l i e . " Having reviewed the pre-1893 s i t u a t i o n 
McCardie J. concluded that " I n my view the law as to the circumstances 
under which an action w i l l l i e f o r the price of goods has not been 
2 5 /"1921_7 3 K.B. 302. 
2 6 ( 3 r d ed) page 380. 
2 7(1833) 1 Cr. and M. 333. 
28 
"Precedents of Pleading" page 39. 
2 9 p e r McCardie J., at page 310, c i t i n g Atkinson v. B e l l (1828) 8 B and C 
277. 
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changed by the Sale of Goods Act 1893". In a r r i v i n g at t h i s conclusion 
McCardie J. did not overlook section 49 (2) Sale of Goods Act 1893, which 
provided for one s i t u a t i o n i n which the s e l l e r could bring an action for 
the price where no property had passed,3"*" for he l a t e r incorporated the 
provisions of that sub-section i n t o his conclusion: 
"In my opinion no action w i l l l i e fnr the price of the 
goods u n t i l the property has passed, save only i n the special 
cases provided for by section 49 ss 2. This seems pla i n on 
both the code and on common law p r i n c i p l e . I have searched i n 
vain for authority to the contrary."^^ 
I t seems quite clear t h a t , at common law, the passing of property 
was the determining factor i n r e l a t i o n t o the a v a i l a b i l i t y of an 
action for the price . Apart from the provisions of section 49(2) Sale 
of Goods Act 1979, the importance of property having passed has not been 
diminished, by the passing of the 1893 Act nor by i t s re-enactment i n 1979. 
I t would appear, as a r e s u l t , that i t should not be possible to sue a buye 
for the pr i c e , where r i s k has passed but property has not. 
The Significance of the Passing of Property 
What, however, i s the "mischief" behind these rules? Why can the 
s e l l e r only sue where he has parted with property? The answer may, perhap 
be that suggested by Parke B. i n Laird v. Pirn?3 a case involving an action 
for breach of a contract t o s e l l land. Where there i s such a breach, 
Baron Parke asserted, the s e l l e r can only sue the buyer for the contract 
price i f the conveyance has been executed and the legal estate transferred 
per McCardie J., at page 310. 
3"^"Where, under a contract of sale, the price i s payable on a day cer t a i n 
irrespective of delivery, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses 
to pay such price, the s e l l e r may maintain an action for the price, a l -
though the property i n the goods has not passed, and the goods have not 
been appropriated to the contract." 
3 2 A t page 310. 
(1841) 151 E.R. 857. 
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34 short of that the s e l l e r can only sue f o r damages. The reason for 
t h i s was, he claimed, that " i t i s clear t h a t he /~the s e l l e r 7 cannot 
have the land and i t s value too".''"' Baron Parke went on to claim t h a t 
"A party cannot recover the f u l l value of a c h a t t e l , unless under circum-
stances which import t h a t the property has passed to the defendant, as i n 
the case of goods sold and delivered, where they have been absolutely 
parted with and cannot be sold again". I f the i n a b i l i t y to r e - s e l l i s 
the underlying requirement of the r u l e t h a t property must have passed 
before the s e l l e r can maintain an action f o r the p r i c e , i s i t possible 
that the s e l l e r can sue for the price where property has not passed but, 
the goods having perished, i t i s clear t h a t a re-sale i s not possible? 
A persuasive voice i s t h a t of Sealey"^ who, pointing out t h a t r i s k i s 
nowhere defined i n the Sale of Goods Act, a t t r i b u t e s many of the doubts 
which e x i s t i n t h i s area t o t h a t lack of d e f i n i t i o n and to the lack of 
rules r e l a t i n g to r i s k as an o b l i g a t i o n / r i g h t . Sealey concludes th a t 
r i s k i s not defined or delineated by the Sale of Goods Act because i t i s 
a negative concept which replaces, or negatives, i n c e r t a i n circumstances, 
conditions which, normally, are p r e - r e q u i s i t e to the enforcement of other 
"primary" o b l i g a t i o n s . Normally, f o r example, the s e l l e r must e s t a b l i s h . 
t h a t he has passed property t o the buyer i f he i s t o be able to sue f o r 
the p r i c e . Where, however, the buyer has the r i s k , Sealey asserts t h a t 
the incidence of r i s k negatives the requirement that property must pass 
and allows the s e l l e r to sue for the p r i c e . The argument i s a t t r a c t i v e 
and may w e l l r e f l e c t a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the apparently i n t u i t i v e f e e l i n g 
34 
Though the equitable order of s p e c i f i c performance would now be a v a i l -
able to compel performance and render the purchaser l i a b l e to pay the price 
3 5 A t page 854 
36 At page 854. 
3 7 " R i s k i n the Law of Sale" 31 C.L.J. 225. 
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which has led academic opinion to the b e l i e f that an action f o r the 
price can l i e , even where property has not passed, i f the goods have 
perished when at the buyer's r i s k . Further support fo r t h i s view may be 
developed by analogy with the provisions of section 49(2) Sale of Goods 
Act.3"'" The Legislature presumably enacted s. 49(2) on the basis that the 
buyer, having agreed to pay the contract p r i c e , even though the goods have 
not been delivered to him and property has not vested i n him, must be 
taken t o have waived his r i g h t t o require these pre-requisites before 
tendering the p r i c e . I f so, i t would seem to follow that i n those 
circumstances i n which r i s k has passed ahead of property as a r e s u l t of 
express agreement between the p a r t i e s , the buyer would be s i m i l a r l y 
taken to have waived performance of these obligations of the s e l l e r 
which, normally, are pre-requisites t o an action f o r the p r i c e . I t i s , 
from'this p o i n t , a short step t o take to the f u r t h e r conclusion t h a t where 
r i s k passes as a matter of law, rather than agreement, the buyer w i l l , 
again, be taken to have l o s t his r i g h t t o i n s i s t upon performance of 
these pre-requisite o b l i g a t i o n s . 
Recovery of "loss" rather than Recovery of " p r i c e " 
Another approach to the problem of determining the s e l l e r ' s remedy 
where his goods have perished w h i l s t at the buyer's r i s k emphasises the 
re l a t i o n s h i p between " r i s k " and "loss" rather than that between " r i s k " 
3 8 
and " p r i c e " . I n Martineau v. Kitc h i n q , Cockburn C.J. asserted that 
"looking at a l l the circumstances of the case, i t i s impossible to doubt 
"Where, under a contract of sale, the price i s payable on a day c e r t a i n 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of d e l i v e r y , and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses 
to pay such p r i c e , the s e l l e r may maintain an action for the p r i c e , a l -
though the property i n the goods has not passed, and the goods have not 
been appropriated to the contract." 
3 8 A t page 451. 
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that the true i n t e n t i o n of the parties ...... was that the property was 
with the buyer and no longer i n the s e l l e r s at the time of the f i r e , 
and therefore the thing having perished, perishes to the dominus, 
namely the buyer, and not to the s e l l e r s , who had ceased to have anything 
to do with i t " . The approach adopted by the Lord Chief Justice implies 
that the i n i t i a l question to be determined by the Court i s to determine 
whether the goods were owned by the s e l l e r or the buyer, so as to 
determine who has suffered the loss. Having established who has suffered 
the loss the Court should then determine who must bear the r i s k of 
that loss. I n Martineau v. Kitchinq the s e l l e r , having transferred 
ownership, had no i n t e r e s t i n the goods, the buyer having both 
property and r i s k . The s e l l e r was, therefore, able to sue, on the 
contract, for the price,"leaving the buyer to suffer the loss of his 
goods. What, however, of the s i t u a t i o n i n which the s e l l e r has property 
but the buyer has risk? I f the goods have perished i t would seem clear 
that the goods being those of the s e l l e r i t i s he, the s e l l e r , who has 
suffered a loss. The buyer has the r i s k and, that being so, he must bear 
the loss, but, i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the loss to be borne i s that which 
would, but for the passing of r i s k , have f a l l e n upon the s e l l e r . Consider 
as an example, the s i t u a t i o n i n which the s e l l e r has agreed to s e l l the 
buyer s p e c i f i c goods or unascertained goods from a s p e c i f i c bulk. Assume 
that r i s k i n these goods has passed to the buyer but property has not. 
The perishing of the s p e c i f i c goods, or of the s p e c i f i c source, w i l l be 
the s e l l e r ' s loss. I f i t i s possible to f r u s t r a t e a contract i n which 
39 
r i s k has passed to the buyer, the contractual o b l i g a t i o n to deliver 
w i l l be discharged and, as a r e s u l t , the goods, which may well have been 
unique only i n so far as they were i d e n t i f i e d for the purposes of the 
39 See l a t e r . 
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contract of sale, may cease to have any unique q u a l i t y . I f so, the 
s e l l e r ' s loss i s obviously the cost of replacing his stock. Why should 
the buyer be l i a b l e for the price? This i s not the s e l l e r ' s loss and, 
the goods being those of the s e l l e r i t i s the s e l l e r ' s loss that the 
buyer i s obliged to bear. 
Circumstances i n which the Price may be Recovered 
When, then, can the s e l l e r bring an action for the price as a r e s u l t 
of his goods having perished at the buyer's risk? 
1) I t i s possible that where the goods are at the buyer's r i s k as 
a r e s u l t of the operation of section 20(2) Sale of Goods Act 
.1979, the buyer may be sued for the price " j u s t as i f 
property had passed". 
2) Where the goods are at the buyer's r i s k because of express 
agreement between the parties there would seem to be l i t t l e 
support f o r the proposition that the s e l l e r can sue fo r the 
price. The case-law i s less than decisive and an h i s t o r i c a l 
perspective would indicate that such an action can only be 
brought when property has passed. To maintain that the s e l l e r 
cannot sue for the price i s not to deny that the s e l l e r may s t i l l 
have an action, for the buyer does have the r i s k . I t would seem 
l i k e l y t h a t , i f an action for the price i s not available to the 
s e l l e r , the most l i k e l y a l t e r n a t i v e would be to sue for the 
replacement value of the goods which have perished. 
I t may be, however, that the s e l l e r may be able to bring an 
action for the price on the basis that the buyer, having 
agreed to accept r i s k , has waived his r i g h t to i n s i s t upon 
delivery or the transfer of property. 
3) I t may be the case t h a t , i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s i n which r i s k has 
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passed to the buyer p r i o r to the s e l l e r having transferred 
property, the doctrine of r i s k would, as Sealey asserts, be 
taken to obviate the requirement that the s e l l e r perform pre-
r e q u i s i t e obligations before bringing his action f o r the price. 
I f so, the price would always be recoverable. 
Failure of Consideration 
A l l of the above alt e r n a t i v e s assume t h a t , whatever the action 
available to the s e l l e r , i f the goods perish, w h i l s t at the buyer's r i s k , 
he must be l i a b l e to compensate the s e l l e r for his loss. When, however, 
considering the s i t u a t i o n i n which r i s k attaches t o the buyer who has 
neither property i n , nor possession of, the goods he has agreed t o buy, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to avoid a r r i v i n g at the conclusion that the buyer has, 
i f the goods perish p r i o r to the passing of property or possession, 
received no benefit under the contract. The receipt of the r i s k i t s e l f 
i s a l l that the buyer has acquired and t h i s i s hardly a b e n e f i t , f o r the 
only r i g h t t h i s would seem to confer upon the buyer i s the r i g h t , now 
that he has an insurable i n t e r e s t i n the goods, to enter i n t o a policy of 
insurance, which " r i g h t " i s , i n r e a l i t y , a mere power to neutralise an 
ob l i g a t i o n . The buyer has, admittedly, received a promise that he w i l l 
receive delivery of, and property i n , the goods he has agreed t o buy, 
but "when one i s considering the law of f a i l u r e of consideration and of 
the quasi-contractual r i g h t t o recover money on that ground, i t i s , 
generally speaking, not the promise which i s referred to as the con-
40 
sid e r a t i o n , but the performance of the contract". Given that the s e l l e r 
has conferred none of the benefits contracted for one i s led to consider 
per Viscount Simon - Fibrosa Spoka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe 
Barbour Ltd. /~1943_7A.C. 32, 48. 
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-the provisions of section 54 Sale of Goods Act 1979 which provides: 
"Nothing i n t h i s Act s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t of the buyer t o recover 
money paid where the consideration for the payment of i t has f a i l e d . " 
The section could not be couched i n stronger terms. I t would 
indic a t e t h a t , where property and possession have not been transferred 
by the s e l l e r , the buyer could recover any money paid, notwithstanding 
the f a c t that he has the r i s k , and i t implies that ;the buyer could refuse 
to pay any money i f he has not already done so. Lord Simonds emphasised 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of section 54 of the Act when, i n The J u l i a n a h e 
asserted t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n to a c . i . f . c ontract, the passing of r i s k was 
of no account i f there was a complete f a i l u r e of consideration: 
"The s e l l e r s ....... urged t h a t the r i s k i n the goods had passed t o 
the buyers, even i f property had not, and t h a t the insurance con-
t r a c t made by the s e l l e r s was available for the buyers 
I am unable to see how /Ehis 7 assists the s e l l e r s . I f the con-
t r a c t i s a contract f o r the sale of rye to be performed 
by i t s physical or symbolic d e l i v e r y , what relevance has i t that 
the s e l l e r s say at a c e r t a i n stage t h a t the r i s k has passed and 
the insurance i s available? I t may w e l l be t h a t , i f there i s any 
v a l i d i t y i n these propositions, the buyers recovering upon the 
insurance p o l i c i e s would hold the proceeds f o r the b e n e f i t of the 
s e l l e r s , but t h i s does not seem to me to touch the question 
whether there has been a t o t a l f a i l u r e of consideration." 
Can i t be that where goods perish w h i l s t i n the possession of a 
s e l l e r who has retained property i n them, the buyer has no o b l i g a t i o n 
t o compensate the s e l l e r , even though the buyer has r i s k ? Perhaps so, 
but i t may be that the problem of a f a i l u r e of consideration w i l l , i n 
r e a l i t y , r a r e l y arise i n those s i t u a t i o n s i n which the s e l l e r has 
property i n the goods w h i l s t the buyer has r i s k . I f the reason f o r 
property remaining i n the s e l l e r i s the buyer's d e f a u l t i n t a k i n g 
d e l i v e r y , the Courts may w e l l be disposed to t r e a t the buyer " j u s t as i f 
there was an emptio perfecta". I f , on the other hand, r i s k i s on the 
Comptoir D'Achat et De Vente du Boeren Bond Beige S/A v. Luis de 
Ridder Limitada / 1949 7 A.C. 293, 315. 
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buyer as a r e s u l t of express agreement between the parties and the s e l l e r 
42 
has changed his p o s i t i o n i n reliance upon the buyer's undertaking, the 
buyer may w e l l be estopped from pointing to the f a i l u r e of consideration. 
I f there i s no basis for an estoppel the buyer may s t i l l be unable to 
invoke the provisions of section 54, f o r , i n many s i t u a t i o n s i n which r i s k 
has passed before property, there w i l l be, as i n Sterns v. Wickers, 
something akin to a constructive d e l i v e r y of the goods which would lead 
the Court to conclude t h a t the buyer has received some b e n e f i t . I t was 
said, f o r example, i n the Juliana that 
" i n those cases i n which i t has been held t h a t r i s k without the 
property has passed to the buyer i t has been because the buyer 
rather than the s e l l e r was seen to have an immediate and 
p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n the goods, as f o r instance where he has an 
immediate r i g h t under the storekeeper's delivery warrant t o the 
deli v e r y of a po r t i o n of an undivided bulk i n store or an 
immediate r i g h t under several contracts with d i f f e r e n t persons 
to the whole of a bulk not yet appropriated t o the several 
contracts'.'.^ 
Clearly a court would be disposed t o f i n d t h a t the buyer had 
acquired some i n t e r e s t i n the goods, amounting to a b e n e f i t received 
under the contract, for i f no b e n e f i t can be shown the notion of f a i l u r e 
of consideration may negative the passing of r i s k . Such a r e s u l t would 
not, i t i s submitted, accord with commercial expectations. I t i s sub-
mitted t h a t where goods perish at the buyer's r i s k , i n circumstances 
i n which neither property nor possession have been t r a n s f e r r e d , the 
buyer i s l i a b l e t o the s e l l e r . The extent of t h i s l i a b i l i t y i s , however, 
a matter of some doubt. 
42 
E.g. when negotiating his insurance cover 
43 per Lord Normand, page 319. 
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SECTION B; 
WHERE RISK PASSES WITH PROPERTY 
Normally r i s k w i l l pass t o the purchaser at the same time that he 
acquires property i n the goods and i n the absence of any contrary agree-
ment and of any default i n r e l a t i o n to de l i v e r y , t h i s w i l l always be the 
44 
case. What i s meant i n these circumstances by the assertion that the 
buyer has risk? 
Hon/ many r i s k s are t o be borne by the party with Risk? 
45 
Sealey reminds us that a contracting party i s subject to a variety 
of r i s k s , .including: 
1) the r i s k that the other may be dishonest; 
2) the r i s k that the other may become insolvent; 
3) the r i s k that changing market conditions may make his bargain 
an unfortunate one; 
4) the r i s k that the goods may perish; and 
5) the r i s k that the contract may be f r u s t r a t e d . 
The wording of section 20 Sale of Goods Act 1979 points t o the meaning 
of " r i s k " f o r the purposes of the Act. The section provides that "the 
goods" are at the s e l l e r ' s r i s k u n t i l property i s transferred, but that 
thereafter "the goods" are at the buyer's r i s k . Clearly r i s k relates to 
the goods themselves rather than to the nature of the bargain effected. 
I t has no r e l a t i o n to the dishonesty or insolvency of one of the contracting 
parties, nor to fluc t u a t i o n s i n market conditions. 
Section 20 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
31 Cambridge Law Journal page 228. 
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I t would also appear t h a t a party w i t h r i s k does not bear the 
r i s k of a f r u s t r a t i n g event: 
"The agreement of parties that the buyers should bear the r i s k 
of a loss against which the insurance was provided f o r by the 
contract i s not evidence of an i n t e n t i o n t h a t the buyers were 
also to take the r i s k of a f r u s t r a t i o n which was not w i t h i n 
the contemplation of the contract."46 
47 
Gl a n v i l l e Williams r e f e r s to d i c t a by Scrutton L.J. i n Kursell v. Timber 
48 
Operators to the e f f e c t t h a t a contract for the sale of goods would be 
f r u s t r a t e d by supervening i l l e g a l i t y even though property, and therefore 
r i s k , had passed to the buyer. He maintains th a t i f t h i s dictum i s correct 
the concept of r i s k i s confined to one p a r t i c u l a r r i s k ; the r i s k t h a t the 
goods perish. 
G l a n v i l l e Williams does not, himself, accept that the concept of 
r i s k i s so l i m i t e d and asserts, i n r e l a t i o n to the term " r i s k " as used 
i n section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act t h a t " i t means a l l r i s k " , i n c l u d i n g 
r i s k of a f r u s t r a t i n g event. There are pre-Act cases i n which the con-
cept of r i s k i s referred t o i n equally wide terms. Thus, f o r example, 
49 50 i n Simmons v. Swift Bayley J. asserts t h a t ; "Two questions are 
involved i n t h i s case: f i r s t , whether the property i n the bark was 
vested i n the defendant so as to throw a l l r i s k s upon him I t i s 
submitted, however, th a t such statements cannot detract from the clear 
wording of the Act. Section 20 refers to "the goods" being at the r i s k 
of s e l l e r or buyer and i t would require an unacceptably extravagent 
extension of t h i s contingent l i a b i l i t y to bring w i t h i n the s e l l e r or buyer's 
46 
per Lord Normand, Comptoir D'Achat et de Vente du Boeren Bond Beige S/A 
v. Luis De Ridder Limitada (The Juliana) /~1949 7 A.C. 293, 319. 
47 
"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" page 84, footnote 34. 
4 8 /'1321J 1 K.B. 298, 312. 
4 9108 E.R. 319. 
5 Q a t page 321. 
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r i s k the p o s s i b i l i t y of, say, supervening i l l e g a l i t y . An event which 
renders subsequent discharge of the contractual obligations i l l e g a l 
attacks performance of the contract rather than the subject matter of the 
contract; i t operates " i n personam" rather than " i n rem". Only an event 
which in t e r f e r e s with the goods themselves w i l l , i t i s submitted, f a l l 
w i t h i n the ambit of that aspect of r i s k which i s provided for by 
section 20 of the Act. 
51 52 This conclusion i s arrived at by Smith who defines r i s k as 
"... the patrimonial ( i . e . economic) loss suffered by the s e l l e r or the 
buyer as the case may be by reason of the physical destruction of the 
goods or such damage thereto that they cease to be of the kind described 
by the contract of sale - but i n such circumstances that the party s u f f e r i n g 
the loss i s not thereby released from performing his obligations under the 
contract". I n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of r i s k two features of the concept are 
c l e a r l y stated: 
1) The concept of r i s k does not discharge the contractual 
obligations of either party; such discharge f a l l s w i t h i n the 
rules r e l a t i n g to f r u s t r a t i o n of contract. 
2) Risk relates to loss r e s u l t i n g from the goods having perished. 
Smith asserts that the loss must r e s u l t from either physical 
destruction of the goods or such damage to the goods th a t they 
cease to be of the kind described by the contract of sale. I t 
w i l l be recalled that i n Part One of t h i s thesis the d e f i n i t i o n 
of "perishing" was extended to cover t h i s kind of damage to the 
goods, that i s to say, damage such as to change the nature of 
the i d e n t i t y of the goods (see pages 13-18). 
5 1 , ,Property Problems i n Sale", T.B. Smith, 
at page 23. 
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I f the second of these two features i s cor r e c t l y stated, and i t has 
been submitted above that such i s the case, the significance of the 
goods being deemed to have "perished" i s manifest. 
Risk and Perishing 
I f the goods have perished, then they u / i i l f a l l w i t h i n the r i s k t h a t , 
v i r t u e of section 20 Sale of Goods Act 1979, l i e s either with s e l l e r or 
buyer. I f they have not, then the question of who bears the loss of an 
untoward event w i l l not be determined by reference t o section 20, for the 
r i s k of t h i s loss i s not provided for i n t h a t section. The seemingly 
"academic" discussion of the meaning of "perishing" i n Part One of t h i s 
thesis should now f a l l properly i n t o perspective. I t may, at t h i s stage, 
be appropriate to r e - v i s i t some of the issues considered i n Part One. 
In Part One there was detailed consideration of the relationship 
between the meaning of the term "perished" and the term "unmerchantable". 
I t was f i n a l l y concluded that goods which had become unmerchantable 
would only be considered to have perished where they are "so unmerchantable 
as t o no longer comply with the o r i g i n a l description". (This statement i s 
almost i d e n t i c a l to that incorporated i n t o Smith's d e f i n i t i o n of r i s k . ) 
There may, i n some cases, be considerable heartsearching as to whether the 
dete r i o r a t i o n i n , or damage caused t o , goods i s s u f f i c i e n t l y dramatic to 
have resulted i n such a deviation from the contractually contemplated 
i d e n t i t y of the goods. Much may turn on the results of such heartsearching 
for i f r i s k has passed to the purchaser he must bear the loss r e s u l t i n g 
from a perishing of the goods, he w i l l not, however, bear the loss of 
any untoward event which results i n less swingeing damage to or 
dete r i o r a t i o n i n the goods. Goods which r e t a i n t h e i r contractual i d e n t i t y 
w i l l not have perished, though they may very well be unmerchantable. As 
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a r e s u l t , the state of the goods w i l l , u l t i m a t e l y , be a cause of concern 
for the s e l l e r rather than the buyer, for he w i l l , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , be 
l i a b l e for t h e i r unmerchantable s t a t e . ^ The fact that r i s k has passed 
to the purchaser w i l l not r e l i e v e the s e l l e r of t h i s l i a b i l i t y , f o r the 
purchaser bears only the r i s k of the goods perishing. 
S i m i l a r l y , there was i n Part One a deta i l e d consideration of the 
l i k e l i h o o d of goods being considered t o have "perished" where they had 
been st o l e n , or requisitioned, or even where, as i n Howell v. Coupland 
they never came i n t o existence. There was considerable weight of 
academic opinion that goods which had been req u i s i t i o n e d had not 
"perished". A l l of the academic w r i t e r s r e f e r r e d t o , however, had 
arri v e d at' t h i s conclusion when contemplating the rules r e l a t i n g t o 
f r u s t r a t i o n and the a p p l i c a b i l i t y or n o n - a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943. I t i s questionable whether they would 
have formed a s i m i l a r opinion had they been considering the consequences 
of a r e q u i s i t i o n i n g i n r e l a t i o n to the concept of r i s k . 
I t i s , perhaps, t h i s s i t u a t i o n that best i l l u s t r a t e s the i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p between "perishing", " r i s k " and " f r u s t r a t i o n " . I f " r i s k " 
r e l a t e s only t o loss r e s u l t i n g from a perishing of the goods, then any 
buyer who bears r i s k merely because of the operation of section 20 Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (rather than by express agreement, i n which case the 
parties may have made s p e c i f i c reference t o the events which are con-
sidered to be at the " r i s k " of the partie s ) w i l l not be responsible where 
goods are r e q u i s i t i o n e d , for he i s not responsible for any loss other than 
th a t which r e s u l t s from a perishing of the goods. I f a contract f o r the 
sale of goods cannot be f r u s t r a t e d where property has passed to the 
"^as a r e s u l t of the implied undertaking as to merchantability contained 
i n section 14(2) of the 1979 Act. 
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buyer, then the s e l l e r w i l l notr be released from his obligation to 
deliver and, i n the event of the rules r e l a t i n g t o r i s k being inapplicable, 
there would seem to be no reason why he should not be l i a b l e i n damages 
for non-delivery (even though the goods requisitioned are those of the 
buyer). S i m i l a r l y , even though the buyer has " r i s k " i n the goods, he would 
not be l i a b l e to pay the pr i c e . Property i n the goods having passed to 
the buyer, the s e l l e r would normally anticipate t h a t , i n the event of an 
untoward event, he could transfer his loss and recover the price from a 
buyer with r i s k . I f , however, the doctrine of r i s k does not apply i n the 
non-perishing s i t u a t i o n so as to negative the s e l l e r ' s obligation to 
de l i v e r , he would not s a t i s f y t h i s pre-condition t o an action for the price 
and would, thus, be unable to sue. 
Where goods do perish, or are deemed to have perished, the r e s u l t i n g 
economic loss must c l e a r l y be borne by the party with r i s k . Here, 
however, the question of quantum raises i t s e l f . 
Risk and Price 
I t has been suggested e a r l i e r i n t h i s Part that the s e l l e r may not be 
able to recover the price of the goods from a purchaser with r i s k where 
those goods perish p r i o r to property passing. Where property has passed 
then, c l e a r l y , that ceases to be a bar to recovery of the price.and such 
an action would, without doubt, be recognised by any Court called upon to 
determine the position of the parties i n the event of goods perishing 
wh i l s t the property of, and at the r i s k of, the purchaser. There are, 
perhaps, two l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for t h i s approach. 
1) The goods are those of the purchaser and t h e i r loss i s , therefore, 
his loss. Had the s e l l e r retained r i s k , the purchaser could 
see the discussion i n Part Three. 
- 59 -
have transferred his loss to the s e l l e r . This not being the 
case, however, the purchaser must bear h i s own loss. This loss 
i s dehors the contract, i n the same way that a perishing of 
the goods several months a f t e r discharge of a l l contractual 
obligations and w h i l s t the goods were i n the possession of 
the buyer would be unrelated to the contract. The s e l l e r of 
the goods, having transferred property to the purchaser would, 
perhaps, be deemed to have delivered to the buyer and would 
thus, by having discharged t h i s one outstanding o b l i g a t i o n , have 
removed a bar to an action for the p r i c e . Support f o r the 
view that a passing of property w i l l be accompanied by such a 
•deemed delivery i s t o be found i n the judgment of Pearson J. 
i n Carlos Federspiel and C° S.A. v. Charles Twiqq and C° Ltd."^ 
i n which i t i s asserted t h a t an appropriation by the s e l l e r 
with the assent of the buyer may be said always to involve an 
actual or constructive d e l i v e r y . I f the s e l l e r retains 
possession he does so as bailee f o r the buyer".^ 
2) An a l t e r n a t i v e approach would be t h a t of Sealey^ who would 
assert t h a t the buyer must pay the price purely and simply 
as a r e s u l t of his having r i s k . This "negative concept" would 
render immaterial the f a c t that there had been no d e l i v e r y , 
which would normally be a pre-requisite to an action f o r the 
p r i c e , and leave no bar to such an action. 
Each of the explanations o u t l i n e d above would appear to j u s t i f y the 
view that the s e l l e r can recover the price from a purchaser with r i s k 
5 5 /"1957_7 1 Lloyds Rep. 240. 
^ a t page 255. 
"^31 Cambridge Law Journal, page 225. 
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where goods perish w h i l s t i n the s e l l e r ' s possession but subsequent to 
the passing of property to the purchaser. 
I t may, however, be possible to approach the problem from a d i f -
ferent tack. I f the goods perish a f t e r property and r i s k has passed to 
the buyer, section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 cannot operate so as t o 
release the s e l l e r from his obli g a t i o n to deliver the goods. Howevers i n 
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such a s i t u a t i o n , Glanville Williams argues, the s e l l e r ' s obligation i s 
discharged at common law by operation of the rule i n Taylor v. Caldwell. 
I f so, the s e l l e r cannot be sued for non-delivery and the contract i s 
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" o f f " . How then, i t may be asked, can the buyer be l i a b l e for the 
contract price? Not having effected d e l i v e r y , the s e l l e r has not 
s a t i s f i e d a necessary pre-condition to an action for the price which, as 
a r e s u l t , ought not to be available to him. The s e l l e r w i l l , then, on t h i s 
argument, lose his r i g h t t o sue for the pric e . I f r i s k had been with him, 
at the time of destruction of the goods, he would also have had to have 
borne the loss of the goods, which loss would be represented by the 
purchase price paid by him for the goods (or the cost of manufacturing 
them i f he i s the manufacturer). His loss, had the goods perished at 
his r i s k would thus have been as follows: 
a) r i s k being with him, he would not have had a claim to r e -
imbursement for the loss r e s u l t i n g from destruction of the goods and 
would have had to have borne that loss himself; 
"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, page 27. 
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Glanville Williams would deny that both parties t o the contract are.dis-
charged from t h e i r obligations, for he argues (at page 27) that the rule 
i n Taylor v. Caldwell discharges only the s e l l e r , for i t i s only his 
obligation that i s now "impossible" to perform. The buyer i s only released 
i f he can point to a f a i l u r e of consideration and, where property has 
passed, he w i l l not be i n a position to do so. This argument i s , however, 
rejected i n Chitty on Contracts (General Principles 1307) where i t i s 
pointed out that section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 
1943 refers to i m p o s s i b i l i t y of performance and asserts that "... the 
parties thereto have for that reason been discharged from further perform-
ance of the contract S i m i l a r l y , i t has been asserted that ".... when 
f r u s t r a t i o n occurs ... i t does not merely provide one party with a defence 
i n an action brought by the other. I t k i l l s the contract i t s e l f and d i s -
charges both parties automatically" (per Viscount Simon, Joseph Constantine 
S.S. Line v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd. /"1942 / A.C. 154, 163J. 
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b) the contract being f r u s t r a t e d , he would have l o s t his claim t o 
the contractually agreed price which, i n e f f e c t , means that he 
would have l o s t his opportunity t o make a p r o f i t . 
In the s i t u a t i o n presently envisaged, however, the r i s k i s not with the 
s e l l e r , i t i s with the buyer. The s e l l e r has not, therefore, l o s t his 
r i g h t to be indemnified i n respect of the loss a r i s i n g from the 
destruction of the goods. Does i t also follow that he has a r i g h t t o be 
indemnified against the l o s t opportunity to make a p r o f i t ? Can i t not be 
argued that the concept of r i s k throws upon the purchaser only the 
obliga t i o n t o indemnify the s e l l e r i n respect of the loss a r i s i n g from 
the destruction of the goods? This loss may be represented by the sum 
that a prudent businessman would have insured the goods for w h i l s t they 
formed part of his stock. Any other valuation of the goods relates to a 
contractual bargain which has been f r u s t r a t e d . We have seen that r i s k does 
not r e l a t e to the r i s k of a f r u s t r a t i n g event. Why then should a 
purchaser with r i s k indemnify a s e l l e r who has, by v i r t u e of that 
f r u s t r a t i n g event, been deprived of his opportunity to perform a contract 
and make a p r o f i t ? 
This approach to the nature of r i s k depends for i t s v a l i d i t y upon the 
notion that a contract of sale can be discharged by f r u s t r a t i o n even 
though property and r i s k have passed. The other, a l t e r n a t i v e , approaches 
to the meaning of r i s k where property and r i s k l i e with the purchaser, 
assume that such a contract cannot be frust r a t e d and s t r i v e to f i n d some 
explanation as to the reason why the s e l l e r i s not to be held l i a b l e for 
non-delivery where his contractual o b l i g a t i o n to do so has not been d i s -
charged by termination of the contract. Further consideration w i l l be 
given to t h i s problem i n Part Three. 
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Failure of Consideration 
Whatever may be the nature of the buyer's r i s k , and whether the sum 
that he must pay to the s e l l e r i s the contract price or some other sum, 
i t seems clear that where property has passed to the purchaser he cannot a v a i l 
himself of a claim that there has been a f a i l u r e of consideration. In 
the Juliana Lord Simonds a s s e r t e d ^ that " i n law there cannot be- a 
f a i l u r e of consideration i f the property has passed". A buyer having 
property and r i s k w i l l , therefore, should the goods perish prior t o 
del i v e r y , be l i a b l e to the s e l l e r . Only the extent of t h i s l i a b i l i t y 
may be questioned, there can be no doubting that the l i a b i l i t y i t s e l f 
e x i s t s . 
/"1949 7 A.C. 293, 315. 
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SECTION C; 
APPORTIONMENT OF RISK BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER AND RE-VESTING- OF RISK 
IN THE SELLER 
So f a r , the notion of r i s k has been treated as being necessarily 
i n d i v i s i b l e . I t i s not, however, always possible t o neatly allocate 
the whole of the r i s k to either s e l l e r or buyer, f o r , i n ce r t a i n circum-
stances, each may bear an aspect of r i s k . S i m i l a r l y , i t may appear from 
that which has so far been w r i t t e n t h a t , short of the buyer repudiating 
the contract following a breach by the s e l l e r , the passing of r i s k i s 
f i n a l and i r r e v e r s i b l e . This i s not, however, always the case. An 
apportionment of r i s k between s e l l e r and buyer, or a revesting of r i s k i n 
the s e l l e r may take place where: 
1) one party has defaulted i n making or taking delivery; 
2) one of the parties i s i n breach of his obligations as 
bailee of the goods; 
3) the goods are i n t r a n s i t , and, 
a) they are l i k e l y to deteriorate as a "necessary incident" 
to the t r a n s i t , or, 
b) the s e l l e r has effected an unreasonable contract of 
carriage, or, 
c) the t r a n s i t i s by sea and the s e l l e r has not given the 
buyer notice s u f f i c i e n t t o permit him to insure the goods for 
the duration of the voyage. 
Default i n making or taking Delivery 
Whilst section 20 Sale of Goods Act 1979 makes basic provision for 
the r i s k to pass, i n i t s e n t i r e t y , at the same time as property, an 
obvious instance of apportionment i s contained i n the second sub-section 
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to the section, which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t : 
where delivery has been delayed through the f a u l t of 
e i t h e r buyer or s e l l e r the goods are at the r i s k of the party 
i n f a u l t as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for 
such f a u l t " . 
This proviso applies where there has been a delay i n delivery 
through the " f a u l t " of e i t h e r party to the contract of sale. Fault i s 
defined, i n section 61(1) of the Act, as meaning a "wrongful act or 
de f a u l t " . . Presumably the s e l l e r , or buyer, i s only i n " d e f a u l t " i f he i s 
i n breach of an o b l i g a t i o n to make or take d e l i v e r y , ^ i n which case there 
i s only an apportionment of r i s k where the delay i n de l i v e r y was, i n i t s e l f , 
a breach of contract. In such circumstances the party i n breach must 
bear some of the r i s k , even though the 'general' r i s k may be upon the 
other party. The party i n d e f a u l t must bear the r i s k of loss "which might 
not have occurred but for such f a u l t " w h i l s t the other party r e t a i n s the 
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r i s k i n r e l a t i o n to other l o s s . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that the word "might" 
i s used i n the proviso, f o r t h i s choice of word would appear t o have con-
siderable implications i n r e l a t i o n t o the e v i d e n t i a l problem of the burden 
of proof and the substantive question of causation. In Denby Hamilton and 
Co. Ltd. v. Barden^ Sellers J. c i t e s ^ 4 Benjamin on Sale of Personal 
The word "defaul t " does not necessarily have such a connotation. In Doe 
d. Dacre v. Dacre (Lady) (1798) 1 B & B 250, 258 Eyre C.J. asserted t h a t , 
" I do not know a larger or looser word than 'default' i n i t s largest 
and most general sense i t seems to mean, f a i l i n g ...... I t i s a r e l a t i v e 
term and takes i t s colour from i t s context". Support f o r the view t h a t , 
i n the present context, a breach of contract i s required may, however, be 
found i n the judgment of Lord Hewart L.C.J, i n J.J. Cuninqham Ltd. v. 
Robert A. Munro and Co. Ltd. (1922) 28 Com. Cas. 42, i n which he held that 
a delay by a purchaser i n taking delivery d i d not throw any r i s k upon him, 
as he was not, at the time of d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the goods, under an 
o b l i g a t i o n to take d e l i v e r y . 
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An example of such 'other loss' may be found i n the following assertion 
by Pothier: " I f I s e l l you a horse, and make default i n d e l i v e r y , and i t i s 
struck by l i g h t n i n g i n my stables, the loss f a l l s on me, because the 
accident would not have happened i f I had duly delivered the horse. But 
i f the horse dies from a disease which would have k i l l e d him i n any case, 
I am not l i a b l e " (Contrat de Vente, a r t i c l e 58). 
6 3 /"1949_7 1 A l l E.R. 435. 
at page 437. 
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65 Property which states: 
"Moreover, the r i s k to be borne by the party i n default i s 
the r i s k of loss which 'might' not otherwise have occurred; and 
the provision seems to throw on the party i n f a u l t the onus of 
showing p o s i t i v e l y that the loss would have occurred 
independently of his f a u l t " . 
Sellers J. doubted that the words of the proviso placed the burden of 
proof upon the party i n default and was of the opinion t h a t , " a l l the 
facts and circumstances have to be looked at ...... i n order to see whether 
the loss can properly be a t t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e of the buyer to take 
delivery of the goods at the proper t i m e " . ^ He further a s s e r t e d ^ that 
"the r e a l question i s whether the loss which has accrued was brought about 
by the delay i n de l i v e r y " . At t h i s stage i t would appear that Sellers J. 
has gone beyond the words of the st a t u t e . As a r e s u l t of so doing he 
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concludes thatr i f the s e l l e r i s i n a p o s i t i o n to s e l l the goods else-
where and acquire other goods for delivery, at the postponed time, to 
the o r i g i n a l buyer, a f a i l u r e to make such a sale w i l l place upon the 
s e l l e r the r i s k of loss or d e t e r i o r a t i o n . I t i s submitted that t h i s 
conclusion i s only v a l i d i f one approaches the problem of causation 
p o s i t i v e l y , asking the question, "was the delay i n taking delivery the 
cause of the loss?". From such a s t a r t i n g point i t might follow that the 
s e l l e r should bear that loss which 'results' from his f a i l u r e to r e - s e l l . 
I f , however, one adopts a more negative approach and the question posed i s 
"might the loss not have occurred i f there had been no delay i n 
delivery?", i t can more readily be appreciated that any f a i l u r e of the 
s e l l e r to r e - s e l l cannot a l t e r the fact that the loss would not have 
occurred but for the default i n taking delivery. The Sale of Goods Act 
requires the question to be posed negatively and there would seem to be 
no good reason why t h i s approach should not be adopted. 
65 7th e d i t i o n , page 426. 
66 I.-Z-I page 437. 
*^at page 438. 
6 8 a t page 438. 
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There i s , of course, an obli g a t i o n on the part of the s e l l e r to 
mitigate his loss, i n the event of breach, and any f a i l u r e to do so 
w i l l be r e f l e c t e d i n the damages awarded for the breach. This obli g a t i o n 
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w i l l , however, only be s i g n i f i c a n t i n an action for damages and would 
not relate to an action for the pr i c e . 
Fridman 7^ points to a further problem of causation which arises out 
of section 20(2). He suggests that the sub-section i s so worded that the 
test i s one of directness rather than foresight. I f the buyer has 
defaulted i n taking delivery i t would seem tha t he must take the r i s k of 
any loss which might not have arisen but for such d e f a u l t , even though he 
could not have contemplated such loss. A s e l l e r bringing an action for 
damages for non-acceptance would, of course, be able to recover only 
such loss as could have been contemplated by the buyer. 7^ This suggestion 
together with the question of m i t i g a t i o n , emphasises the care with which 
a s e l l e r must frame his action when suing i n respect of loss which might 
not have occurred but for default on the part of the buyer. The s e l l e r ' s 
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statement of claim must state the s p e c i f i c remedy claimed and, 
presumably, any claim for damages would a t t r a c t rules r e l a t i n g to m i t i g a t i 
and remoteness. I s the s e l l e r confined to such a claim? One must not be 
misled by the fact that the buyer i s i n breach. A buyer who i s not i n 
default, but who has r i s k i n the goods, i s l i a b l e to the s e l l e r , should 
the goods perish, because he has the r i s k . I n a s i t u a t i o n f a l l i n g w i t h i n 
section 20(2) the buyer i s , because of his def a u l t , l i a b l e to the s e l l e r 
6 9White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor /"1962_7 A.C. 413, and see 
Benjamin's'Sale of Goods, a r t i c l e 1173. 
7 0The Sale of Goods, page 240. 
7 1Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341. 
72R.S.C. Ord. 18 r 15 ( 1 ) . 
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independently of the breach and the s e l l e r ' s remedy w i l l not, therefore, 
necessarily be an action for damages, though he may elect to sue i n 
r e l a t i o n to the breach.^ I f the s e l l e r does not bring an action for 
damages he u / i l l not hav/e been under a duty to mitigate and the question 
of causation may, indeed, be determined by reference to directness rather 
than f o r e s i g h t . 
/"A s e l l e r w i l l , however, only need to re l y upon the second sub-
section to section 20 where property and r i s k has not passed to the 
buyer i n accordance with the general provision contained i n section 20. 
The property not having passed to the buyer, there must be doubt as to 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of an action for the p r i c e . I f , however, i t i s accepted 
that the notion of r i s k obviates the need for property to have passed, 
i t would follow that an action for the price would be available to the 
s e l l e r . 7 
I t would appear, then, that the apportionment of r i s k which r e s u l t s 
from section 20(2) i s that the party who has property i n the goods w i l l , 
normally, bear the "general" r i s k of loss, w h i l s t the party i n default 
w i l l bear the r i s k of any loss which might not have occurred but f o r such 
de f a u l t . I t i s submitted that where the party i n default i s the buyer, 
he may have to bear such loss even though the s e l l e r could have acted 
to minimise the loss but has f a i l e d to do so. 
Risk and Obligation as Bailee 
To free the s e l l e r of the duty to mitigate w i l l not, i n every 
s i t u a t i o n , free him from a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to the goods, 
for the t h i r d sub-section of section 20 s t i p u l a t e s that: "Nothing i n 
'"as i n Denby Hamilton and Co. v. Barden /"1949_7 1 A l l E.R. 435, where 
the s e l l e r claimed the contract price or, as an"alternative, damages 
for breach. 
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t h i s section affects the duties or l i a b i l i t i e s of either s e l l e r or 
buyer as a bailee .... of the goods of the other party". I t should be 
noted that t h i s sub-section does not impose a bailment i n any s i t u a t i o n , 
nor does i t indicate the duties of the bailee. The proviso merely 
retains whatever l i a b i l i t y there may be at common law. 
I t is not easy to appreciate that a s e l l e r who has never l o s t 
possession of the goods which form the subject matter of the sale can 
possess such goods under a bailment. The buyer, who would be the b a i l o r 
i n r e l a t i o n to any such bailment, has never come i n t o possession of the 
goods and, as a r e s u l t , cannot have delivered the goods to the s e l l e r . 
The existence of a delivery appears to be basic t o the notion of bailment. 
Jones on Bailment,^ for example, i d e n t i f i e s f i v e categories of bailment: 
1) a gratuitous deposit with the bailee, who must keep i t for the 
bai l o r (depositum); 
2) the delivery of a c h a t t e l to the bailee, who i s to do something 
without reward to or with the c h a t t e l (mandatum); 
3) the gratuitous loan of a c h a t t e l by the ba i l o r to the bailee 
for the bailee t o use (commodatum); 
4) the pawn or pledge of a c h a t t e l by the b a i l o r to the bailee, 
who i s to hold i t as a security for a loan or debt or the f u l -
filment of an obligation (pignus); 
5) the hire of a c h a t t e l or services by the b a i l o r to the bailee 
for reward ( l o c a t i o conductio). 
A l l of the categories involve a transfer of possession. Bailment 
i s , indeed, defined i n Halsbury's Laws of England^ as " a delivery 
of personal chattels on t r u s t " and i n Crossley Vaine on Personal 
74 F i r s t e d i t i o n (1786). 
75 Fourth e d i t i o n (para. 1501). 
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Property 7^ as " ess e n t i a l l y a delivery on terms ". No 
actual delivery i s made to a s e l l e r who remains i n possession of the 
goods, but i t is possible for a constructive delivery to have been made. 
I t was, for example, accepted i n Wiehe v. Dennis Bros. 7 7 that a s e l l e r 
who continued to possess a pony he had sold did so as a bailee. The 
p l a i n t i f f purchaser had expressly requested the defendant s e l l e r to 
r e t a i n the pony i n order th a t he might continue t o c o l l e c t money at the 
Inte r n a t i o n a l Horse Show for "Our Dumb Friends League", and such an 
express request presumably amounted to a constructive delivery so as to 
constitute mandatum. S i m i l a r l y , i n Staffs Motor Guarantee Ltd. v. 
78 
B r i t i s h Wagon Mackinnon J. Found that a s e l l e r who had sold goods to a 
finance company, from which he had then hired the goods under a h i r e 
purchase agreement, was a bailee of the goods, even though there had been 
no delivery to him. In Pacific Motor Auction Pty. Ltd. v. Motor Credits 
79 
(Hire Finance) Ltd. the J u d i c i a l Committee of the Privy Council 
80 
i d e n t i f i e d t h i s bailment as one which arose from an attornment, 
pointing out that there was a separate and express transaction creating 
the bailment. What, however, of the s i t u a t i o n i n which there i s no 
express agreement that the s e l l e r should r e t a i n the goods? What, indeed, 
of the s i t u a t i o n i n which there i s express agreement that he should not 
r e t a i n possession, but should, instead, make delivery to the purchaser? 
Can a bailment be implied i n such circumstances? I t would appear that 
81 
one can. In Koon v. Brinkerhoff Haight J., r e l y i n g on Story on the Law 
7 ^ F i f t h e d i t i o n (page 76). 
7 7(1913) 29 T.L.R. 250. 
7 8 /"1934_7 2 K.B. 305. 
7 9 /"1965_7 A.C. 867. 
80 4. 
at page 885. 
8 1(1886) 39 Hun 130. 
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of Sales, asserted that " where the delay ( i n delivery) i s 
occasioned by the vendee .... the vendor i s only l i a b l e as a 
depositary and mandatory ". Relying to some extent on t h i s 
82 
a u t h o r i t y , Halsbury's Laws of England assert t h a t , " a s e l l e r i n 
possession of the buyer's goods i s i n respect thereof probably subject to 
the obligations of a bailee for reward u n t i l the expiration of the time 
expressly or by implication appointed fo r the buyer to take d e l i v e r y . 
After the expiration of that time the s e l l e r i s probably subject to the 
83 
obligations of a gratuitous bailee". I t should be noted that the above 
84 
passage refers t o the s e l l e r being i n possession of the buyer's goods. 
Section 20(3) Sale of Goods Act 1979 confirms that the s e l l e r w i l l only 
be considered to be a bailee i f property has passed, for i t provides that 
the s e l l e r retains his l i a b i l i t y as bailee "of the goods of the other 
party". 
The t h i r d sub-section t o section 20 also provides that nothing i n 
that section s h a l l a f f e c t the obligations of the buyer as bailee of the 
82 
goods. Halsbury's Laws indicate that a buyer i n possession of the 
s e l l e r ' s goods, perhaps on sale or return terms, i s probably a bailee for 
reward u n t i l the expiration of the time appointed for passing of property 
After a v a l i d r e j e c t i o n of the goods and the expiration of a reasonable 
time for the s e l l e r to remove them, the buyer becomes a gratuitous bailee 
Taken together, the various provisions of section 20 would seem to 
indicate t h a t : 
1) where property has passed to the buyer, he w i l l have r i s k i n 
the goods, but a s e l l e r i n possession retains his obligations 
as bailee; 
82 
Third e d i t i o n (page 79). 
83 
sub s t a n t i a l l y the same conclusion i s arrived at i n Benjamin's Sale of 
Goods (para. 417). 
84 
as does Benjamin's Sale of Goods, supra. 
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2) where property has not passed to the buyer, the s e l l e r w i l l 
have general r i s k i n the goods, but the buyer w i l l have r i s k 
i n r e l a t i o n to any loss which might not have occurred but f o r 
def a u l t on his part i n taking d e l i v e r y . The buyer w i l l , i n 
ad d i t i o n , be l i a b l e as a bailee of the goods should he have 
came i n t o possession of them. 
Request th a t Delivery be taken 
Section 20 must, however, be considered together w i t h the separate 
provisions of section 37 of the 1979 Act. Section 37 provides t h a t : 
"When the s e l l e r i s ready and w i l l i n g t o deliv e r the goods, and 
requests the buyer to take d e l i v e r y , and the buyer does not 
w i t h i n a reasonable time a f t e r such request take d e l i v e r y of the 
goods, he i s l i a b l e t o the s e l l e r f o r any loss occasioned by 
his neglect or r e f u s a l t o take d e l i v e r y , and also f o r a 
reasonable charge for the care and custody of the goods". 
This section throws upon the buyer the r i s k of any loss, providing 
such loss has been "occasioned by" the buyer's d e f a u l t . I n Diqht v. 
85 
Craster H a l l (Owners) Cozens-Hardy M.R. equated the words "occasioned 
86 
by" with "due t o " and, as a r e s u l t , i t would appear t h a t section 37 may 
be taken to esta b l i s h t h a t the buyer must bear the r i s k of any loss due 
to his f a u l t . What does t h i s section add to section 20? Apart from 
gi v i n g the s e l l e r the r i g h t t o sue for storage charges, the section 
appears to be intended to throw some element of r i s k upon the buyer i n 
de f a u l t . The extent of t h i s "extra" r i s k i s , however, d i f f i c u l t to 
ascertain. I f the buyer has property i n the goods he w i l l , by section 20, 
normally have general r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o them, and i f property has not 
passed, he w i l l i n any event have r i s k i n r e l a t i o n to loss which r e s u l t s 
(1913) 6 B.W.C.C. 674. 
at page 676. 
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from any default on his part "in taking delivery. Perhaps the true 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of section 20 and section 37 can be determined by reference 
to the nature of the r i s k transferred. Section 20 deals with r i s k i n 
r e l a t i o n to "the goods" and whatever i s the obligation imposed upon a 
buyer who bears such r i s k , i t would seem that i t cannot be greater than 
an o b l i g a t i o n t o pay to the s e l l e r the contract price. Section 37, 
however, relates to "any loss" and, perhaps, would cover other, con-
sequential, loss flowing from the buyer's default. The s e l l e r may, for 
example, have to pay someone to remove the goods, or t h e i r remains, from 
his premises, or he may, due to the fact that he has l o s t storage space, 
have suffered a slowdown i n the turnover of his stock, r e s u l t i n g i n loss 
of p r o f i t on sales which would otherwise have taken place. I t should be 
noted t h a t , unlike section 20, section 37 requires the s e l l e r t o expressly 
request the buyer to take d e l i v e r y . 
Where the buyer defaults i n taking delivery, i n circumstances i n which 
property has not passed from the s e l l e r , there would, then, appear to be 
the following apportionment of r i s k : 
1) The buyer has r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o loss which might not have 
occurred but for his d e f a u l t . This r i s k relates t o the goods 
and, at most, involves an obligation to pay for them should 
they perish. 
2) The buyer also has r i s k i n r e l a t i o n to any consequential loss, 
provided there has been an express request that he should take 
delivery. 
3) The s e l l e r retains only a p a r t i a l r i s k , the r i s k of loss which 
would have occurred whether or not the buyer had defaulted i n 
taking delivery. 
— 87 /"Fridman suggests that i t i s possible that section 37 of the 
Sale of Goods, page 240. 
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Act may provide a means by which the s e l l e r of the goods can relieve 
himself of his obligations as bailee where property has passed to the 
buyer. There would appear to be some support for t h i s view i n the 
sections. Section 20(3), which makes reference t o the s e l l e r ' s 
obligations as a bailee, i s couched i n r e s t r i c t e d terms. The second 
sub-section of section 20 i s so worded as to create an out-and-out 
exception to the general ru l e that r i s k passes with property and provides 
that one aspect of r i s k i s to be carried by the buyer. The t h i r d sub-
section i s not so p o s i t i v e l y expressed and merely provides for the 
retention of common law l i a b i l i t y . Further, section 20(3) indicates 
that "nothing i n t h i s section s h a l l a f f e c t the duties or l i a b i l i t i e s of 
either s e l l e r or buyer as a bailee of the goods of the other party". 
This wording may be contrasted with the much stronger wording of sections 
l i k e section 54 of the Act, which provides that "Nothing i n t h i s Act 
s h a l l a f f e c t the r i g h t of the buyer or the s e l l e r ". Presumably 
section 20(3) was inserted merely to establish that a general passing of 
r i s k , i n accordance with section 20, did not, i n i t s e l f , r e l i e v e the 
s e l l e r of his obligations as a bailee. Section 37, however, may provide 
a means by which the s e l l e r can divest himself of such obligations. Should 
he expressly request the buyer to take delivery of the goods, a f a i l u r e t o 
do so w i t h i n a reasonable time w i l l throw any loss upon the buyer. 
/"One cannot, however, escape the problem of causation. The buyer 
takes, under section 37, the r i s k of loss occasioned by (due to) his 
f a i l u r e t o take delivery. What i f a buyer does not take delivery when 
requested to do so, and the goods are subsequently destroyed, or stolen, 
i n circumstances i n which i t i s clear that the s e l l e r has been i n breach 
of even the l i m i t e d obligations of a gratuitous bailee? What would be 
taken to have caused such loss, the default i n taking delivery or the 
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breach of bailment? I t i s submitted that i t would be the l a t t e r . 7 
Contributory Negligence 
A further instance of apportionment of r i s k as a r e s u l t of f a u l t 
might be thought to arise from the provisions of the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Certainly, t h i s i s considered to be 
88 
a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n Benjamin's Sale of Goods. Section 1(1) of the 
1945 Act provides: 
"Where any person suffers damage as the r e s u l t p a r t l y of his 
own f a u l t and pa r t l y of the f a u l t of any other person or 
persons, a claim i n respect of that damage s h a l l not be 
defeated by reason of that f a u l t of the person s u f f e r i n g the 
damage, but the damages recoverable i n respect thereof s h a l l 
be reduced t o such extent as the Court thinks j u s t and 
equitable having regard to the claimant's share i n the res-
p o n s i b i l i t y for the damage". 
Consider, for example, the s i t u a t i o n i n which property has not passed 
from the s e l l e r to the buyer, the buyer has defaulted i n taking 
delivery and the goods have perished, p a r t l y as a r e s u l t of the s e l l e r 
f a i l i n g t o take care of them. The s e l l e r would, i n such circumstances, 
bring an action against the buyer, r e l y i n g upon section 20(2). Could 
the buyer invoke the provisions of the 1945 Act? He would need to show 
that the s e l l e r had been at " f a u l t " w i t h i n the meaning of section 4 of 
the 1945 Act, which provides t h a t : " ' f a u l t ' means negligence, 
breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives r i s e to a 
l i a b i l i t y i n t o r t or would, apart from t h i s Act, give r i s e to the defence 
of contributory negligence". I t would seem that negligent mis-performance 
of a contract i s not, of i t s e l f , considered to be " f a u l t " w i t h i n the 
89 
meaning of section 4. In Quinn v. Burch Bros. (Builders) Ltd. Paull J. 
asserted: 9^ 
8 8 p a r a . 419. 
8 9 /"1966_7 2 Q.B. 370. 
90 at page 380. 
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"I n my judgement, i n looking to see whether there was a f a u l t 
w i t h i n the meaning of the Act, one cannot look a t the manner 
i n which a contract has been broken; only the terms of the 
contract and the consequences of a breach of any such term. 
In order to apply the Act one has to f i n d that there was 
some term which imported a duty not to be negligent and a 
breach of that term". 
Thus, the nature of the breach of contract i s not i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t , 
the important factor i s the existence of a duty of care which, i n a con-
t r a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , may r e s u l t from a term of the contract or, presumably, 
may e x i s t independently of the contract. There are circumstances i n 
which a s e l l e r of goods may be i n breach of such a duty of care when 
misperforming his contract, as, f o r example, when he s e l l s goods which 
91 
are dangerous per se without warning the buyer of the danger. I n 
the s i t u a t i o n presently envisaged, however, the s e l l e r would not appear 
t o be i n breach of any such duty. The property i n the goods not having 
passed to the buyer, the existence of a duty a r i s i n g out of a bailment 
would not appear t o be l i k e l y and the lack of care on the par t of the 
s e l l e r would appear to amount to no more than negligent misperformance 
of the contractual o b l i g a t i o n . 
Where property has passed to the buyer and the s e l l e r holds the 
goods as bailee for the buyer, the s e l l e r w i l l , should he be i n breach of 
the bailment, be i n breach of a duty of care owed'to the buyer and, i n 
such circumstances i t might appear t h a t the provisions of the 1945 Act 
could apply. They w i l l , however, only be s i g n i f i c a n t should the Court 
f i n d the buyer l i a b l e t o the s e l l e r . In circumstances i n which there 
has been a breach of bailment i t would appear that the buyer would not be 
l i a b l e t o the s e l l e r , despite the f a c t that he has r i s k . Section 20(3) 
does, a f t e r a l l , expressly reserve the s e l l e r ' s obligations as bailee. 
I t may be that the buyer would be l i a b l e to the s e l l e r i n circumstances 
as i n Clarke v. Army and Navy Co-operative Society /"1903 7 1 K.B. 155. 
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i n which the price he has agreed to pay f o r the goods exceeds t h e i r market 
value. His action against the s e l l e r , for wrongful interference with goods, 
92 
w i l l be for the value of the goods w h i l s t the s e l l e r w i l l be able to 
sue the buyer for the price (the property having passed). Even here, 
however, i t would appear th a t the provisions of the 1945 Act would be of 
l i t t l e assistance, for section 1(1) of the Act provides that " the 
damages recoverable s h a l l be reduced to such extent as the Court 
thinks j u s t and equitable ". Where the s e l l e r sues f o r the p r i c e , 
the buyer must counterclaim i n respect of the breach of bailment. I t 
would appear that the 1945 Act has l i t t l e s i gnificance i n r e l a t i o n to 
apportionment of r i s k . 
Risk and Transit (1) 
So f a r , we have considered instances of apportionment of r i s k i n 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the goods have e i t h e r not l e f t the 
s e l l e r ' s possession or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , have a c t u a l l y been delivered to 
the buyer p r i o r t o perishing. The remaining instances of apportionment 
of r i s k r e l a t e to the s i t u a t i o n i n which goods have been dispatched by 
the s e l l e r and perish w h i l s t i n t r a n s i t to the buyer. 
Section 33 Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides t h a t : 
"Where the s e l l e r of goods agrees to de l i v e r them at h i s own 
r i s k at a place other than t h a t where they are when sold, the 
buyer must, nevertheless (unless otherwise agreed) take any 
r i s k of d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the goods necessarily incident to 
the course of t r a n s i t " . 
In the circumstances envisaged i n section 33 there i s clear provision 
for an apportionment of r i s k . The s e l l e r has the "general" r i s k i n the 
goods and the buyer bears a p a r t i c u l a r r i s k , he must bear any loss which 
i s necessarily incident t o the t r a n s i t . This apportionment only takes 
Clerk and L i n d s e l l on Torts (14th e d i t i o n ) para. 337. 
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place, however, where the several requirements of section 33 are complied 
w i t h , that i s to say: 
1) the s e l l e r has agreed to deliver the goods at a place other 
than that where they are sold; 
93 
2) the goods have been sold, that i s to say property has passed 
(and, as a r e s u l t general r i s k would normally have passed to 
the buyer); 
3) the s e l l e r has agreed to deliver at his own r i s k (despite 
the fact that r i s k would, otherwise, probably be upon the 
buyer). 
What of the s i t u a t i o n i n which a l l of the requirements of section 33 
are complied with save for the fact that the s e l l e r has not expressly 
94 
agreed to deliver at his own risk? Sassoon argues that i f the buyer 
must, because of section 33, bear the r i s k of loss which i s necessarily 
incident t o the t r a n s i t when the s e l l e r has expressly undertaken to 
send the goods at his own r i s k , i t must follow, a f o r t i o r i , that the 
buyer has such r i s k where the s e l l e r has made no such express promise. 
Such a conclusion i s , however, apparently at odds with the fol l o w i n g 
95 
d i c t a of Diplock J. i n Mash and Murrell v. Joseph Emmanuel Ltd.: 
" I t i s extraordinary d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the goods due to abnormal 
conditions experienced during t r a n s i t for which the buyer takes 
the r i s k . A necessary and inevitable d e t e r i o r a t i o n during 
t r a n s i t which w i l l render them unmerchantable on a r r i v a l i s 
normally one for which the s e l l e r i s l i a b l e " . 
Diplock J. arrived at t h i s conclusion having considered the pleadings i n 
96 
Bowden Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. L i t t l e , which state that the appellants 
s.2(ft) Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
28 M.L.R. 180. 
/"1961 7 1 A l l E.R. 485, 493. 
(1907) 4 C.L.R. 1364. 
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had promised that "the onions upon a r r i v a l i n Sydney would be i n 
merchantable condition except for such deter i o r a t i o n as would be the 
necessary and inevitable r e s u l t of the t r a n s i t , yet the onions upon 
97 
a r r i v a l were not i n such condition". Diplock J. regarded t h i s express 
warranty (which i s , i n e f f e c t , the promise made by the s e l l e r i n the 
section 33 s i t u a t i o n ) as the converse of the warranty (of merchantable 
q u a l i t y ) implied by section 14(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979. In a r r i v i n g at 
98 
t h i s conclusion he r e l i e d upon Beer v. Walker. In that case a whole-
saler, i n London, sold a quantity of dead rabbits to a r e t a i l e r i n 
Brighton, the r e t a i l e r agreeing to pay the cost of t r a n s i t . Upon 
a r r i v a l at Brighton some of the rabbits were found t o be u n f i t for 
human food. Grove J. expressly found that the t r a n s i t was i n the 
"usual course" and that the rabbits which were u n f i t f o r human food had 
become so i n the ordinary course of t r a n s i t . He nevertheless held t h a t 
the implied warranty that goods should be f i t for t h e i r purpose extended 
to the time at which, i n the ordinary course of t r a n s i t , the rabbits should 
reach t h e i r destination, and, f u r t h e r , maintained t h a t they should remain 
so f i t u n t i l the r e t a i l e r should have a reasonable opportunity of dealing 
with them i n the ordinary course of business. Diplock J. also referred 
99 100 to O l l e t t v. Jordan i n which Atkin J. concluded u t h a t , " the 
e f f e c t of the decision i n Beer v. Walker i s that the condition that the 
goods must be merchantable means that they must be i n that condition when 
appropriated t o the contract and that they w i l l continue so f o r a 
reasonable time. That does not necessarily mean that goods s h a l l be 
97 
98 
at page 493. 
(1877) 46 L.J.Q.B. 677. 
9 9 /"1918 7 2 K.B. 41. 
100 at page 47. 
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merchantable on delivery i f the vendee di r e c t s them to be sent by 
a long and unusual t r a n s i t Diplock J. agreed with AtkinJ.'s 
analysis of the meaning of the decision i n Beer v. Walker and held that 
goods should be merchantable u n t i l a r r i v a l at t h e i r destination. The 
defendant appealed, to the Court of Appeal, on two grounds: 
1) that Diplock 3, had drawn a wrong inference of fact,- the 
appellant contending that the t r a n s i t was not a normal voyage 
as submitted by the p l a i n t i f f s ; 
2) that the warranty recognised by Diplock J. was not j u s t i f i e d at 
law. 
The Court of Appeal elected not to argue the second ground of appeal, 
for i t ass.umed, for the purposes- of the appeal, that the warranty 
existed. I t nevertheless found for the appellant on the basis t h a t , 
because of lack of v e n t i l a t i o n , the voyage was not a normal one and 
that there was no evidence that the goods would not have survived normal 
t r a n s i t . The goods were, therefore, at the r i s k of the buyer as a r e s u l t 
of the abnormality of the voyage, not as a r e s u l t of t h e i r having perished 
as a necessary incident to the t r a n s i t . 
This conclusion i s d i r e c t l y at odds with the a f o r t i o r i argument 
advanced by Sassoon. Bringing together the rule contained i n section 33 
and the case-law outlined above one might ar r i v e at the following con-
clusions: 
1) Where r i s k i s upon the buyer, but the s e l l e r , having agreed 
to send the goods to the buyer, undertakes r i s k during t r a n s i t , 
the buyer, nevertheless, has r i s k of unavoidable loss which 
results from normal t r a n s i t . 
2) Where r i s k i s upon the buyer, and the s e l l e r , having agreed to 
send the goods to the buyer, does not undertake to do so at his 
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own r i s k , the buyer has to take the r i s k of loss r e s u l t i n g 
from abnormal t r a n s i t . The s e l l e r , however, has r i s k i n 
r e l a t i o n t o loss r e s u l t i n g from normal t r a n s i t . 
I t would thus appear t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n t o loss which i s necessarily 
incident to the t r a n s i t , the buyer i s i n a worse s i t u a t i o n where the 
s e l l e r has expressly undertaken to deliver at his own r i s k than he would 
be i n the absence of such an express s t i p u l a t i o n . Conversely, the 
s e l l e r would only have r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o such loss where he had elected 
not to undertake r i s k for the duration of the t r a n s i t . 
The very perversity of such conclusions compels one to question 
t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Sassoon a s s e r t s ' ^ that the true position can be 
appreciated only upon drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between two s i t u a t i o n s : 
1) In the f i r s t s i t u a t i o n , a s e l l e r dispatches goods which 
deteriorate during t r a n s i t . A l l goods matching the contract 
description would, necessarily, perish during that p a r t i c u l a r 
course of t r a n s i t and the goods dispatched deteriorate no more 
than would any other goods of the genre. 
2) In the second s i t u a t i o n , a s e l l e r dispatches goods which perish 
during t r a n s i t because of an inherent defect, which defect i s 
not common to a l l goods of the genre. Other goods, matching 
the contract description, could have survived the t r a n s i t . 
Sassoon concludes that the case-law outlined above relates to the f i r s t 
s i t u a t i o n whereas section 33 l e g i s l a t e s for the second. In support of 
102 
t h i s conclusion Sassoon c i t e s B u l l v. Robinson i n which Alderson B. 
asserted"* -^ that " hoop-iron to be manufactured i n Staffordshire, 
1 0 1 /"1962 7 J.B.L. 351, 354 and /"1965 7 28 M.L.R. 180 at 190, 191. 
102 (1854) 10 Ex 342. 
103 at page 345. 
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and to be forwarded by canal and r i v e r , t o be delivered i n Liverpool, 
must be accepted by the vendee, i f only so deteriorated as a l l such iron must 
necessarily be deteriorated i n i t s t r a n s i t from Staffordshire to 
Liverpool". Alderson B. concluded that "A manufacturer who contracts to 
deliver a manufactured a r t i c l e at a dist a n t place must, indeed, stand the 
r i s k of any extraordinary or unusual d e t e r i o r a t i o n ; but we think that the 
vendee i s bound to accept the a r t i c l e , i f only deteriorated to the 
extent that i t i s necessarily subject to the course of t r a n s i t from one 
place to the other, or, i n other words, that he i s subject to and must 
bear the r i s k of de t e r i o r a t i o n necessarily consequent upon the trans-
mission" . 
I t would seem, then, that where goods are dispatched to the buyer, 
at his general r i s k , and the s e l l e r does not undertake r i s k during 
t r a n s i t , the s e l l e r w i l l not bear any part of the r i s k where the goods 
perish as a necessary incident to the course of t r a n s i t . Section 33 w i l l 
not apply d i r e c t l y t o the s i t u a t i o n , but the existence of i t s provisions 
would surely persuade a Court that a buyer cannot be i n a better s i t u a t i o n , 
vis-a-vis the s e l l e r , where the s e l l e r has refused to provide an under-
taking that he w i l l carry r i s k than he would upon the granting of such an 
undertaking. 
Where section 33 does apply there i s , as previously stated, a clear 
apportionment of r i s k between s e l l e r and buyer. The s e l l e r has the r i s k 
he has undertaken, save for the r i s k of de t e r i o r a t i o n i n the goods which 
i s necessarily incident to the t r a n s i t . This r i s k i s upon the buyer. 
The r i s k upon the buyer i s , however, a r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o "de t e r i o r a t i o n " . 
Would there be a sim i l a r a l l o c a t i o n of r i s k where the goods perish? I f 
the perishing of the goods i s necessarily incident to the course of t r a n s i t , 
would the buyer suffer the loss, even though the s e l l e r has undertaken to 
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transport the goods at his r i s k ? Surely i f i t i s not thought appropriate 
that the s e l l e r should bear the r i s k of an inevitable d e t e r i o r a t i o n , i t i s 
even less appropriate that he should bear the r i s k of a de t e r i o r a t i o n so 
massive that i t results i n the goods being taken to have perished. 
One cannot", however, ignore the use of the word "d e t e r i o r a t i o n " i n 
section 33. Perhaps the best construction of section 33 i s one which 
would r e s u l t i n the buyer bearing the r i s k of any perishing necessarily 
incident t o the course of t r a n s i t providing the perishing results from a 
natural d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the goods. The buyer would not, however, be l i a b l e 
for a perishing which i n e v i t a b l y r e s u l t s from the t r a n s i t but which arises 
independently of a natural d e t e r i o r a t i o n . One could, for example, contemplate 
circumstances i n which a s e l l e r would agree to deliver goods to a port sub-
j e c t t o a h o s t i l e blockade. As a r e s u l t of t h i s t r a n s i t the ship carrying 
the goods i s sunk, or taken, by the h o s t i l e force and the goods are l o s t . 
Section 33 would, i t i s submitted, have no application here. The s e l l e r 
has taken upon himself the r i s k of the venture and that i s t h a t . The 
reference t o "de t e r i o r a t i o n " i n section 33 i s not, i t i s submitted, exclusive 
of perishing, i t i s , however, r e s t r i c t i v e of the cause of perishing. 
Risk and Transit (2) 
Section 32 Sale of Goods Act 1979 consists of three sub-sections, 
two of which provide, p o t e n t i a l l y , for an apportionment of r i s k between 
s e l l e r and buyer. The 'key* sub-section, sub-section ( 1 ) , provides that: 
"Where, i n pursuance of a contract of sale, the s e l l e r i s authorised 
or required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to 
a c a r r i e r , whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of 
transmission t o the buyer i s prima facie deemed to be a delivery of 
the goods to the buyer." 
Sub-section ( 2 ) , however, provides t h a t : 
"Unless otherwise authorised by the buyer, the s e l l e r must make 
such contract with the c a r r i e r on behalf of the buyer as may be 
reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and the other 
circumstances of the casej.and i f the s e l l e r omits bo do so, and the 
see Part One for a consideration of circumstances i n which goods w i l l 
be taken to have perished as a r e s u l t of d e t e r i o r a t i o n . 
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goods are l o s t or damaged i n course of t r a n s i t , the buyer may 
decline to t r e a t the delivery to the c a r r i e r as a delivery 
to himself, or may hold the s e l l e r responsible i n damages". 
What i s the e f f e c t of t h i s second sub-section? The sub-section provides 
th a t the buyer may, i n the circumstances specified t h e r e i n , elect to 
exercise either of two remedies. He may e i t h e r : 
1) decline to t r e a t the delivery t o the c a r r i e r as a delivery t o 
himself, or 
2) hold the s e l l e r responsible i n damages. 
What e f f e c t w i l l these remedies have upon the a l l o c a t i o n of risk? 
Should the buyer elect to t r e a t the goods as not having been 
delivered, his remedy u/ould, presumably, be to sue f o r damages f o r non-
delivery. However, i f the general r i s k i s on the buyer, t h i s remedy may 
not be available to him, for most academic w r i t e r s would accept that i f 
the buyer has r i s k he must, i f the goods perish, pay the contract price 
even though they have not been delivered to him."^ I t i s , however, 
possible that the sub-section w i l l , i n some circumstances, divest the 
buyer of r i s k which would, but for the sub-section, be on him. This 
would appear to be the case where the property, and therefore the r i s k , 
only passed to the buyer upon delivery of the goods to the c a r r i e r . I n 
Waite v. Baker"^ Parke B. said, i n r e l a t i o n to a contract for 
unascertained goods: 
" I t may be admitted, that i f goods are ordered by a person, a l -
though they are to be selected by the vendor, and to be delivered 
to a common c a r r i e r to be sent to the person to whom they have 
been ordered, the moment the goods, which have been selected i n 
pursuance of the contract, are delivered to the c a r r i e r , the 
c a r r i e r becomes the agent of the vendee, and such delivery amounts 
to a delivery to the vendee; and i f there i s a binding contract 
between the vendor and the vendee then there i s no doubt 
that the property passes by such delivery to the c a r r i e r " . 
see page 37. 
(1848) 2 Exch. 1, 7. 
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The delivery t o the c a r r i e r amounts to an unconditional appropriation of the 
goods so as to transfer property to the buyer i n accordance with Rule 5 of 
section IS Sale of Goods Act 1979. As a r e s u l t , r i s k would normally 
then attach t o the buyer. I f , however, the buyer elects to decline to 
t r e a t the delivery t o the c a r r i e r as a delivery t o himself, i t may be 
that property w i l l not be considered t o have passed upon delivery t o the 
c a r r i e r and, as a r e s u l t , the s e l l e r w i l l s t i l l have general r i s k i n 
r e l a t i o n to the goods. The buyer who has thus been relieved of property 
and r i s k i n r e l a t i o n t o the goods w i l l not be l i a b l e to the s e l l e r for the 
price and, moreover, upon any subsequent f a i l u r e t o de l i v e r he would be 
able to maintain an action f o r damages f o r non-delivery. Section 32(2) 
can, however, only operate t o so r e l i e v e the buyer of r i s k where property 
and r i s k have not passed p r i o r t o the d e l i v e r y to the c a r r i e r . I f property 
and r i s k have passed to the buyer p r i o r t o the c a r r i e r being given 
possession of the goods (as a r e s u l t of express agreement between the parties, 
or because of the operation of the rules of section 18 Sale of Goods Act 
1979) the f a c t that the buyer has the r i s k w i l l not be r e l a t e d to the 
deli v e r y to the c a r r i e r and the deemed delivery to the buyer. I f , i n such 
circumstances, the buyer, r e l y i n g upon section 32(2), elects t o t r e a t the 
goods as not having been delivered to him, t h i s section w i l l only r e s u l t 
i n there having been no delivery to the buyer, i t w i l l not a l t e r the 
fac t t h a t the goods have been l o s t w h i l s t at his r i s k . Following h i s 
e l e c t i o n , the buyer w i l l f i n d t h a t he has no remedy against the s e l l e r 
and, having received property i n the goods, he w i l l not, presumably, be 
able t o claim a t o t a l f a i l u r e of consideration. Moreover, the s e l l e r , 
having transferred property and r i s k , w i l l be able to maintain an action 
against the buyer for the contract p r i c e . 
The r i g h t given t o the buyer, by section 32(2), t o :elect to decline 
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to t r e a t a delivery to a c a r r i e r as a delivery to himself, w i l l not, i n 
any circumstances, r e s u l t i n an apportionment of r i s k between s e l l e r and 
buyer. I t may, i f property has not passed to the buyer p r i o r to the 
delivery to the c a r r i e r , r e s u l t i n r i s k re-vesting i n the s e l l e r . In 
a l l other circumstances i t u / i l l have no e f f e c t on the a l l o c a t i o n of r i s k 
which w i l l remain, i n i t s e n t i r e t y , with the buyer. I t i s , however, 
possible that the alternative remedy provided by section 32(2) may r e s u l t 
i n an apportionment of r i s k . 
The a l t e r n a t i v e remedy, of damages, i s framed i n a positive manner, 
the sub-section providing that the buyer "may hold the s e l l e r responsible 
i n damages". I f r i s k i s on the buyer he w i l l , presumably, be able to 
counterclaim against the s e l l e r u/hen sued for the price. There i s , 
however, some doubt as to the extent of the buyer's r i g h t s i n these 
circumstances, for i t i s uncertain whether the buyer can sue only i n 
r e l a t i o n to loss which results from the unreasonable contract of carriage 
or whether he can sue for any loss. Benjamin"*"^ argues that w h i l s t the 
only duty imposed upon the s e l l e r i s one of ensuring that the contract with 
the c a r r i e r i s a reasonable one, " i t would seem t h a t , i f the s e l l e r i s i n 
breach of t h i s duty, the buyer would be e n t i t l e d to decline to t r e a t the 
delivery t o the c a r r i e r as a delivery t o himself notwithstanding that the 
loss or damage might have occurred without such breach". Benjamin contrasts 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n with that provided for by section 20(2) which, i t w i l l be 
recall e d , relates only to loss which might not have occurred but for the 
buyer's default. Whilst Benjamin mentions only the f i r s t of the remedies 
provided for by section 32(2), presumably the same argument would suggest 
that the buyer can also elect to sue for damages i n respect of loss which 
might have occurred without a breach of the s e l l e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n to 
Sale of Goods (1974) para. 594. 
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108 negotiate a reasonable contract. Certainly Atiyah notes that " i t 
109 
appears that the buyer's remedies for the damage to or loss of the 
goods operate whether or not the loss or damage was the consequence of the 
s e l l e r ' s f a i l u r e to make a reasonable contract with the c a r r i e r " . In 
short, given that the s e l l e r has not effected a reasonable contract of 
carriage, i t i s possible that i f r i s k has passed to the buyer, i t w i l l 
re-vest i n the s e l l e r i n r e l a t i o n to any loss which may occur during 
t r a n s i t . What, however, i s the mischief of the sub-section? There i s 
authority for the proposition that the purpose of ensuring that the 
s e l l e r makes a reasonable contract with the c a r r i e r i s to ensure that the 
buyer w i l l , i n the event of loss, have an indemnity against the c a r r i e r . 
In Clarke v. Hutchins^^ Lord Ellenborough asserted'^ that "he (the 
s e l l e r ) had an implied a u t h o r i t y , and i t was his duty to do whatever was 
necessary to secure the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the c a r r i e r s for the safe 
delivery of the goods, and to put them i n t o such a course of conveyance as 
that i n case of a loss the defendant might have an indemnity against the 
112 
c a r r i e r s " . S i m i l a r l y , i n Thomas Young and Sons Ltd. v. Hobson and Partners 
Tucker J. was of the opinion that "...... the question was whether a 
proper contract was made on t h e i r (the buyer's) behalf by which the 
defendants could have recovered from the railway for the damage which i n 
fact occurred".'''^ I t would appear, then, that one important aspect of 
the sub-section i s the encouragement i t gives to s e l l e r s to e f f e c t contracts 
of carriage which w i l l provide an indemnity to the buyers. I t may well be, 
1 0 8The Sale of Goods (5th e d i t i o n ) page 223. 
109 
i. e . both of them. 
1 1 0 ( 1 8 1 1 ) 14 East 475. 
H I 4- hIC 
at page 476. 
1 1 2 ( 1 9 4 9 ) 65 T.L.R. 365. 
113 -tec n 
pages 366,7. 
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how/ever, that i n ce r t a i n circumstances i t i s , because of cost, not com-
mercially practicable to negotiate a contract which provides for such an 
indemnity i n respect of each and every p o t e n t i a l cause of loss. In such 
circumstances i t would, presumably, be recognised that a contract of 
carriage was not unreasonable merely because i t d id not provide for a 
complete indemnity. Would a s e l l e r be l i a b l e i f he has not effected a 
reasonable contract of carriage, but the loss that has actually occurred 
i s such t h a t , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , i t would not have been covered by a 
reasonable contract of carriage. Bearing i n mind th a t the buyer has the 
r i s k , i s i t not l i k e l y that a court would not f i n d the s e l l e r l i a b l e i n 
such a situation? I f so, there i s here, yet again, provision for 
apportionment of r i s k . Given th a t a s e l l e r has not effected a reasonable 
contract of carriage, he must bear the r i s k of loss which would have been 
covered by such a contract. The buyer, nevertheless, would r e t a i n r i s k 
i n r e l a t i o n t o loss which, commercial practice indicates, would not have 
been covered by such a contract. 
Risk and Transit (3) 
The t h i r d sub-section to section 32 provides th a t : 
"Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the s e l l e r to 
the buyer by a route involving sea t r a n s i t , under circumstances 
i n which i t i s usual to insure, the s e l l e r must.give such notice 
to the buyer as may enable him to insure them during t h e i r sea 
t r a n s i t , and, i f the s e l l e r f a i l s to do so, the goods s h a l l be 
deemed to be at his r i s k during such sea t r a n s i t " . 
This sub-section would not appear to provide for any apportionment of r i s k , 
rather i t provides that where r i s k has passed to the buyer i t w i l l , i n the 
circumstances envisaged i n the sub-section, re-vest completely i n the 
s e l l e r for the duration of the voyage. What, however, i s the nature of the 
" r i s k " borne by the sell e r ? Normally, the fact that the s e l l e r has the 
r i s k means simply that he cannot recover from the buyer should the goods 
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perish. Being relieved of his obli g a t i o n to pay for the goods may, 
however, be l i t t l e comfort to the buyer, who may have secured a bargain 
i n his dealing^ with the s e l l e r , or may have bought the goods on a r i s i n g 
market. Had the buyer been given notice s u f f i c i e n t to have allowed him 
to have insured the goods, he would, presumably, have insured them for 
t h e i r market value and would, as a r e s u l t , nave received a f u l l indemnity 
upon t h e i r perishing. Does the re-vesting of r i s k , i n accordance with 
section 32(3), r e s u l t i n an obligation on the part of the s e l l e r to pay 
to the buyer his actual loss. Must he, i n f a c t , not only abandon his claim 
114 
to the price, but also pay compensation to the buyer? Surely not, 
for the concept of r i s k attaches to the goods themselves rather than to 
the bargain which has been made i n r e l a t i o n to them. The buyer would, 
presumably, being relieved of his obli g a t i o n to pay the pr i c e , recover 
his compensation by way of an action for damages for non-delivery. I t i s 
at t h i s stage, however, that the s i t u a t i o n becomes unclear. The s e l l e r 
w i l l only be l i a b l e for non-delivery i f his contract with the buyer sur-
vives the perishing of the goods. I f , however, the perishing of the 
goods frustrates the contract he w i l l be free of such l i a b i l i t y . Where 
the goods are s p e c i f i c , the contract can be fr u s t r a t e d by v i r t u e of 
section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979, which provides t h a t : 
"Where there i s an agreement to s e l l s p e c i f i c goods, and 
subsequently the goods, without any f a u l t on the part of the 
s e l l e r or buyer, perish before the r i s k passes to the buyer, 
the agreement i s thereby avoided". 
Several problems arise, i n these circumstances, i n r e l a t i o n to the pro-
visions of t h i s section, not the least of which i s that which results 
There i s j u d i c i a l expression of doubt on t h i s point. I n Wimble Sons 
and Co. v. Rosenberg and Sons /~1913 7 3 K.B. 757 Hamilton L.J. asserts 
t h a t : 
" I f the s e l l e r f a i l s to f u l f i l t h i s o b l i g a t i o n , then, i n addition 
to or s u b s t i t u t i o n for ( I know not which) any provable damages 
for the breach, he loses both the goods and the price i n case 
the goods are l o s t at sea". 
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from the re-vesting of r i s k i n the s e l l e r . Normally a contract can be 
f r u s t r a t e d i f the s e l l e r has r i s k , as he has i n the section 32(3) 
s i t u a t i o n . Section 7 expressly provides, however, that the contract may 
only be f r u s t r a t e d "before the r i s k passes to the buyer" and, i n the 
section 32(3) s i t u a t i o n , i t w i l l have passed to the buyer, though i t w i l l 
subsequently be taken to re-vest i n the s e l l e r . Should the Court decide 
that the important factor i s the fact that the s e l l e r does have the 
r i s k , rather than the fact that i t has previously, and temporarily, passed 
to the buyer, i t may yet experience further d i f f i c u l t i e s i n applying 
section 7 i n these circumstances. Certainly the contract could, as 
required by the section, be an "agreement to s e l l " rather than a sale, 
for r i s k may have passed to the buyer ahead of property. A more taxing 
problem, however, whould be to determine, i n such circumstances, 
whether the goods have perished "without any f a u l t " on the part of the 
s e l l e r ? "Fault", as has previously been indicated, includes "any 
wrongful act or default" and, quite c l e a r l y , the s e l l e r has, i n the 
section 32(3) s i t u a t i o n , "defaulted" i n r e l a t i o n to his o b l i g a t i o n to 
give notice to the buyer s u f f i c i e n t to enable him to insure the goods. 
I t i s not, however, clear whether the reference to " f a u l t " i n section 7 
incorporates i n t o that section a f a u l t notion i n r e l a t i o n to causation or 
whether i t has a wider meaning. The f a i l u r e of the s e l l e r to give notice 
w i l l not cause the goods to perish and, i f the reference to " f a u l t " r e l a t e 
to causation, the s e l l e r w i l l not be at f a u l t . An element of f a u l t 
attaches to the s e l l e r ' s performance of his contractual obligations, 
however, and should the reference to " f a u l t " be given a wide meaning, 
section 7 w i l l not apply. 
I f section 7 can be applied i n the section 32(3) s i t u a t i o n , the 
s e l l e r and buyer w i l l each share an aspect of r i s k . The s e l l e r , having 
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the r i s k , may lose his r i g h t to sue for the" price, w h i l s t the buyer, 
because of the l i k e l i h o o d of the contract being f r u s t r a t e d , may lose 
his r i g h t to sue for non-delivery and, as a r e s u l t , that part of the 
value of the goods which exceeds the contract price. I t i s submitted 
however, that section 7 should not apply i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , for the 
fact that the s e l l e r i s "deemed" to have the r i s k , as a r e s u l t of 
section 32(3) should not obscure the fact that r i s k has, i n r e a l i t y , 
passed to the buyer. Section 7 could, i n any event, only apply where 
property had not passed to the buyer. Further, where the goods are 
purely generic there w i l l be no question of f r u s t r a t i o n . Generally, 
therefore, section 32(3) w i l l not r e s u l t i n any apportionment of r i s k 
I t w i l l , however, notionally re-vest r i s k i n the s e l l e r . 
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PART THREE 
FRUSTRATION OF THE CONTRACT 
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The perishing of goods which form the subject matter of a contract 
of sale w i l l not, of i t s e l f , discharge the contract: 
a man i s not discharged from his o b l i g a t i o n of f u l -
f i l l i n g his contract because he i s able t o say that he 
could not f u l f i l i t . This i s one of the main reasons f o r 
his paying damages, that he could not f u l f i l it" A 
The contract w i l l be discharged only where the perishing of the goods 
r e s u l t s i n a f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract; and that w i l l occur where the 
perishing of the goods r e s u l t s i n : 
a) the ap p l i c a t i o n of the r u l e contained i n section 7 Sale of 
Goods Act 1979; or 
b) the ap p l i c a t i o n of common law p r i n c i p l e s which recognise 
th a t the contract i s f r u s t r a t e d . 
per Rowlatt J. Sargant and Sons v. Paterson and Co. (1923) 129 L.T. 
471, 473. 
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SECTION A: 
FRUSTRATION BY SECTION 7 SALE OF GOODS ACT 1979 
Section 7 of the 1979 Act provides t h a t : 
"Where there i s an agreement to s e l l s p e c i f i c goods and sub-
sequently the goods, without any f a u l t on the part of the 
s e l l e r or buyer, perish before the r i s k passes to the buyer, 
the agreement i s thereby avoided." 
Must the Goods be Specific? 
I t w i l l be seen that t h i s section appears to r e l a t e only to 
spe c i f i c goods, which goods are defined i n section 61(1) of the Act as 
being "... i d e n t i f i e d and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale i s 
made". Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, however, was of the opinion that section 7 
applied whether the goods had been i d e n t i f i e d at the time of contract or 
2 
not or, indeed, whether i n existence at the time of contract or not. 
Chalmers r e l i e d upon dicta by Mellish J. i n Howell v. Coupland 3 r e l a t i n g 
to a contract for the supply of 200 tons of potatoes to be grown on a 
pa r t i c u l a r farm. Mellish J. asserted t h a t : 
"This i s not l i k e the case of a contract to deliver so many goods 
of a p a r t i c u l a r kind, where no sp e c i f i c goods are to be sold. 
Here there was an agreement to s e l l and buy 200 tons of a crop 
to be grown on spec i f i c land, so that i t i s an agreement to s e l l 
what w i l l be, and may be called s p e c i f i c things; therefore 
neither party i s l i a b l e i f the performance becomes impossible." 
The d e f i n i t i o n contained i n section 61(1) i s , of course, inconsistent with 
such a conclusion. Goods which have not been i d e n t i f i e d or agreed upon 
at the moment of contract cannot, under the d e f i n i t i o n , be sp e c i f i c goods. 
However, i t may not follow from t h i s that section 7 cannot apply to such 
goods. 
Chalmers "Sale of Goods Act 1893" (16th ed) page 74. 
3(1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258, 262. 
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Consider, for example, an analogous s i t u a t i o n , involving section 52 
of the Act. That section provides: 
"In any action for breach of contract to deliver s p e c i f i c or 
ascertained goods the court may, i f i t thinks f i t , on the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s application ... d i r e c t that the contract s h a l l 
be performed s p e c i f i c a l l y 
The express reference to "specific or ascertained goods" i n section 52 
would appear to indicate that the section does not extend to contracts 
for unascertained goods. In Sky Petroleum v. V.I.P. Petroleum L t d . , 4 
however, the High Court s p e c i f i c a l l y enforced a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods i n circumstances i n which damages would, i n the 
opinion of the Court, have been inadequate. (The contract was f o r the 
supply of p e t r o l to a f i l l i n g s t a t i o n , and the breach occurred during the 
1973 p e t r o l c r i s i s . ) I n doing so Goulding J. recognised the d i f f i c u l t y 
presented by the words of the section but asserted that the Court should 
not be confined by those words but should look rather to the 'ratio behind 
the r u l e " ^ or, i n other words, t o the mischief. The r a t i o behind the rule 
contained i n section 52 was, to Goulding J., the p r i n c i p l e that s p e c i f i c 
performance of a contract for the sale of goods should never be awarded 
where damages would be an adequate remedy. In v i r t u a l l y a l l cases 
damages would adequately compensate a purchaser for the non-delivery of 
unascertained goods, f o r , with the damages, he could re-enter the market 
and purchase the goods he requires. Where, however, there was no a v a i l -
able market (as was the case for p e t r o l i n 1973) the goods, though 
unascertained, acquired a uniqueness which made them sin g u l a r l y important. 
Having such importance, the unascertained goods f e l l w i t h i n the r a t i o 
underpinning the words of section 52 and the section could be applied to 
4 /"1974_7 1 A l l E.R. 954. 
''at page 956. 
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the contract for t h e i r sale. I t would, presumably, be possible to extend 
t h i s approach to section 7 Sale of Goods Act and f i n d that goods other 
than s p e c i f i c goods could be embraced by th a t section. The draftsman, 
u/e may assume, referred to spec i f i c goods only on the basis that the 
destruction of unascertained goods should not be taken to f r u s t r a t e a 
contract for t h e i r sale, as further supplies of such goods would be a v a i l 
able to the seller.so as to enable him to perform his contractual under-
taking. I f the goods were ascertained at the time of destruction 
property would, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , have passed to the buyer and i t was 
manifestly not the draftsman's i n t e n t i o n to f r u s t r a t e a contract i n 
which property had passed.^ I f t h i s i s so, and the reference to spec i f i c 
goods i s merely an attempt to exclude the perishing of ascertained goods 
or unascertained goods which can be replaced ( i . e . purely generic 
unascertained goods), i t would be open to a Court to include w i t h i n the 
" r a t i o " of section 7 the destruction of unascertained goods from a 
speci f i c source. 
Whether a court would be prepared to do so i s , of course, another 
question. Prior to 1943, i t would have mattered l i t t l e whether such a 
contract was fr u s t r a t e d by section 7 or by normal principles of common 
law. The passing of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 has, 
however, changed t h i s , for the provisions of that Act do not apply to 
contracts f r u s t r a t e d by section 7. As a r e s u l t , i t i s a matter of some 
doubt that a court would s t r i v e to bring w i t h i n section 7 a s i t u a t i o n 
which would otherwise a t t r a c t the provisions of the 1943 Act. 
Property and Risk must not have passed 
Section 7 w i l l not apply to contracts i n which property has passed 
the section only applies where there i s "an agreement to s e l l " . 
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for the draftsman expressly r e f e r s only to an "agreement to s e l l " . Nor 
w i l l i t apply to a contract i n which the r i s k of loss has passed to the 
buyer. Various commentators^ conclude from t h i s t h a t the perishing of the 
goods cannot f r u s t r a t e an executed contract for the sale of those goods. 
Surely, however, the only l e g i t i m a t e conclusion t h a t can be drawn from 
the wording of section 7 i s t h a t there can be no f r u s t r a t i o n under 
section 7 of a contract i n which property, or r i s k , or both property and 
r i s k , has passed to the, buyer. Whether there can be a common law 
f r u s t r a t i o n of such contracts w i l l be discussed elsewhere. For the 
moment, however, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h that for section 7 to 
apply neither property nor r i s k must be with the buyer. 
There i s also a u t h o r i t y f o r the proposition t h a t an agreement w i l l 
not be avoided by section 7 where the parties have determined that r i s k 
g 
s h a l l l i e with the s e l l e r . I n Logan v. I_e Mesurier, the J u d i c i a l 
Committee of the Privy Council considered a s i t u a t i o n i n which s p e c i f i c 
goods were destroyed p r i o r to t h e i r measurement and consequent deter-
mination of the p r i c e . The Court held t h a t r i s k had not passed to the buyer 
and, r i s k being with the s e l l e r , i t was :he who should bear the l o s s . 
The s e l l e r was, accordingly, ordered to r e t u r n the price paid by the 
purchaser. This part of the judgment i s unexceptional and i s not incon-
s i s t e n t with the operation of the r u l e contained i n section 7. The s e l l e r 
was, however, also ordered to pay damages for non-delivery. The basis of 
the award of damages i s not explained i n Lord Brougham's judgement"^ and i s 
d i f f i c u l t to determine. I t i s argued i n Benjamin's "Sale of Goods''"^ 
see, for example, Fridman "Sale of Goods" page 243. 
^see Section E of t h i s Part. 
9(1847) 13 E.R. 628. 
1 0 s e t out at 13 E.R. 634. 
n a r t . 426. 
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that the case indicates the Court's willingness to f i n d that the parties 
had agreed that the goods were to be at the s e l l e r ' s r i s k u n t i l property 
had been transferred t o the buyer and that such agreement resulted i n a 
s i t u a t i o n i n which the " f r u s t r a t i n g event" did not avoid the contract. 
I f c o r rect, t h i s would mean that section 7 w i l l not avoid a contract 
where the parties have agreed that r i s k s h a l l l i e with the s e l l e r u n t i l 
property i s transferred to the buyer. 
This proposition appears, however, to ignore the fa c t that goods 
are always at the s e l l e r ' s r i s k p r i o r t o the buyer acquiring r i s k and 
t h a t , normally, r i s k i s transferred to the buyer at the same time as 
property. I n any event, the fact that the goods are at the s e l l e r ' s r i s k 
w i l l not impose an obl i g a t i o n upon him to pay damages for non-delivery, 
but w i l l merely determine that he w i l l not be able to secure recompense from 
the buyer for his loss i n the event of the goods perishing. A court would 
need to ;be s a t i s f i e d that the parties intended the s e l l e r t o bear the 
r i s k of a f r u s t r a t i n g event occurring, rather than mere r i s k of 
destruction of the goods, i f i t was to be i n a position to impose upon the 
s e l l e r l i a b i l i t y i n damages for non-delivery. Moreover, i t may be that the 
award of damages i n Logan v. Le Mesurier did not depend upon the presumed 
i n t e n t i o n of the parties as to r i s k . There had been, i n that case, a breach 
of contract prior to the " f r u s t r a t i n g event", for the goods had not been 
delivered at the agreed place of delivery upon the agreed day. The sub-
sequent f r u s t r a t i n g event would not, retrospectively, erase t h i s breach 
and damages would have been available to the buyer as compensation for t h i s 
e a r l i e r breach rather than for the non-delivery r e s u l t i n g from the 
perishing of the goods. I f so, i t would appear that any express or implied 
agreement between the parties that the s e l l e r s h a l l bear the r i s k of 
destruction of the goods w i l l c e r t a i n l y have the e f f e c t of ensuring that 
- 98 -
the buyer does not bear t h i s r i s k , but w i l l not be taken to i n t e r f e r e with 
the operation of section 7. 
Fault 
A further requirement of section 7 i s that the goods must perish 
without any f a u l t on the part of s e l l e r or buyer. Obviously there can 
be no f r u s t r a t i o n where either party i s at f a u l t and, as a r e s u l t of that 
f a u l t , the goods perish. Thus, there w i l l be no f r u s t r a t i o n where either 
s e l l e r or buyer has defaulted i n the making (or taking) of delivery. As a 
r e s u l t , i f the s e l l e r has been at f a u l t i n not e f f e c t i n g delivery t o the 
buyer the goods w i l l , because of section 20(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979, be 
at the r i s k of the s e l l e r who must bear the loss of the goods and, 
section 7 of the Act not applying because of his f a u l t , the s e l l e r w i l l 
also be l i a b l e t o the buyer for damages for non-delivery. Where the 
buyer has, as a r e s u l t of f a u l t , not taken delivery of the goods he w i l l , 
s i m i l a r l y , bear the r i s k of loss and w i l l be l i a b l e i n damages for non-
acceptance. 
What, however, i f f a u l t i s not causative of the loss? Consider, for 
example, a s i t u a t i o n i n which a s e l l e r has agreed to s e l l s p e c i f i c goods 
which are not merchantable or which deviate from t h e i r contract description. 
W i l l the s e l l e r ' s f a u l t take the contract outside the provisions of 
section 7 so that there w i l l be no f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract should the 
goods perish p r i o r to the passing of property and risk? Perhaps i t can 
be argued that i n the above s i t u a t i o n the s e l l e r does not break his contract, 
I t may be that the s e l l e r i s e n t i t l e d to the "replacement value"-of his 
goods by v i r t u e of the buyer having the r i s k of loss and that recovery 
of p r o f i t depends upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the action for damages. 
(See Part Two) 
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and, thus, i s not at f a u l t , u n t i l delivery i s effected. U n t i l d e livery, 
then, there may be no f a u l t on the part of the s e l l e r , the contingent 
l i a b i l i t y , which would have developed i n t o actual l i a b i l i t y but for 
delivery being prevented by the goods perishing, being i r r e l e v a n t . 
A more subtle form of non-causative f a u l t may, however, prove more 
taxing. I t may be that the f a u l t of the s e l l e r relates to the precautions 
he should have taken to ensure the safety of the goods. He may not have 
taken the steps that a reasonable businessman would have taken to have 
prevented t h e i r perishing. I t may be, however, that had he taken such 
steps, these normal precautions would not, i n the event, have been 
s u f f i c i e n t to have prevented the goods perishing as a r e s u l t of some 
enormous and unpredictable intervention by the forces of nature. W i l l the 
contract be fr u s t r a t e d as a r e s u l t of t h i s unforeseen and non-preventable 
natural intervention, or w i l l the s e l l e r ' s f a u l t preclude the application 
of section 7? Section 20(2) of the Act which refers to "... any loss which 
might not have occurred but f o r such f a u l t " c l e a r l y requires f a u l t t o have 
been a l i k e l y cause of the loss; the causative nature of the f a u l t i s not, 
however, expressly referred to i n section 7 and, indeed, by t h i s omission 
may be taken to have been excluded. Would, then, the s e l l e r ' s f a u l t i n 
the above s i t u a t i o n render him l i a b l e i n damages for non-delivery even 
though he would not have been i n a position t o deliver had he not been at 
f a u l t ? 
Exclusion of section 7 
I t i s possible that the operation of section 7 cannot be prevented 
by contrary agreement. Section 55(1) Sale of Goods Act provides: 
Section 14(2) refers to the goods supplied under the contract being 
merchantable, w h i l s t section 13 provides that the goods s h a l l (at the time 
of delivery!) correspond with t h e i r description. 
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"Where a r i g h t , duty or l i a b i l i t y would arise under a contract 
of sale of goods by implication of law, i t may (subject to the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977) be negatived or varied by 
express agreement, or by the course of dealing between the 
pa r t i e s , or by such usage as binds both parties to the contract." 
This sub-section refers to " r i g h t s , duties or l i a b i l i t i e s " which arise by 
implication of law. I t may be argued that section 7 does not create 
r i g h t s , duties or l i a b i l i t i e s , but rather, by i t s operation, negatives 
them. I f so, section 55(1) w i l l not apply to section 7. Further support 
for the view that section 7 may not be excluded by agreement i s to be found 
i n the wording of the section and of other sections w i t h i n the Act. 
Sections such as sections 20 and 33 expressly provide that they operate 
"unless otherwise agreed". A perusal of Part IV of the Act indicates that 
these words are a "golden formula" used by the draftsman to signal his 
i n t e n t i o n that the parties are free to vary his statutory terms i n t h e i r 
contracts. There i s no such wording i n section 7 which may, by 
im p l i c a t i o n , indicate that the section must apply i n any s i t u a t i o n i n which 
i t s provisions have been s a t i s f i e d . 
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SECTION B; 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CONTRACT BEING FRUSTRATED BY SECTION 7 
Where the several requirements of section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 
have been f u l f i l l e d the section provides that "... the agreement i s 
thereby avoided". I t would appear from t h i s wording that the agreement 
automatically ceases to e x i s t upon the goods perishing. I t does not, 
14 
however, cease to have existed; i n the Fibrosa case, Lord Porter, 
r e f e r r i n g to the section 7 s i t u a t i o n , pointed to "... a contract v a l i d l y 
made and continuing i n existence u n t i l the goods perish"'^ and asserted 
that the contract "... i s not void ab i n i t i o , but further performance i s 
excused a f t e r the destruction has taken p l a c e " . ^ I t would appear, then, 
that where a contract i s f r u s t r a t e d by operation of section 7: 
1) both parties are released from a l l obligations which had- not 
accrued at the time of the perishing of the goods; 
2) any o b l i g a t i o n which had accrued before t h i s time must be 
performed; 
3) any o b l i g a t i o n which had accrued and which had been performed 
remains undisturbed. 
In short,- the r i g h t s and obligations of the parties are determined as at the 
time the goods perish. The provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943 do not apply, for section 2(5) of that Act provides 
t h a t : "This Act s h a l l not apply ... 
... (c) to any contract to which section seven of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 .... applies ..." The consequences of f r u s t r a t i o n are, accordingly, 
those of the unamended provisions of the common law. These consequences 
w i l l now be considered i n d e t a i l . 
14 
A.' 
15 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. /~1943 7 
at page 83. 
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Discharge of both parties i n r e l a t i o n to Obligations which have not 
Accrued 
Benjamin's "Sale of Goods" states unequivocally that .... "The 
e f f e c t of the operation of section 7 i s that the agreement i s avoided. 
Both parties are released from a l l obligations which have not yet 
accrued at the time at which the goods perish"."^ On the wording of the 
section t h i s i s the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn. 
Gl a n v i l l e Williams asserts,"^ however, t h a t the wording of the s t a t u t e 
r e s u l t s from the draftsman's mistaken i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r a t i o of 
18 
Taylor v. Caldwell.- He maintains t h a t , i n the section 7 s i t u a t i o n , the 
s e l l e r should be treated as being discharged from his obligations by 
v i r t u e of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of performance subsequent to the perishing of 
the goods which form the subject matter of the contract. The buyer, 
however, should be treated as being discharged not by reason of impos-
s i b i l i t y of performance, for he may perform h i s o b l i g a t i o n under the 
contract ( i . e . payment of the p r i c e ) , but rather by f a i l u r e of consideration 
by reason of the s e l l e r ' s i n a b i l i t y to perform. More w i l l be said of t h i s 
approach l a t e r . Where, however, section 7 applies to a contract for the sale 
of goods i t would appear clear from the wording a c t u a l l y used by the 
draftsman, whether r e s u l t i n g from a mistake or not, t h a t both pa r t i e s are 
discharged by reason of the contract being avoided. 
I t w i l l be recalled from Part One, that goods may be taken to have 
perished where, i n r e a l i t y , some considerable por t i o n of the goods remain 
19 
i n existence. In Barrow Lane Ltd. v. P h i l l i p P h i l l i p s and Company Ltd., 
16 a r t . 428. page 202. 
17 The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" page 82. 
18 (1863) 3 B. and S. 826. 
19 /"1929 7 1 K.B. 574. 
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for example, a consignment of 700 bags of nuts was taken ta have 
perished as a r e s u l t of 109 of the bags having been sto l e n . I n a 
s i t u a t i o n i n which goods are deemed to have perished i n t h i s way and i n 
which section 7 applies, w i l l the buyer be able to i n s i s t that the goods 
which have not ac t u a l l y perished should be delivered? I t i s submitted 
20 
tha t he can not. In Sainsbury Ltd. v. Street Flackenna J. distinguished 
two, s i m i l a r , s i t u a t i o n s : 
a) the Howell v. Coupland s i t u a t i o n , i n which there i s an agree-
ment to buy goods subject t o a condition precedent th a t s u f f i c i e n t 
goods be grown or acquired by the s e l l e r (or t o a condition sub-
sequent which w i l l determine the contract i f s u f f i c i e n t goods are 
not a v a i l a b l e ) ; 
b) the s i t u a t i o n i n which section 7 Sale of Goods Act applies. 
In the former s i t u a t i o n , he was able to assert t h a t the existence of a 
condition r e l i e v i n g the s e l l e r of his o b l i g a t i o n t o make complete 
delivery need not excuse him from d e l i v e r i n g the smaller, a v a i l a b l e , 
quantity should the buyer be w i l l i n g t o accept i t . Having distinguished 
the two s i t u a t i o n s , and having addressed himself t o the former (and f o r 
him, relevant) s i t u a t i o n , he did not comment on the l a t t e r . His judg-
ment does, however, demonstrate th a t the Howell v. Coupland s i t u a t i o n 
and the section 7 s i t u a t i o n are d i s t i n c t and t h a t j u d i c i a l comments made 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the former cannot be taken to apply to the l a t t e r . In 
the l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n , the words of the st a t u t e are clear and unambiguous. 
S i m i l a r l y clear wording i n section 6 of the Sale of Goods Act has caused 
the e ditors of Benjamin's "Sale of Goods" t o question the suggestion 
that a buyer can i n s i s t upon a reduced delivery i n a section 6 s i t u a t i o n : 
2 0 /"1972 7 3 A l l E.R, 1127. 
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" I t has been suggested that the buyer may always i f he wishes 
waive his r i g h t t o f u l l and complete delivery and i n s i s t on 
having the remainder i f he i s w i l l i n g to pay the f u l l contract 
p r i c e , or perhaps i n a proper case, the appropriate part of a 
d i v i s i b l e p r i c e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how t h i s can be_ 21 
reconciled with the statutory rule that the contract i s void". 
Equally, i t i s submitted, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how a buyer's claim to 
entitlement to delivery can survive an avoidance of a contract by 
section 7. By contrast, i t may be noted that section 7(2) American 
Uniform Sales Act provides that i f the goods have perished i n part or 
have wholly or i n a material part so deteriorated i n q u a l i t y as to be 
sub s t a n t i a l l y changed i n character, the buyer can, at his option, t r e a t 
the sale as avoided or as t r a n s f e r r i n g property i n e x i s t i n g goods ( i n which 
case he must pay the whole price i f the contract was i n d i v i s i b l e ) . 
Performance of Obligations which have Accrued 
Notwithstanding the operation of section 7, the parties are bound 
to perform obligations which had accrued p r i o r to the moment at which the 
goods perished. S i m i l a r l y any performance of such obligations which had 
taken place at the time of perishing w i l l remain undisturbed. In Chandler 
22 
v. Webster Collins M.R. asserted t h a t : 
"... where, from causes outside the v o l i t i o n of the p a r t i e s , 
something which was the basis of, or essential to the f u l f i l m e n t of, 
the contract has become impossible, so t h a t , from the time when the 
fact of that i m p o s s i b i l i t y has been ascertained, the contract can 
no further be performed by either party, i t remains a perfec t l y 
good contract up to that point and everything previously done i n 
pursuance of i t must be treated as r i g h t l y done". 
23 
Thus, to borrow an example provided by Lord Atkin i n the Fibrosa case, 
i f "A agrees to s e l l a horse to B for £50, delivery to be made i n a month 
21 
a r t . 119, page 75. 
2 2 /"1904 7 1 K.B. 493 at 499, 23 at page 50, 
- 105 -
the price to be paid f o r t h w i t h , but the property not to pass t i l l 
d e l i v e r y , and B t o pay A each u/eek an agreed sum for keep of the horse 
during the month", then, i f the horse dies i n a f o r t n i g h t , D i s bound 
to pay the sum due for the f o r t n i g h t . 
The purchaser may, however, bring an action for recovery of any 
par i of the price paid (the f u l l £50 i n the above example) where there 
has been a t o t a l f a i l u r e of consideration. The action i s quasi-contractual 
for money had and. received: 
"The claim for money had and received i s not ... a claim for 
further performance of the contract. I t i s a claim outside the 
contract. I f the parties are l e f t where they are, one feature of 
the p o s i t i o n i s that the one who has received the prepayment i s 
l e f t i n possession of a sum of money which belongs to the 
other. The f r u s t r a t i o n does not change the property i n the 
money, nor i s the contract wiped out altogether, but only the 
future performance".24 
Compensation for Expenses Incurred 
As the provisions of the 1943 Act do not apply to contracts avoided 
by section 7 of the 1979 Act, there i s no provision by which the s e l l e r 
can recover a share of expenses incurred p r i o r to f r u s t r a t i o n . 
Moreover, because of the decision i n the Fibrosa case he w i l l have to 
refund, i n f u l l , any part of the purchase price which has been paid over 
(assuming that there has been a f a i l u r e of consideration) and w i l l , 
thus, not be permitted to r e t a i n any portion of that sum to compensate 
him for expenses incurred. 
Payment for Goods Delivered 
25 
I f a contract of sale i s non-severable, the rule i n Cutter v. Powell 
would lead one to conclude that there can be no payment for goods delivered 
per Lord Wright, the Fibrosa page 71. 
(1795) 6 T.R. 320. 
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i n part-performance of a contract, p r i o r t o the perishing of the 
remainder of the goods contracted f o r . 
26 
Atiyah asserts, however, that i t may be possible to imply a 
contract under which the purchaser i s obliged to pay for the goods he 
has received. This implied contract would, he suggests, arise from the 
purchaser's r e f u s a l to re t u r n t o the s e l l e r the goods delivered t o him. 
27 
There i s some j u d i c i a l support f o r t h i s view; i n Pattinson v. Luckley, 
Bramwell B. indicated t h a t ... " I n the case of goods sold and delivered, 
i t i s easy t o shew a contract from the r e t e n t i o n of the goods 
Whether or not there would be s i m i l a r support i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which a 
contract has a c t u a l l y been made, but the s e l l e r urges the court t o imply 
another, to assist him i n his claim f o r part-payment, i s , of course, f a r 
from c e r t a i n . I t would seem, however, that a court might be more w i l l i n g 
t o imply a contract where goods have been delivered than i n other circum-
stances i n which there has been part-performance (say, f o r example, p a r t -
completion of a b u i l d i n g ) . The reason f o r t h i s i s the option t h a t the 
28 
purchaser of goods has to r e t u r n a p a r t - d e l i v e r y t o the s e l l e r and 
thereby r e f r a i n from taking the be n e f i t of the s e l l e r ' s a c t i o n ; " i t i s 
only where the circumstances are such as t o give that option that there i s 
29 
any evidence on which to ground the inference of a new contract". 
""The Sale of Goods" (4th ed) page 173. 
2 7(1875) L.R. 10 Ex. 330. 
2 8 I n B.P. Exploration v. Hunt (No. 2) /"1979_7 1 W.L.R. 783, however, 
Goff L.J. asserted ( a t page 806) that "unlike money, services can never 
be restored, nor usually can goods, since they are l i k e l y t o have been 
consumed or disposed of, or to have depreciated i n value". 
2 9 p e r Collins L.J., Sumpter v. Hedges /"1898 7 1 Q.B. 676. 
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There may be, however, no need to refe r t o quasi-contractual 
p r i n c i p l e s where, p r i o r t o goods perishing, the s e l l e r has made a part-
delivery. Section 30(1) Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides: 
"Where the s e l l e r delivers t o the buyer a quantity of goods 
less than he contracted to s e l l , the buyer may r e j e c t them, 
but i f the buyer accepts the goods so delivered he must pay for 
them at the contract r a t e " . 
The wording of the sub-section would seem to cover the s i t u a t i o n 
presently envisaged. Professor Atiyah suggests^ that section 30(1) 
has no application i n such a s i t u a t i o n "... because i t postulates circum-
stances i n which the delivery of only part of the goods i s a breach of 
contract, and i n which the buyer may r e j e c t that part at once'. The 
case put here / " i . e . the s i t u a t i o n i n which there has been a par t -
delivery p r i o r t o f r u s t r a t i o n 7 i s one i n which the delivery of part of 
the goods i s not a breach of contract and the buyer cannot therefore r e j e c t 
them when delivered". I t may be that a court would be persuaded by t h i s 
argument. I t should be noted, however, th a t the sub-section only imposes 
upon the buyer an obligation t o pay for the part-delivery where he 
"accepts" the goods and, by v i r t u e of section 35 of the Act, mere retention 
of the goods would not, by i t s e l f , c o nstitute an acceptance u n t i l a 
"reasonable time" had elapsed. Presumably, where there has been a part-
delivery p r i o r t o f r u s t r a t i o n , a court would not consider a reasonable 
time t o have elapsed u n t i l such time as the goods had been retained by 
the purchaser i n f u l l knowledge that the remainder of the goods contracted 
for had perished and would not be delivered. 3''' I f section 30(1) does 
apply i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i t should be noted that the buyer w i l l not be 
l i a b l e to pay merely a reasonable price for the goods delivered, he w i l l 
be l i a b l e t o pay at the contract rate. 
3 0"The Sale of Goods" (4th ed) page 173. 
^ I t i s , admittedly, also possible that the buyer could r e - s e l l the goods 
delivered, thereby accepting them, and render himself l i a b l e to pay for 
those goods wh i l s t unaware that l a t e r d e l i v e r i e s were not to follow. 
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SECTION C: 
FRUSTRATION AT COMMON LAW 
Section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies only to the perishing of 
spe c i f i c goods. A s e l l e r i n possession of unascertained goods which 
perish w i l l normally f i n d a court unsympathetic to any claim that a contract 
of sale should, as a r e s u l t , be f r u s t r a t e d : 
"... a bare and unqualified contract for the sale of unascertained 
goods w i l l not (unless most special facts compel an opposite 
implication) be dissolved by the operation of the p r i n c i p l e of 
K r e l l v. Henry even though there has been so grave and unforeseen 
a change i n circumstances as to render i t impossible for the 
vendor to f u l f i l his bargain".32 
In most circumstances, of course, the perishing of the s e l l e r ' s stock of 
unascertained goods w i l l not prevent him from discharging his contractual 
obligations, for he w i l l be free to secure replacements for the goods 
tha t have perished. 
Where, however, the s e l l e r has contracted to deliver unascertained 
goods from a sp e c i f i c source, the position may w e l l be d i f f e r e n t ; f o r , 
should the sp e c i f i c source perish, i t w i l l be impossible to deliver 
goods which correspond to the contract description. There are no 
reported cases i n which the courts have recognised f r u s t r a t i o n of a 
contract of t h i s type, but there are statements of p r i n c i p l e which are 
33 
wide enough to embrace the s i t u a t i o n . In re Badische Co., Bayer Co. etc., 
for example, Russell J. asserted that "... I can see no reason why, given 
the necessary circumstances to e x i s t , the doctrine /"of f r u s t r a t i o n 7 
should not apply equally to unascertained goods. I t i s , of course, 
obvious from the nature of the contract that the necessary circumstances 
32 
per McCardie J., Blackburn Bobbin Company v. T.W. Allen and Sons 
/"1918_7 1 K.B. 540, 550. 
3 3 /"1921 7 2 Ch. 331, 382. 
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can only very r a t e l y arise i n the case of unascertained goods. That 
they may arise appears to me undoubted One of the circumstances 
i n which Russell J. anticipated the p o s s i b i l i t y of f r u s t r a t i o n was 
where the goods had, i n his words, "almost a sp e c i f i c t o u c h " . I t 
seems l i k e l y , then, that there i s at least one s i t u a t i o n i n which there 
w i l l be a common law f r u s t r a t i o n of a contract of sale r e s u l t i n g from 
the perishing of goods; that i n which the goods are unascertained, but 
to be drawn from a sp e c i f i c bulk. 
Glanville Williams suggests another that i n which the goods 
which have perished were, at the time of contract, unascertained, but, 
p r i o r to t h e i r perishing, have become ascertained. I f , he maintains, r i s k 
has not passed to the buyer at the time of the goods perishing (as a 
r e s u l t , perhaps, of express agreement between the p a r t i e s ) , then the 
se l l e r w i l l be discharged from his o b l i g a t i o n to deliver by the rule i n 
Taylor v. Caldwell and the buyer w i l l be discharged from his obl i g a t i o n 
to pay the price because of a f a i l u r e of consideration. I t may be 
possible to deny the l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s outcome i n such a s i t u a t i o n by 
reference t o the fact that i t i s inconsistent with the common law approach 
to unascertained goods. Ascertained goods are, i n e f f e c t , goods which 
are so designated when a contract for the sale of unascertained goods has 
been performed t o some extent ( i . e . at least as far as i s necessary t o 
enable the goods to be i d e n t i f i e d ) . The contract i s s t i l l , i n essence, 
one for unascertained goods and the uniqueness of the goods results more 
from the operation of legal rules designed t o bring i n t o operation con-
cepts of property and r i s k than from any fee l i n g expressed by the p a r t i e s . 
at page 383. 
"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" page 89. 
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For the buyer, and indeed for the s e l l e r , the goods w i l l be replaceable. 
However, there i s no doubt that ascertained goods have "almost a 
spe c i f i c touch" and t h e i r uniqueness to the buyer i s suggested i n 
section 52 of the 1979 Act which permits s p e c i f i c performance of a con-
t r a c t t o deliver goods which are speci f i c or, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , ascertained. 
I t i s possible that the "quasi-specific" nature of these goods would r e s u l t 
i n f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract should, they perish. I f so, i t seems clear 
that such goods are not sp e c i f i c w i t h i n the meaning of section 61(1) 
and that section 7 Sale of Goods Act could not apply. Any f r u s t r a t i o n of 
the contract would, therefore, have to be at common law. 
A t h i r d s i t u a t i o n i n which there may be f r u s t r a t i o n at common law i s 
the Howell v. Coupland 3^ s i t u a t i o n . I n that case there was an agreement 
to purchase 200 tons of regent potatoes grown on a specific parcel of 
land belonging to the s e l l e r . S u f f i c i e n t of t h i s land was sown to produce 
the required crops, but, because of potato b l i g h t , the crop f a i l e d . The 
s e l l e r u/as, at f i r s t instance and on appeal, relieved of his obligations. 
37 38 At f i r s t instance Blackburn J. asserted t h a t : 
"The p r i n c i p l e of Taylor v. Caldwell which was followed i n 
Appleby v. Myers i n the Exchequer Chamber, at a l l events, 
decides that where there i s a contract with respect to a 
pa r t i c u l a r t h i n g , and that thing cannot be delivered owing to 
a perishing without any default i n the s e l l e r , the delivery i s 
excused. Of course, i f the perishing were owing t o any default 
of the s e l l e r , that would be quite another t h i n g . But here 
the crop f a i l e d e n t i r e l y owing to the b l i g h t , which no s k i l l , 
care or diligence of. the defendant could prevent ... But the 
contract was for 200 tons of a pa r t i c u l a r crop i n pa r t i c u l a r 
f i e l d s , and therefore there was an implied term i n the contract 
that each party should be free i f the crop perished. The 
property and r i s k had c l e a r l y not been transferred under the 
terms of the contract, so that the consequence of the f a i l u r e 
of the crop i s , that the bargain i s o f f so far as the 120 tons 
are concerned". 
3 6(1876) 1 Q.B.D. 258. 
3 7(1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 462. 
•3^pages 465-66. 
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The goods i n question were not such as to be s p e c i f i c w i t h i n the 
meaning of section 61(1) of the 1979 Act. In t h i s kind of s i t u a t i o n , 
therefore, section 7 of the Act w i l l not apply. How, then, would a 
39 
court proceed i n such a situation? In Sainsbury v. Street, Mackenna J. 
c i t e s with approval the conclusion of Atkin L.J. i n Re W a i t e d 0 
"The case of Howell v, Coupland would now he covered by section 5(2) 
of the Code or, as i s suggested by the learned authors of the 
l a s t two editions of 'Benjamin on Sale', by section 61(2) of the 
Code". 
There would, thus, appear to be two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
1) A court would f i n d that the contract was c o n d i t i o n a l , w i t h i n 
section 5 ( 2 ) , and that either i t had not come i n t o operation 
because of non-fulfilment of a condition precedent or had been 
discharged by condition subsequent ( i . e . by agreement). 
2) Howell v. Coupland may be taken as authority for the p r i n c i p l e 
that such a contract i s discharged by the rule i n Taylor v. 
Caldwell. I f so, t h i s common law p r i n c i p l e i s preserved by 
section 62(2) of the 1979 Act (formerly section 61(2) of the 
1893 A c t ) . 
I f the second of the above alternatives i s adhered t o , i t would, perhaps, 
be as we l l to note that Glanville Williams would, no doubt, point to the 
fa c t that the s e l l e r would be discharged under the p r i n c i p l e of Taylor v. 
Caldwell and that the buyer would be discharged because of f a i l u r e of con-
sideration. Nevertheless, these terms would, today, both be regarded as 
f a l l i n g w i t h i n the generic term " f r u s t r a t i o n " and Howell v. Coupland 
would provide a t h i r d s i t u a t i o n i n which there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of discharge 
by f r u s t r a t i o n , at common law, of a contract for the sale of goods 
which have subsequently perished. 
3 9 /"1972_7 1 W.L.R. 834, 837. 
4 0 /" 1927 7 1 Ch. 606, 631. 
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SECTION D: 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CONTRACT BEING DISCHARGED BY COMMON LAW 
Section 2(5)(c) Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 provides 
only that the provisions of that Act do not apply to contracts for the 
sale of sp e c i f i c goods which perish, section 2(5)(c) does not r e f e r t o 
contracts for the sale of non-specific goods. Thus, the provisions of 
the 1943 Act w i l l apply to any contract for the sale of unascertained or 
ascertained goods which i s fr u s t r a t e d by reason of the perishing of those 
goods. The consequences of such a contract being f r u s t r a t e d are now set 
out i n d e t a i l . 
Discharge of Both Parties 
Frustration of a contract for the sale of unascertained or ascertained 
goods w i l l r e l i e v e the s e l l e r of his obli g a t i o n to deliver and the buyer 
of his obli g a t i o n t o pay the pr i c e . This r e s u l t s from common law, not 
from the provisions of the 1943 Act, for the Act applies only to contracts 
which have been discharged i n t h i s way; the mutual discharge of the 
parties i s , i n e f f e c t , a condition precedent t o the operation of the Act, 
section 1(1) of which provides t h a t : 
"Where a contract governed by English law has become impossible of 
performance or been otherwise f r u s t r a t e d and the parties thereto 
have for that reason been discharged from the further performance 
of the contract, the following provisions of t h i s section s h a l l 
... have e f f e c t i n r e l a t i o n thereto". 
The Act c l e a r l y applies only t o contracts which have: 
a) become impossible t o perform; or 
b) been "otherwise f r u s t r a t e d " . 
41 
Glanville Williams asserts that where goods perish subsequent to an 
"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" page 22. 
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agreement for t h e i r sale i t i s only the s e l l e r who can plead impos-
s i b i l i t y of performance ( r e l y i n g upon the p r i n c i p l e i n Taylor v. Caldwell), 
for there i s nothing t o prevent the buyer from paying the price. The 
purchaser i s relieved of his obl i g a t i o n because of the fact that he has 
received nothing from the s e l l e r and there i s a f a i l u r e of con-
sideration r e s u l t i n g from the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of performance. Glanville 
Williams points, however, to the modern usage of the term " f r u s t r a t i o n " 
to embrace discharge for f a i l u r e of consideration as well as discharge 
r e s u l t i n g from i m p o s s i b i l i t y of performance. The buyer's obligations 
have, therefore, i n the terms used by the Act, been "otherwise 
f r u s t r a t e d " and the Act w i l l apply t o the contract which has been d i s -
charged. 
When a s e l l e r i s discharged by the p r i n c i p l e i n Taylor v. Caldwell, 
from his o b l i g a t i o n t o deliver i n accordance with his contractual under-
taking, the problem of a part-perishing arises, as i t does i n r e l a t i o n t o 
section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979. I t has been noted that section 7 
expressly avoids the contract and thus appears to end any claim the 
buyer has t o enforce delivery of any part of the contract goods which 
remains unscathed. Is the outcome the same where the s e l l e r i s released 
from his obl i g a t i o n by the p r i n c i p l e i n Taylor v. Caldwell rather than by 
42 
section 7 of the 1979 Act? In Howell v. Coupland, the s e l l e r , who had 
undertaken to deliver 200 tons of potatoes, delivered to the buyer 80 tons 
which survived potato b l i g h t ; what i f he had not done so? Quinn J., who 
declared himself to be applying the p r i n c i p l e i n Taylor v. Caldwell, c i t e d 
43 44 with approval a statement i n "Sheppard's Touchstone": 
4 2L.R. 9 Q.B. 462. 
43 
at pages 466-7. 
44 at page 382. 
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"And when the condition of an obl i g a t i o n i s to do one single 
t h i n g , which afterwards, before the time when i t i s to be 
done, doth become impossible to be done i n a l l or i n part, 
the o b l i g a t i o n i s wholly discharged; and yet i f i t i s possible 
to be done i n any part, i t s h a l l be performed as near to the 
condition as may be". 
Equally, Blackburn J., who also expressly applied the p r i n c i p l e i n 
45 
Taylor v. Caldwell determined that "... the consequences of the f a i l u r e 
of the crop, i s that the bargain i s o f f so f a r as the 120 tons are con-
cerned". So, for him too, the s e l l e r was only discharged from his 
obligation to del i v e r that part of the contract goods which had actu a l l y 
perished. 
I t may be, therefore, that where a s e l l e r agrees to s e l l unascertained 
goods from a s p e c i f i c bulk, the consequences of a part-perishing of the 
goods w i l l d i f f e r from those where there has been a part-perishing of 
sp e c i f i c goods. I f , for example, a s e l l e r agrees to s e l l to a buyer 100 
cases of goods from his stock of 1,000, the destruction of 950 cases i n 
the stock would not, i t appears, release him from his residual 
obligation t o deliver the remaining 50 cases. I f , however, that same 
se l l e r had agreed to s e l l to the buyer a l l of the cases i n his stock, 
then a destruction of 950 cases would seem t o r e s u l t i n the contract 
being avoided and, with i t , the obl i g a t i o n t o deliver any of the goods. 
Financial Adjustments 
Where the 1943 Act applies, the Court has power to order the 
following: 
a) recovery by the purchaser of money paid p r i o r to f r u s t r a t i o n ; 
b) retention by the s e l l e r of money paid i n advance to compensate 
for expenses incurred; 
at page 466. 
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c) recovery by the s e l l e r of payment for goods delivered p r i o r 
t o f r u s t r a t i o n . 
a) Recovery of money paid p r i o r _ t o f r u s t r a t i o n 
Where section 7 Sale of Goods Act 1979 applies, the purchaser i s only 
able t o recover a pre-payment where there has been a t o t a l f a i l u r e of 
consideration. Thus, the delivery to the purchaser, p r i o r t o f r u s t r a t i o n , 
of any part of the goods contracted for w i l l preclude the recover of any 
advance payment. Where the 1943 Act applies, however, section 1(2) 
provides t h a t : 
" A l l sums paid or payable to any party i n pursuance of the 
contract before the time when the parties were so discharged 
... s h a l l , i n the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from 
him as money received by him for the use of the party by whom 
the sums were paid, and, i n the case of sums so payable, cease 
to be payable". 
Clearly, the wording of the sub-section permits recovery of a pre-
payment even though the f a i l u r e of consideration i s only p a r t i a l . Indeed, 
the rules r e l a t i n g to f a i l u r e of consideration are not relevant, fo r the 
sub-section indicates that the pre-payment i s to be regarded as "money 
received ... for the use of the (buyer)" rather than, as might, perhaps, 
have been expected, money paid on a consideration that has f a i l e d . 
I t i s possible t o argue that a pre-payment may be ind i c a t i v e of an 
int e n t i o n by the parties to s h i f t the r i s k of loss from s e l l e r to buyer 
to the extent of the pre-payment, the s e l l e r retaining the r i s k i n 
r e l a t i o n to loss not covered by the pre-payment. I f so, section 2(3) of 
the 1943 Act would negative the provisions of section 1(2). Section 2(3) 
provides t h a t : 
"Where any contract to which t h i s Act applies contains any provision 
which, upon the true construction of the contract, i s intended to 
have e f f e c t i n the event of circumstances a r i s i n g which operate, or 
would but for the said provision operate, to f r u s t r a t e the contract, 
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or i s intended to have e f f e c t whether such circumstances arise 
or not, the court s h a l l give e f f e c t t o the said provision and 
s h a l l only give e f f e c t to /"section 1 7 to such e x t e n t , - i f any, as 
appears to the Court to be~consistent~with the said provision". 
However, a pre-payment may indicate ntohing of the kind. I t may, f o r 
example, be a payment secured as a safeguard against the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the purchaser becoming insolvent or defaulting i n payment. I t seems 
l i k e l y , therefore, that a court w i l l not, i n the words of Lord P o r t e r , ^ 
"speculate as to the object for which the advance was obtained" and w i l l 
only accept that a pre-payrnent represents an assumption of r i s k where 
the clearest language i s used by the p a r t i e s . 
b) Retention by the s e l l e r of money paid i n advance to compensate for 
expenses incurred 
The proviso t o section 1(2) of the 1943 Act stip u l a t e s t h a t : 
".... i f the party t o whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred 
expenses before the time of discharge i n , or for the purpose of, 
the performance of the contract, the Court may, i f i t considers i t 
j u s t t o do so having regard to a l l the circumstances of the case, 
allow him to r e t a i n or, as the case may be, recover the whole or 
any part of the sums so paid or payable, not being an amount i n 
excess of the expenses so incurred". 
I t i s clear that the sub-section gives the Court a di s c r e t i o n to make an 
order r e l a t i n g t o expenses; there i s no duty upon the Court and no 
corresponding r i g h t vested i n the s e l l e r . The Court only has t h i s d i s -
c r e t i o n , however, where: 
a) a payment i n advance has been made to the purchaser p r i o r to 
the perishing of the goods, or where such a payment was payable 
at that time; and 
b) the expenses have been incurred p r i o r to f r u s t r a t i o n and i n , 
or for the purpose of, the performance of the contract. 
Fibrosa case /"1943 7 A.C. 32, 78. 
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The requirement that there be a payment i n advance has been 
c r i t i c i s e d as perpetuating " i n a d i f f e r e n t form the old vice of 
Chandler v. Webster, namely, that the incidence of loss depends on the 
47 
accident of payment i n advance"; though i t i s possible to argue that a 
prudent s e l l e r w i l l make provision for his contingent loss by requiring 
advance payment from the purchaser so as to enable the Court to 
exercise i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n his favour i n the event of his having 
incurred expenses p r i o r to the perishing of the goods and the 
f r u s t r a t i o n of his contract. Whatever the merits of the r u l e , however, 
i t i s clear t h a t , generally, there can be no recovery by the s e l l e r of an 
apportionment of his expenditure; there may only be a retention of 
moneys paid over i n advance. Recovery i s only possible where an 
advance payment had f a l l e n due pr i o r t o f r u s t r a t i o n and had not been 
made. 
There i s no power to apportion expenditure which has taken place 
subsequent to the f r u s t r a t i n g event and the power t o make such an 
apportionment i n r e l a t i o n t o expenditure which preceeds the time of 
discharge exists only i f the expenditure was incurred " i n , or for the pur-
pose of, the performance of the contract". This phrase suggests that 
expenses can be awarded to the s e l l e r where he has incurred those 
expenses: 
a) " i n • • o performance of the contract"; or 
b) "for the purpose of the performance of the contract". 
Some expenditure w i l l c l e a r l y be incurred " i n performance of the 
contract" and, as such, may be awarded to the s e l l e r . Thus, the 
packaging of goods which, under the terms of the contract, are to be 
'The Law of Re s t i t u t i o n " , Goff and Jones (1st ed) page 333. 
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delivered i n packaged form w i l l be an act i n performance of the 
contract and any expenditure involved w i l l have been so incurred. What, 
however, i s meant by the words, "for the purpose of the performance of 
48 
the contract"? Glanville Williams suggests two possible in t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of these words. The "narrower" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would embrace only 
expenditure which relates to a contract which has been made but which i s 
not d i r e c t l y related to an act of performance. Thus, the purchase of 
packaging material would, i n the above example, not be expenditure 
involved'in performance" of the contract, for i t i s merely an act pre-
paratory t o performance, but c l e a r l y the expenditure has been incurred 
"for the purpose of the performance of the contract". The "wider" 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggested by Glanville Williams would also embrace 
expenditure incurred i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the contract being made; such 
expenditure not being expenditure involved " i n performance" of a 
contract, f o r , at that stage, there i s no contract to perform. 
49 
Glanville Williams suggests that the narrower of these two i n t e r -
pretations i s preferable, but Gough and J o n e s , w h i l s t accepting that the 
words "exclude expenditure incurred i n mere speculation on future 
contracts" assert that the proviso "would include expenditure incurred 
before the contract i s entered i n t o on the reasonable assumption that i t 
w i l l be made". They provide the following example: 
"A and B enter i n t o serious negotiations which, i n the l i g h t 
of past experience, A assumes w i l l very l i k e l y r e s u l t i n a 
contract. In a n t i c i p a t i o n of such contract, A incurs 
expenditure for the purpose of i t s performance. The contract 
i s duly made, but i s subsequently f r u s t r a t e d " . 
4 8"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943", page 43. 
49 
at page 44. 
5 0"The Law of R e s t i t u t i o n " (2nd ed) page 567. 
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In such a s i t u a t i o n , they conclude, A should be able to secure his 
expenses. This, of course, could only be the position i f an advance 
payment had been negotiated and such payment had either been made 
before f r u s t r a t i o n or was due at that time. 
Section 1(4) provides t h a t : 
"I n estimating for the purposes of the foregoing provisions 
of t h i s section, the amount of any expenses incurred by any 
party t o the contract, the court may ... include such sum as 
appears t o be reasonable i n respect of overhead expenses and 
i n respect of any work or services performed personally by the 
said party". 
The term "overhead expenses" i s not defined i n the Act and G l a n v i l l e 
Williams turns'^ to "Webster's Dictionary" f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of 
"Overhead Costs" which are stated t o be "... the general expenses of a 
business, as d i s t i n c t from those caused by p a r t i c u l a r pieces of t r a f f i c ; 
i n d i r e c t or undistributed costs". This d e f i n i t i o n appears to r e l a t e 
"overhead costs" to " f i x e d " , rather than "variable" costs and, i f so, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see why a s e l l e r should be compensated for a fixe d 
expenditure which could not have been avoided irrespective of the 
existence or non-existence of the contract which has been f r u s t r a t e d . 
The di s c r e t i o n afforded to the Court i s that i t may award a sum 
which does not exceed the whole of the money paid (or payable) i n 
advance. Having exercised i t s d i s c r e t i o n to award expenses, the Court 
has a further d i s c r e t i o n as to the amount to award w i t h i n t h i s 
maximum. How should t h i s d i s c r e t i o n be exercised? The Law Revision 
52 
Committee recommended that "... the payer should be e n t i t l e d to the 
repayment of a l l moneys he has paid to the payee, less the amount of any 
loss d i r e c t l y incurred by the payee for the purpose of performing the 
contract". There i s , i n t h i s recommendation, no notion of apportionment 
5 1"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943" page 55. 
52Cmmd 6009 of 1939. 
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and i t c l e a r l y envisages that the s e l l e r should have f u l l recompense for 
his expenditure, i f such i s possible out of the sum paid (or payable) 
i n advance. The rationale for t h i s view i s that " i t i s reasonable to 
assume that i n s t i p u l a t i n g for pre-payment the payee intended to protect 
himself against loss under the contract"." 3 This view i s supported by the 
words used by Luru Chancellor Simon when introducing the B i l l to the 
1943 Act i n the House of Lords: 
" I f , for example, there has been £1,000 paid i n advance or i f the 
contract that has been made confers the r i g h t to pre-payment, and 
i f he /"the s e l l e r J can show that he has already spent £800 i n 
p a r t i a l performance, he i s not required to return the £1,000, but 
only the balance of £200".54 
The rationale for t h i s view i s suspect, for the object of the advance 
may very w e l l not have been related to loss a r i s i n g under the contract. 
"The object of the advance may be to put the payee i n funds to continue 
the contract, or to protect him from loss flowing,from the payer's breach 
55 
or insolvency." I t i s d i f f i c u l t to disagree with Glanville Williams' 
suggestion^ that i n the normal case the j u s t course, as 
required by the Act, and also the s o c i a l l y desirable course, would be t o 
order the retention or repayment of h a l f the loss incurred ... not the 
whole of i t " . 
I t may, f i n a l l y , be noted that section 1(2) of the 1943 Act does 
not expressly override the r u l i n g i n the Fibrosa case that where there 
has been a t o t a l f a i l u r e of consideration, there may be recovery i n f u l l , 
without any deduction to compensate the s e l l e r for his expenditure. I t 
i s , suggests Glanville W i l l i a m s , ^ possible to argue that the proviso 
33Cmmd 6009 1939, 7. 
5 4 0 f f i c i a l Report 29 June 1943 col 138. 
5 5"The Law of R e s t i t u t i o n " Goff and Jones (2nd ed) page 567. 
5 6"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943", page 36. 
57 at page 34. 
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t o section 1(2) only operates where the purchaser needs to rely-upon 
section 1 ( 2 ) , t h a t i s to say where there has been only a p a r t i a l f a i l u r e 
of consideration. Having raised t h i s argument " f o r the sake of complete-
ness" G l a n v i l l e Williams r e j e c t s i t . I t i s submitted t h a t t h i s must be 
correct and that the Legislature intended, i n the 1943 Act, to deal, 
w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the Act, with a l l s i t u a t i o n s i n which there had been 
a pre-payment, whether or not the f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract r e s u l t e d i n 
only a p a r t i a l f a i l u r e of consideration. 
c) Recovery by the s e l l e r of payment for goods delivered p r i o r t o 
f r u s t r a t i o n 
Section 1(3) of the 1943 Act provides t h a t : 
"Where any party t o the contract has, by reason of anything done by any 
other party thereto, i n , or for the purpose of, the performance 
of the contract, obtained a valuable b e n e f i t (other than a payment 
of money to which the l a s t foregoing sub-section applies) before 
the time of discharge, there s h a l l be recoverable from him by 
the said other party such sum ( i f any), not exceeding the value of 
the said b e n e f i t t o the party obtaining i t as the court considers 
j u s t , having regard t o a l l the circumstances of the case and, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r -
(a) the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of d i s -
charge by the benef i t t e d party i n , or. for the purpose of, the 
performance of the contract, including any sums paid or payable by 
him t o any other party i n pursuance of the contract and.retained 
or recoverable by t h a t party under the l a s t foregoing sub-
section, and 
(b) the e f f e c t , i n r e l a t i o n t o the said b e n e f i t , of the c i r -
cumstances gi v i n g r i s e t o the f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract". 
Where, therefore, the s e l l e r has conferred a "valuable b e n e f i t " upon 
the purchaser p r i o r to f r u s t r a t i o n he i s e n t i t l e d t o a sum not exceeding 
the value of that b e n e f i t . In most cases, a s e l l e r who has delivered 
goods p r i o r t o discharge of the contract w i l l c l e a r l y have conferred a 
benefit upon his purchaser and w i l l , as a r e s u l t , be e n t i t l e d t o recom-
58 
pense. The wording of the sub-section i s such as to indicate that 
One s i t u a t i o n i n which there i s questionable benefit accruing t o the 
purchaser as a r e s u l t of a p a r t - d e l i v e r y , i s that i n which destruction of 
the goods which have not been delivered renders unusable those which have. 
- 122 -
there i s a r i g h t to payment, but a d i s c r e t i o n as to the amount of such 
payment. The Court may not award a sum which exceeds "the value of the 
said benefit to the party obtaining i t " , but that would appear to be the 
only l i m i t on i t s d i s c r e t i o n as to quantum. Three possible bases for 
assessment of the sum to be awarded have been suggested: 
a) that the sum should be a rateable part of the contract price* 
b) that the actual value of the goods to the buyer at the time of 
f r u s t r a t i o n should be awarded; 
c) that a reasonable price should be paid. 
The wording of the sub-section, which appears to envisage a s i t u a t i o n i n 
which less than the value conferred may be awarded, would seem to 
preclude any suggestion that the sum should always be calculated i n accord-
ance with (b) a b o v e . I t i s suggested i n Benjamin's "Sale of Goods''^ 
that " i n contracts of sale of goods, the value of the benefit should 
prima facie be assessed as a rateable part of the contract price". There 
would seem to be no f i r m basis for t h i s conclusion and no reason why the 
Court should not, at i t s d i s c r e t i o n , award a reasonable price. The 
decision, at f i r s t instance, i n B.P. Exploration Co. v. Hunt (No. 2 ) ^ 
supports t h i s view. Goff J. asserted, i n that case, t h a t : 
" F i r s t i t has to be shown that the defendant has, by reason of 
something done by the p l a i n t i f f i n , or for the purpose of, 
the performance of the contract, obtained a valuable benefit 
(other than payment of money) before the time of discharge. 
That benefit has to be i d e n t i f i e d and valued and such value forms 
the upper l i m i t of the award. Secondly, the court may award 
to the p l a i n t i f f such sum, not greater than the value of such 
bene f i t , as i t considers j u s t having regard to a l l the circum-
stances of the case62 „. the basic measure of 
recovery i n r e s t i t u t i o n i s the reasonable value of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
59 
Though Glanville Williams does suggest ("The Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943" page 47) that the sub-section appears to be based 
upon quasi-contract which normally "depends upon unjust enrichment, that 
i s upon benefit conferred upon the defendant, not detriment incurred by 
the p l a i n t i f f " . 
at page 211. 
6 1 /"1979_7 1 W.L.R. 783. 
62 at page 801. 
- 123 -
performance - i n a case of services, a quantum meruit or. 
reasonable remuneration, and i n a case of goods, a quantum 
valebat or reasonable price".63 
I t should, however, be noted that Goff J. accepted^"* t h a t "the contract 
consideration i s always relevant as providing some evidence of what w i l l 
be a reasonable sum to be awarded i n respect of the p l a i n t i f f ' s work". 
I f the Court i s prepared to sever the contract, the provisions of 
section 2(4) of the Act w i l l apply. The sub-section provides t h a t : 
"Where i t appears to the Court that a part of any contract t o 
which t h i s Act applies can properly be severed from the 
remainder of the contract, being a part wholly performed before 
the time of discharge, or so performed except for the payment 
i n respect of th a t part of the contract of sums which are or can 
be ascertained under the contract, the Court s h a l l t r e a t t h a t 
part of the contract as i f i t were a separate contract and had 
not been f r u s t r a t e d and s h a l l t r e a t the foregoing section of 
t h i s Act as only applicable t o the remainder of that contract". 
I f the contract i s severable,^ the s e l l e r w i l l be able to claim his 
contractual remuneration for the goods delivered, rather than a sum at the 
disc r e t i o n of the Court under section 1(3) and t h i s remuneration w i l l 
not be l i m i t e d by reference t o the value of the benefit conferred upon 
the buyer. The p o s s i b i l i t y of section 30(1) applying where there has, 
pri o r to f r u s t r a t i o n , been a part delivery has been discussed e a r l i e r . ^ 
I f the sub-section i s applicable there would seem to be no good reason 
why i t s operation should be affected Jay section 1(3) of the 1943 Act 
which would then, i n e f f e c t , be r e s t r i c t e d t o contracts other than those 
involving the sale of goods. 
at page B05. 
64 
Glanville Williams suggests ("The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) 
Act 1943", pages 64 and 68) that a contract of sale w i l l be severable 
i f , for example, i t consists of an agglomeration of e n t i r e parts, for each 
of which a separate consideration has been specified; or i f i t was one i n 
which the consideration appeared to be e n t i r e but was, i n f a c t , the r e s u l t 
of an express or implied agreement for payment on a pro rata basis. 
See Section B of t h i s Part. 
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Prorating 
A s e l l e r may f i n d that he has several contracts to deliver 
unascertained goods from a sp e c i f i c bulk. What would be the position 
i f , as a r e s u l t of the perishing of part of that bulk, he can perform 
some, but not a l l , of his contracts? 
The American Uniform Commercial Code" provides"' that i n such 
circumstances the s e l l e r "... must allocate production and deli v e r i e s 
among his customers Would an English court adopt a sim i l a r approach? 
There i s some authority for the proposition that a court would have sympathy 
68 
for t h i s view. In Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. C.S. Wilson and Co. Ltd., 
69 
Lord Finlay L.C. asserted t h a t : 
"Probably i t would be held i n such a case that the deliveries would 
f a l l t o be made i n the order of p r i o r i t y as they f a l l due and t h a t , 
i n the event of delivery being due under several contracts at 
the same time, the amount which i t was possible t o be divided 
among them pro rata ....". 
The ob l i g a t i o n to deliver the remaining goods at the time f i x e d for 
delivery would, Lord Finlay L.C. concluded, be discharged. I t should, 
however, be noted that the House of Lords was, i n t h i s case, considering 
the a f f e c t of an express term dealing with unforeseen contingencies, 
which term provided that there should be no l i a b i l i t y i f i t became impos-
s i b l e to make delivery at the appointed time. The a t t i t u d e of the House 
i n r e l a t i o n to the positio n that would obtain i n the s i t u a t i o n presently 
considered resulted from t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the expressed and implied 
i n t e n t i o n of the parties rather than from any general principles of law. 
I t seems l i k e l y t h a t , i n the absence of express provision i n his 
various contracts, the s e l l e r would be obliged to discharge as many 
6 61962 O f f i c i a l Text with Comments. 
6 7 s e c t i o n 2-615b 
6 8 /"1917_7 A.C. 495. 
69 at page 508. 
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contracts as possible and render himself l i a b l e i n damages for breach 
of a l l o t h e r s . ^ In Hong Guan and Co. Ltd. v. R. Jumabhoy and Sons Ltd. 
the respondents contracted to s e l l to the appellants f i f t y tons of 
cloves "subject to force majeure and shipment". The s e l l e r s procured 
shipment of s u f f i c i e n t cloves to perform t h i s contract, but insuf-
f i c i e n t i n r e l a t i o n to a l l t h e i r contracts. They elected to use the 
cloves i n performance of t h e i r other contracts and were held l i a b l e t o 
the buyers. The case did not turn on f r u s t r a t i o n but on the condition 
precedent that the goods be shipped. Nevertheless, the opinion of the 
Court that the condition precedent had been s a t i s f i e d because s u f f i c i e n t 
goods for the p a r t i c u l a r contract i n question had been shipped would, no 
doubt, be'reflected i n a sim i l a r view t h a t there can be no f r u s t r a t i o n 
where s u f f i c i e n t goods remain to perform the p a r t i c u l a r contract i n 
question. This a t t i t u d e i s stated quite baldly by Lord Morris of 
Borth-Y-Gest: 7 2 
"Their Lordships are c l e a r l y of the opinion that the 
respondents -cannot be allowed to excuse t h e i r non-performance 
by reference to t h e i r other commitments, or to seek to give 
other commitments p r i o r i t y over the appellants' claim". 
on the basis that the " f r u s t r a t i n g event" has been self-induced, 
Maratime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd. /~1935 7 A.C. 524. 
/"196Q 7 A.C. 684. 
at page 708. 
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SECTION E: 
CAN THERE BE A COMMON LAW FRUSTRATION OP A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
SPECIFIC GOODS WHICH HAVE PERISHED? 
What i f section 7 Sale of Goods Act does not apply because 
property or r i s k has passed to the buyer? Does the s e l l e r r e t a i n his 
oblig a t i o n to deliver the goods he has promised to deliver? Where 
section 7 applies the contract i s avoided and, as a r e s u l t , the buyer 
cannot maintain an action for non-delivery. Is i t possible to assert 
that the converse i s also t r u e ; that where section 7 does not apply the 
contract i s not avoided and the s e l l e r retains his contractual 
obligations? 
I t would not, perhaps, seem unreasonable to suppose t h a t where 
Parliament has made provision for the avoidance of a contract for the 
sale of specific goods only where the goods perish before property or 
r i s k passes to the buyer, i t was not the in t e n t i o n of the Legislature 
that the contract should be avoided i f either has passed at the time of the 
perishing of the goods. I f the contract i s not avoided the obli g a t i o n 
to deliver remains, as do the buyer's obligations t o accept and pay for 
the goods, and, i n the absence of any other means of terminating the 
contractual obligations, i t would follow t h a t : 
1) the buyer must pay for the goods, 
and 
2) the s e l l e r must deliver them. 
Presumably, as the buyer has the r i s k of loss or de t e r i o r a t i o n i n the 
goods he can only i n s i s t upon the s e l l e r d elivering the perished goods. 
As we have seen,^ however, goods may be considered to have "perished" 
see Part One. 
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for the purposes of the contract where they s t i l l physically e x i s t i n 
some recognisable form and r e t a i n some, perhaps considerable, : 
74 
commercial value. In Asfar v. Blundell, for example, the consignment 
of dates which was taken to have perished was ultimately sold, for the 
purposes of d i s t i l l a t i o n i n t o s p i r i t , at a price of £2,400 (a not incon-
siderable sum i n the nineteenth century). I f i n cases such as t h i s , the 
s e l l e r retains his obligation to deliver the goods, the buyer can i n s i s t 
upon delivery and, should the s e l l e r d e f a u l t , s e t - o f f damages for non-
delivery against any claim made by the s e l l e r for the price . Conversely, 
i f the obligations under the contract survive the perishing of the goods 
and the 'remains:*' of the perished goods have no value, the s e l l e r can, 
presumably, i n s i s t that the buyer accepts delivery of the goods and, by 
so doing, reli e v e the s e l l e r of the expense of disposing of the same. 
Any default i n taking delivery would, i t would seem, give r i s e t o an 
action under section 377"* of the 1979 Act by which the s e l l e r could recover 
the expense of disposing of the contract goods. 
I t has, since Taylor v. Caldwell 7^ been assumed that the s e l l e r ' s 
o b l i g a t i o n t o deliver does not survive the perishing of the sp e c i f i c 
goods which form the subject-matter of the contract. I n that case 
Blackburn J. asser t e d 7 7 t h a t : 
"Where a contract of sale i s made amounting t o a bargain and 
sale, t r a n s f e r r i n g presently the property i n sp e c i f i c c h a t t e l s , 
which are to be delivered by the vendor at a future day; 
there, i f the c h a t t e l s , without the f a u l t of the vendor, perish 
i n the i n t e r v a l , the purchaser must pay the price and the vendor 
i s excused from performing his contract to deliver which has 
become impossible." 
H / 1896_7 1 Q.B. 123. 
73"When the s e l l e r i s ready and w i l l i n g to deliver the goods, and requests 
the buyer to take delivery, and the buyer does not w i t h i n a reasonable 
time a f t e r such request take delivery of the goods, he i s l i a b l e t o the 
s e l l e r for any loss occasioned by his neglect or refu s a l to take delivery, 
and also for a reasonable charge for the care and custody of the goods." 
7 6(1863) 3 B &S, 824. 
7 7 a t page 837. 
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The conceptual basis of t h i s assertion i s not apparent and, w h i l s t 
78 79 Blackburn J. c i t e s as a u t h o r i t y Ruqq v. Minett, he does concede 
th a t " i t seems i n that case rather to have been taken for granted 
than decided that the destruction of the thing sold before delivery 
excused the vendor from f u l f i l l i n g his contract to d e l i v e r on payment". 
Moreover, T a y l o r v . Caldwell pre-dates the 1893 Act and cannot influence 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the clear meaning of sections of t h a t Act or i t s 
replacement. I t i s , i n section 28 of the Act, provided that "Unless 
otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are con-
current conditions, t h a t i s to say, the s e l l e r must be ready and w i l l i n g 
to give possession of the goods t o the buyer i n exchange foe the pr i c e 
No doubt the courts would be prepared to assume t h a t , the r i s k 
being on the buyer, the s e l l e r i s re l i e v e d o f ~ t h i s o b l i g a t i o n where the 
goods have, i n the f u l l e s t sense of the word, perished. Indeed, we have 
80 
noted previously that Sealey asserts t h a t t h i s i s the very meaning of 
the notion of r i s k ; i t i s a negative concept which acts, quite simply, 
so as to excuse the s e l l e r from the need to d e l i v e r and thus s a t i s f y the 
normal condition precedent to an action for the p r i c e . Would a c o u r t , 
however, be w i l l i n g t o depart from the clear wording of section 28 where 
the goods, w h i l s t deemed to have perished for the purposes of the con-
t r a c t , are s t i l l i n existence and are capable of being sold at a price? 
Presumably they could do so only on the basis that section 28 requires 
delivery of "the goods" and that these goods, the goods i d e n t i f i e d i n 
the contract, are no longer i n existence. Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would, 
of course, permit the s e l l e r to p r o f i t from the f r u s t r a t i n g event. He 
may maintain an action against the buyer for the price and, i n a d d i t i o n , 
s e l l the "remains" of the goods i n the relevant market. 
7 8 1 1 East 210. 
7 9 a t page 837. 
80 
see Part Two. 
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The d i f f i c u l t i e s outlined above would disappear i f the contractual 
obligations of s e l l e r and buyer were to terminate as a r e s u l t of 
f r u s t r a t i o n . Clearly there can be no avoidance of the obligations by 
v i r t u e of section 7 of the 1979 Act where property or r i s k has passed. 
Any f r u s t r a t i o n of the contractual obligations i n such contracts must, 
therefore, arise at common law. 
The i n t e n t i o n of Parliament? 
There i s , i n the 1943 Act, an i n d i c a t i o n that Parliament accepted 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of f r u s t r a t i o n where property or r i s k i n s p e c i f i c goods 
has passed to the buyer at the time of perishing. Section 2(5)(c) of 
the Act, as amended, provides that the Act s h a l l not apply t o : 
a) "any contract t o which section seven of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 (which avoids contracts for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods 
which perish before the r i s k passes to the buyer) applies"; or 
b) "to any other contract for the sale, or for the sale and 
deli v e r y , of sp e c i f i c goods, where the contract i s fr u s t r a t e d by 
reason of the fact that the goods have perished". 
I t would appear from (b) above that the Legislature contemplated the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a contract for the sale of sp e c i f i c goods being 
f r u s t r a t e d , as a r e s u l t of the perishing of the goods, other than by 
81 
v i r t u e of section 7. What i s not apparent i s whether Parliament con-
templated the p o s s i b i l i t y of a common law f r u s t r a t i o n of a contract for 
the sale of spec i f i c goods where: 
a) property (but not r i s k ) has passed to the buyer; or 
though some academic wr i t e r s deny any such inference and assert either 
that the provision i s as i t i s simply as a r e s u l t of clumsy draftmanship 
or that the provision was inserted "ex abundanti cautela", for the avoid-
ance of doubt. See, for example, Benjamin "Sale of Goods" a r t . 443, 
"Chitty on Contracts" a r t . 4431, Cheshire and Fifoot "Law of Contract" 
(9th ed.) page 565. 
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b) where r i s k has passed to the buyer (perhaps with property, 
perhaps without); or 
c) i n either case. 
A consideration of the requirements of section 7 reveals that a 
contract w i l l be avoided under that section i f : 
1) the s e l l e r and buyer enter i n t o an "agreement to s e l l 1 1 
( i . e . an executory agreement i n which property does not pass 
at the time of con t r a c t ) ; and 
2) the goods which form the subject matter of the contract are 
s p e c i f i c ; and 
3) the goods subsequently perish; and 
4) the perishing of the goods i s not a t t r i b u t a b l e to the f a u l t of 
either party; and 
5) at the time of perishing, r i s k has not passed to the buyer. 
Of these f i v e variables, those outlined i n (2) and (3) above are 
common to a section 7 f r u s t r a t i o n and to whatever other form of 
f r u s t r a t i o n may have been contemplated by Parliament when i t enacted 
section 2(5)(c) of the 1943 Act. The remaining variables are, therefore, 
the key to that other s i t u a t i o n , i f one e x i s t s , i n which a contract for the 
sale of spec i f i c goods may be fr u s t r a t e d by reason of t h e i r perishing. I t 
i s surely inconceivable that a contract w i l l be f r u s t r a t e d where the 
im p o s s i b i l i t y results from the f a u l t of one of the contracting p a r t i e s , 
which r e s t r i c t s the present consideration to the variables outlined i n 
(1) and (5) above. 
I f we i n v e r t variable ( 1 ) , i n our attempt, to i d e n t i f y the s i t u a t i o n 
i n which there may be f r u s t r a t i o n other than under section 7, we must 
contemplate a s i t u a t i o n i n which the contracting parties have entered 
i n t o a sale, rather than an agreement to s e l l . Is i t possible to con-
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template f r u s t r a t i o n i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n ? Some academics would argue 
that a contract of sale cannot be f r u s t r a t e d where property has passed 
because i t has, by v i r t u e of the passing of property, been executed. 
Advocates of t h i s view r e l y upon the d e f i n i t i o n of a sale of goods con-
83 
t r a c t , set out i n section 2(1) of the Act, which i d e n t i f i e s the 
sa l i e n t feature of the contract as the obl i g a t i o n to transfer property 
to the buyer. Support for t h i s approach might also appear to be con-
84 
tained i n the decision of the Court of Appeal i n Rowland v. D i v a l l 
that there was a complete f a i l u r e of consideration when a purchaser 
received possession, but not ownership, of goods from a s e l l e r who had no 
t i t l e to them. The decision, i n so far as i t indicated that the buyer's 
possession of goods did not prevent him from having suffered a t o t a l 
f a i l u r e of consideration, suggests t h a t , i n a contract of sale, transfer 
of property i s a l l that i s of concern t o the buyer. This approach i s 
85 
rejected by others and, indeed i s d i f f i c u l t to reconcile with the 
express provisions of the Act. Section 27, which appears under a 
heading "Performance of the contract", indicates, uncompromisingly, 
that " i t i s the duty of the s e l l e r to deliver the goods i n accord-
ance with the terms of the contract of sale". Surely a contract of sale 
can be f r u s t r a t e d , whoever has the property i n the goods, so long as t h i s 
o b l i g a t i o n has not been performed. There i s , i n r e a l i t y , nothing i n the 
decision i n Rowland v. D i v a l l to suggest that t h i s i s not so. The Court 
of Appeal ignored the possession enjoyed by the purchaser simply because 
See, for example, Atiyah, "The Sale of Goods" (4th ed.) page 167, 
Greig "Sale of Goods" page 220. 
8'5"A contract of sale of goods i s a contract whereby the s e l l e r transfers 
or agrees to transfer the property i n goods to the buyer for a money 
consideration, called the price". 
8 4 /"1923 7 2 K.B. 500. 
8 5See Macleod, "Sale and Hire Purchase" page 257. 
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86 he had not, at any time, enjoyed a " r i g h t t o possession". This 
cannot be authority for the proposition that a contract of sale may be 
f u l l y executed at a stage pr i o r to delivery being effected. I t would 
appear to be far from outrageous to suggest that there can be f r u s t r a t i o n 
of a contract for the sale of sp e c i f i c goods even though property i n 
the goods has passed to the buyer p r i o r to t h e i r perishing. Indeed, Pro-
87 
fessor Glanville Williams i d e n t i f i e s the s i t u a t i o n i n which property, 
but not r i s k , has passed to the buyer p r i o r to the spe c i f i c goods 
perishing as a casus omissus i n section 7 of the 1893 Act. This, then, 
may be the s i t u a t i o n contemplated by Parliament i n section 2(5)(c) of 
the 1943 Act. 
Let us not, however, forget the remaining variable i n section 7. 
I f section 7 applies only where r i s k has not passed, i t may be that 
Parliament contemplated the a l t e r n a t i v e s i t u a t i o n i n which there can be 
f r u s t r a t i o n as being that i n which r i s k has passed to the buyer p r i o r to 
the perishing of the goods. Such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s almost universally 
88 
discounted. Atiyah, for example, states quite baldly that " there 
cannot be f r u s t r a t i o n for t h i s would discharge the buyer's obl i g a t i o n 
to pay the price or enable him to recover i t i f already paid, and t h i s 
would mean that r i s k was on the s e l l e r and not the buyer". I t i s sub-
mitted that t h i s conclusion i s untenable and results from a confusion as 
to the relation s h i p between r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n . I f there can be no 
f r u s t r a t i o n i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t i s not for t h i s reason. Risk relates t o 
the l i a b i l i t y of the buyer to pay the price (or some other sum) should 
8 ^ a t page 507. 
8 7"The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943", page 83. 
8 8See, for example, Atiyah, "The Sale of Goods" (4th ed.) page 167 and 
T r e i t a l "Law of Contract" (3rd ed.) page 778. But see also Macleod 
"Sale and Hire Purchase" page 257. 
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the goods perish or d e t e r i o r a t e ; f r u s t r a t i o n determines whether the 
s e l l e r i s l i a b l e i n damages for non-delivery. To r e l i e v e the s e l l e r of 
his o b l i g a t i o n to d e l i v e r i s not to r e l i e v e the buyer of his o b l i g a t i o n 
t o pay the price (or some other sum). A f r u s t r a t i n g event w i l l terminate 
contractual obligations which have not arisen at the time of f r u s t r a t i o n , 
but obligations which already existed at that time w i l l remain. I f there 
can be common law f r u s t r a t i o n where r i s k has passed i n r e l a t i o n t o s p e c i f i c 
goods, the f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract w i l l r e l i e v e the s e l l e r of his 
o b l i g a t i o n to de l i v e r but i t w i l l not a f f e c t the p r i n c i p l e of r i s k . At 
the time of the perishing of the goods one of the part i e s w i l l , under the 
terms of the contract or by v i r t u e of the provisions of the Sale of Goods 
Act, have ,the r i s k of loss. That person w i l l , subsequent to the contract 
being f r u s t r a t e d , r e t a i n that l i a b i l i t y : " A l l Taylor v. Caldwell says i s 
that the parties are to be excused from the performance of the contract 
A l l t h a t can be said i s t h a t when the procession was abandoned the contract 
was o f f , not tha t anything done under the contract was void. The loss 
89 
must remain where i t was at the time of the abandonment"-. A Sale of 
Goods contract may be avoided by v i r t u e of the f r u s t r a t i n g event, but i t 
i s not rendered voi d . I f the buyer acquired r i s k , by v i r t u e of section 
20 of the Act, he w i l l r e t a i n t h a t l i a b i l i t y . The contract may no 
longer e x i s t but i t does not cease t o have existed, and while i t existed 
the question of r i s k was determined. To f r u s t r a t e the s e l l e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n 
to d e l i v e r w i l l not, then, re-vest r i s k i n him. This conclusion i s 
90 91 stated succinctly i n Chandler v. Webster where Lord Romer L.J. asserts 
t h a t , i n the Taylor v. Caldwell s i t u a t i o n , any le g a l r i g h t previously 
89 
per Earl Halsbury L.C. C i v i l Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co. / 1 9 0 3 / 2 K.B. 764. 
9 0 /"1904_7 1 K.B. 493. 
91 
at page 501. 
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accrued according to the terms of the agreement /"or presumably, by 
operation of law 7 w i l l not be disturbed". 
Atiyah supports his assertion that there can be no f r u s t r a t i o n 
where r i s k has passed by reference to the fact that i n c . i . f . contracts, 
where the r i s k normally passes before property, the perishing of the 
qoods between these two events does not f r u s t r a t e the contract. A c . i . f . 
contract i s , however, a special contract. I t has been described, by 
92 
Scrutton J., as "not a sale of goods, but a sale of documents r e l a t i n g 
93 
to goods"; by Bankes L.J. and Warrington L.J., as "a contract for the 
sale of goods performed by the delivery of documents"; and, by McCardie 
94 
J., as a contract i n which "the obli g a t i o n of the vendor i s to deliver 
documents rather than goods, to transfer symbols rather than"the physical 
property represented thereby". Quite c l e a r l y , such a contract cannot be 
fr u s t r a t e d by loss of the goods, but t h i s i s due to the fa c t that the 
s e l l e r w i l l remain able to deliver the documents and not to the fact t h a t 
the buyer has the r i s k . Atiyah also c i t e s as authority the decision of 
95 
Morris J. i n Home v. Minister of Food. In that caser however, Morris 
J. decided only that section 7 could not apply where r i s k had passed. 
There would seem to be, therefore, no obvious reason why a contract for 
the sale of sp e c i f i c goods should not be f r u s t r a t e d , even though the buyer 
has acquired r i s k . 
9 2Arnhold Karberg & Co. v. Blyth, Green, Jourdain & Co. /~1915 7 2 K.B. 
379', ~S'6$", 
93, Arnhold Karberg & Co. v. Blyth, Green, Jourdain & Co. (supra) page 510, 
5 IS 
94 Manbre Saccharine Co. v. Corn Products Co. (191a) 24 Comm Cas 89, 97. 
9 5 /"1948 7 2 A l l E.R. 1036. 
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Effect of a Common Law Frustration 
I f there can be a f r u s t r a t i o n , other than a section 7 f r u s t r a t i o n , 
of a contract for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods which perish, there are, 
then, three possible s i t u a t i o n s i n which such a f r u s t r a t i o n may be 
recognised: 
1) Where property has passed to the buyer but r i s k has not; 
2) Where r i s k has passed to the buyer but property has not; 
3) Where property and r i s k have both passed to the buyer. 
A common law f r u s t r a t i o n i n (1) above would r e l i e v e the s e l l e r of his 
obliga t i o n to deliver the goods; and, the r i s k being with the s e l l e r , 
the buyer would not be l i a b l e f o r the price. Frustration i n (2) and 
(3) would,, however, occur i n r e l a t i o n to a contract for the sale of goods 
which were, at the time of f r u s t r a t i o n , at the buyer's r i s k . What 
e f f e c t would such a f r u s t r a t i o n have i f , as has been argued, the buyer 
retains the r i s k even though the contract i s at an end? Obviously there 
would be no question of any oblig a t i o n to make or take delivery of the 
goods, for these obligations would be f r u s t r a t e d . The s e l l e r would, 
however, be able to sue the buyer as a r e s u l t of the fact that the goods 
were, at the time of f r u s t r a t i o n , at his r i s k . What, however, would the 
s e l l e r be able to recover? 
In s i t u a t i o n (3) there would appear to be two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
a) I t might be argued that the s e l l e r would be able to recover 
the contract price from the buyer. No obligations on the contract 
remain f o r , the contract being f r u s t r a t e d , performance of outstanding 
obligations i s excused. The implied term i n the contract that 
delivery and payment are concurrent would, therefore, not be 
relevant and the i n a b i l i t y to tender delivery no bar to recovery 
of the price. The s e l l e r i s , quite simply, able to sue the buyer 
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because, as a matter of law, he bears the r i s k of loss which would 
otherwise f a l l upon the s e l l e r . Property having passed to the 
buyer pr i o r to the perishing of the goods, the s e l l e r had, p r i o r 
to the f r u s t r a t i n g event, acquired the r i g h t to sue for the price 
i n the event of default. Had the goods not perished, therefore, 
he would have delivered the goods and received the price or, i n the 
event of non-acceptance or non-payment by the buyer, have been able 
96 
to sue for the price. In Tarlinq v. Bates, Bayley J. and 
Holroyd J. emphasise the cer t a i n t y of the s e l l e r ' s contingent 
r i g h t , i n these circumstances, by t h e i r assertion that upon property 
i n the goods passing to the purchaser, the vendor acquires a r i g h t 
of property i n the price. The buyer, who has the r i s k , i s , therefore, 
l i a b l e to a s e l l e r who had a contingent r i g h t t o the price at the 
time of the f r u s t r a t i n g event. Subsequent to the perishing of the 
goods, therefore, the buyer must pay that price. 
b) I t may, however, be possible to argue that the s e l l e r has no 
claim to the price. Section 28 Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides 
that "unless otherwise agreed, delivery of the goods and payment 
of the price are concurrent conditions". U n t i l , therefore, 
delivery i s tendered there may be no r i g h t to payment. I f the 
s e l l e r has not effected or tendered delivery prior to the 
f r u s t r a t i n g event, i t may thus be argued that he had no r i g h t to sue 
for the price at that time. The buyer, who has the r i s k , must 
bear the s e l l e r ' s loss, but the s e l l e r has not l o s t the price of the 
goods for the s e l l e r had never acquired that r i g h t . Where r i s k i s 
with the buyer as a r e s u l t of express agreement between the parties 
section 28 w i l l , presumably, be inapplicable, for by t h e i r agreement 
the parties must be taken to have indicated that the section w i l l 
(1827) 108 E.R. 484. 
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not apply where delivery cannot be effected as a r e s u l t of a 
perishing of the goods. Where, however, r i s k has passed to the buye 
by operation of law, rather than by express agreement, there 
would seem to be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for circumvention of the rule 
that payment is due only upon delivery. I f so, the s e l l e r may 
f i n d that he i s i n the same s i t u a t i o n as a s e l l e r i n s i t u a t i o n ( 2 ) . 
As i n s i t u a t i o n ( 3 ) , the s e l l e r i n s i t u a t i o n (2) has, p r i o r to 
f r u s t r a t i o n , acquired a r i g h t against the buyer, the r i g h t to recover 
from him the loss which results from the goods perishing. Again, 
however, the question arises as to the measure of that loss. The 
s e l l e r has c e r t a i n l y l o s t the replacement cost of the goods he i s 
s e l l i n g . He has, to put i t another way, l o s t the pre-contract value of 
the goods, the sum for which a prudent businessman who wished to 
carry no part of the r i s k himself would have insured the goods whilst 
they formed part of his stocks and had not yet been selected or other-
wise i d e n t i f i e d by the purchaser as the goods he wished to buy. Has the 
s e l l e r also l o s t his p r o f i t ? At the time of the f r u s t r a t i n g event he 
has, i t i s submitted, no r i g h t to sue for the price, f o r , as property 
has not yet passed to the buyer, that r i g h t has not yet accrued. There 
i s , therefore, no obligation on the purchaser to pay the contract price. 
Action for the Price or an Indemnity i n r e l a t i o n to Actual Loss? 
Situations (2) and (3) above suggest, perhaps, that where the r i s k 
i s with the buyer at the time of p e r i s h i n g , the s e l l e r may only be 
able to sue the buyer for the price i f the contract i s not f r u s t r a t e d . 
For, i n the absence of f r u s t r a t i o n , the contract endures and with i t the 
attendant r i g h t s and obligations. The s e l l e r has, under t h i s contract, 
a r i g h t to sue the buyer for the price, which r i g h t i s subject to two 
conditions precedent. He must: 
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a) have transferred property t o the buyer, and 
b) have made a delivery to the buyer. 
I f the concept of r i s k acts so as to dispense with the necessity for f u l -
filment of these conditions (save that he may be required to deliver the 
perished goods), the s e l l e r w i l l be able to sue the buyer for the price 
on the contract. I f , however, the contract i s f r u s t r a t e d , the s e l l e r 
w i l l be re l y i n g upon the fact that the buyer has r i s k , rather than upon 
the buyer being under a contractual o b l i g a t i o n . In t h i s event, i t i s 
submitted, the buyer i s l i a b l e to compensate the s e l l e r for his loss, 
which loss must be assessed without reference to the contractual r i g h t s 
which no longer e x i s t . The s e l l e r ' s loss would, i n these circumstances, 
be calculated by reference to r i g h t s which had vested at the time of the 
f r u s t r a t i n g event. 
Much, then, depends upon whether a contract can be f r u s t r a t e d , at 
common law, where r i s k i n the goods rests with the buyer at the time the 
goods are destroyed. The s t a r t i n g point for a court would, i n a l l 
p r o b a b i l i t y , be that there can be no f r u s t r a t i o n i n these circumstances. 
Why t h i s should be i s , perhaps, less than obvious. 
A Casus Omissus 
In any event, there would appear to be no reason why a contract for 
the sale of spec i f i c goods should not be frust r a t e d where property, but 
not r i s k , has passed to the buyer at the time of the perishing of the 
goods (the casus omissus i n section 7 noted by Professor Glanville 
Williams). I f a contract for the sale of s p e c i f i c goods may be 
frustrated i n such circumstances, the s e l l e r ' s obligation to deliver and 
the buyer's obligation to accept delivery w i l l no longer exist and, to 
Section 49 S.G.A. 1979. 
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t h i s extent, they w i l l be i n the same position as i f there had been a 
section 7 f r u s t r a t i o n . Further, as r i s k i s with the s e l l e r he must 
bear his own loss and no l i a b i l i t y attaches to the buyer. Here again, 
the parties are i n the same position as they would hold subsequent to a 
f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract by section 7. The f r u s t r a t i o n w i l l not, 
however, be a section 7 f r u s t r a t i o n , i t v / i l l he a common lay/ f r u s t r a t i o n 
and, as such, w i l l f a l l uncomfortably between two sets of provisions: 
a) Because the goods which have perished are s p e c i f i c , the pro-
visions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 w i l l 
not apply. The buyer w i l l not, therefore, be able to re l y upon the 
98 
statutory r i g h t to recover money paid i n advance. 
b) At common law, recovery of money paid i n advance i s only 
99 
possible where there has been a complete f a i l u r e of consideration. 
A buyer whose contract has been fr u s t r a t e d by section 7 (and the 
consequences of which are determined by common law) w i l l , therefore, 
be able to recover a deposit or advance payment i n most circumstances 
Where property has passed to the buyer, however, he may be unable t o 
establish a complete f a i l u r e of consideration and w i l l , thus, f a l l 
w i t h i n the mischief which led, i n part, to both the Fibrosa decision 
and to the passing of the 1943 Act. 
98 see sections 1(2) and 2(5)(c) Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 
99 / — 7 Fibrosa Spolka Akcjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. / 1943_/ 
A * C o 3 2 e 
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ADDENDUM 
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Having set out, i n the three Parts to t h i s thesis, the con-
sequences of a post-contract perishing of goods which form the subject-
matter of a contract of sale, i t might now be useful to provide a post-
s c r i p t t o the thesis. This w i l l not take the form of a summary of the 
thesis, for the d i v i s i o n of the thesis i n t o Parts and Sections w i l l , 
hopefully, permit the reader to remind himself of the main areas of 
discussion w i t h i n the thesis without the assistance of a summary. The 
addendum to the thesis w i l l , rather, attempt t o bring together the 
various strands of one pa r t i c u l a r thread which l i e s concealed w i t h i n 
the f a b r i c of the the s i s . In the main part of the thesis aspects of the 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p of the concepts of r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n and of t h e i r 
dependence, upon the notion of "perishing" have been developed. The 
t o t a l i t y of such i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t h i s l i m i t e d context has, 
however, remained elusive. I t i s , perhaps, appropriate that an attempt 
should now be made to f i x the rel a t i o n s h i p between the three areas of 
perishing, r i s k and f r u s t r a t i o n which, separately, have provided a 
framework for each of the three Parts of the thesis. 
The l i n k between "perish" and " r i s k " 
The word "perished" was introduced i n t o the 1893 Act by a draftsman 
who elected t o incorporate that term i n t o a section (section 7) dealing 
with f r u s t r a t i o n of a contract of sale; the,concept of r i s k was also 
brought i n t o that section. Clearly, therefore, for the purposes of 
section 7 Sale of Goods Act, the concept of r i s k and the notion of 
perishing are each of significance. When one attempts to determine the 
relationship between these two areas, however, one i s handicapped by 
the fact that neither "perish" nor " r i s k " i s defined i n the Sale of Goods 
Act. 
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The analysis i n Part Two suggests that i t may well be that the terms 
are related t o one another i n such a way that each can only be defined by 
reference to the other. I t was suggested i n Part Two that " r i s k " 
might be a term used w i t h i n the Act to mean the burden that a party to 
the contract bears i n r e l a t i o n to loss which might arise as a r e s u l t of 
the goods perishing, i t was suggested, for example, that the term " r i s k " 
may have no relevance to the s i t u a t i o n i n which goods are requisitioned. 
I f so, the concept of r i s k i s applicable only where goods perish and i s , 
as a concept, p a r a s i t i c t o the notion of perishing, coming i n t o play only 
where goods perish or are deemed to have perished and determining the 
outcome of such an event. 
I t may be, however, that t h i s conclusion d i s t o r t s the relation s h i p 
between r i s k and perishing to an extent which completely reverses t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e importance. Throughout Part One of t h i s thesis i t was apparent 
that v i r t u a l l y any event which resulted i n goods being unavailable to 
the s e l l e r i n performance of his contract would be accepted as r e s u l t i n g 
i n t h e i r having "perished". Thus, not only i n the obvious case of 
physical destruction were goods taken t o have perished, such was also 
deemed to be the case where the goods had been subject to material 
physical d e t e r i o r a t i o n or to t h e f t . Only i n the case of requisitioned 
goods were academic writers prepared to refuse t o accept that the goods 
had "perished" and, even here, they arrived at t h i s conclusion when con-
templating the application of rules r e l a t i n g t o f r u s t r a t i o n rather than 
the concept of r i s k . Any event l i k e l y to activate the concept of r i s k 
was invariably accepted as amounting to a perishing of the goods. 
Surely, then, i f i t i s possible to suggest that " r i s k " relates only to 
the s i t u a t i o n i n which goods "perish", i t i s equally possible to reverse 
the proposition and maintain that the term "perished" i s a term wide 
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enough t o embrace goods which have been subject to any event which 
commercial men would expect to activate the concept of r i s k . Where 
goods are destroyed, where they are stolen or where they are 
requ i s i t i o n e d , an informed businessman would surely expect that the 
resultant loss would f a l l to the party bearing r i s k . For the purposes 
of the contract of sale the goods no longer e x i s t and i t surely does not 
s t r a i n c r e d i b i l i t y to suggest that the term "perish" may cover a l l of 
these si t u a t i o n s and may thus be a f a i r l y e l a s t i c term covering any event 
which results i n an economic loss for which the party with r i s k may be 
held to be l i a b l e . I f t h i s proposition can be accepted, then the term 
"perish" i s c l e a r l y p a r a s i t i c to the term " r i s k " and w i l l be taken to 
apply to goods subject to any event which brings that concept i n t o play. 
I t w i l l be recalled that Sealey suggests that r i s k i s a negative concept 
which releases the s e l l e r from the normal pre-conditions to an action for 
the price ( i . e . passing property to the buyer and e f f e c t i n g d e l i v e r y ) . 
I f one accepted t h i s view, i t would be possible to suggest that goods 
w i l l be taken to perish whenever, through no f a u l t of the s e l l e r , they can-
not be delivered to a buyer i n circumstances i n which the s e l l e r w i l l be 
released from his obligation to deliver the goods and the buyer w i l l be 
l i a b l e t o the s e l l e r for the pr i c e . Equally, the goods w i l l be taken to 
have perished where, r i s k being with the s e l l e r , the buyer i s not l i a b l e 
to the s e l l e r but, i n the opinion of the Court, would have been had r i s k 
been transferred. 
Whatever the true relationship between the terms "perish" and " r i s k " , 
however, i t i s submitted that they are i n t e r l o c k i n g terms and that one 
cannot apply without the other. I f so, where goods are taken to have 
"perished" then the concept of r i s k w i l l apply; equally, where one of the 
contracting parties i s taken to have l i a b i l i t y for the loss of goods which 
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were, at the time of loss, at his r i s k , then i t follows that the goods 
must have perished. I f " r i s k " and "perishing" are inexorably entwined 
i t may be that the courts could, i f they were prepared to approach 
commercial situations at t h i s conceptual l e v e l , determine d i f f i c u l t 
cases by reference to p r a c t i c a l rather than "academic" questions. 
Consider, for example, the s i t u a t i o n i n which s p e c i f i c goods are ' l o s t ' 
to the s e l l e r p r i o r to property and r i s k passing to the buyer. Section 7 
of the 1979 Act w i l l apply to the s i t u a t i o n only i f the goods "perish". 
Conversely, the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 
1943, w i l l apply t o the transaction only i f the goods have not perished. 
I f a Court attempts to determine whether the goods have or have not 
perished through a debate as to the meaning of that term i t i s l i k e l y to 
f i n d that debate s t e r i l e . I t might be more p r a c t i c a l for such a court 
to accept the conceptual re l a t i o n s h i p between "perish" and " r i s k " and to 
ask i t s e l f a more straightforward question: "Would the Court have 
determined that the buyer was l i a b l e i f r i s k had passed to him?". I f 
the answer to t h i s question i s "yes", then the Court has determined that 
the event leading to the 'loss' of the goods i s one which has led t o 
t h e i r having "perished". Consequent upon t h i s f i n d i n g the Court would 
then, presumably, apply section 7 of the Act. 
To suggest that such an approach would be v a l i d , i s to suggest that 
i n at least one s i t u a t i o n involving the concept of f r u s t r a t i o n , that i n 
which section 7 Sale of Goods Act applies, one concept, that of 
f r u s t r a t i o n , w i l l assist the s e l l e r where the other, r i s k , does not, but 
would have done but for the fact that r i s k remains with the s e l l e r . Such 
an argument indicates that the predominant concept i s r i s k . Where r i s k 
has passed to the buyer and the Court i s w i l l i n g t o activate t h i s concept, 
then the s e l l e r can rel y upon i t to recover his loss from the buyer. 
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Where r i s k has not passed t o the buyer, but the Court would have 
activated the concept t o assist the s e l l e r had i t passed, then the 
contract w i l l be taken to have been avoided by section 7 and the s e l l e r 
w i l l be released from his contractual obligations and relieved from any 
further economic loss. To extend t h i s approach to a l l instances of 
f r u s t r a t i o n i n the sale of goods provides a basis for the view that there 
can, indeed, be no f r u s t r a t i o n of a contract where r i s k has passed. I t 
sharpens the rel a t i o n s h i p between "perishing", " r i s k " and " f r u s t r a t i o n " 
i n t o one i n which "perishing" i s the name given to the process by which 
the rules of r i s k are activated and " f r u s t r a t i o n " i s the process by 
which the s e l l e r ' s contractual obligations may be negatived when the 
concept of r i s k , considered i n Sealey's terms, does not assist him. 
A wider meaning f o r " r i s k " 
Another approach to the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p of the terms "perish", 
" r i s k " and " f r u s t r a t i o n " , i s to give " r i s k " i t s widest possible 
meaning and to accept the assertion made by Glanville Williams, noted i n 
Part Two, that t h i s term, as used i n section 20, "means a l l r i s k " . To 
assert such i s to provide one explanation as to the wording of section 7 
of the 1979 Act. Adopting t h i s approach i t can be argued that there can 
be no f r u s t r a t i o n under section 7 (nor, presumably, at common law) 
where r i s k has passed to the buyer, as a buyer with r i s k must accept 
loss r e s u l t i n g from any unforeseen event, for that i s what having r i s k 
means. This approach, which elevates the significance of the concept of 
r i s k , indicates paradoxically, that there i s no special significance i n 
the use of the term " r i s k " i n section 7; the reference to r i s k would, upon 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , merely represent a reminder that there can be no 
f r u s t r a t i o n where r i s k i s with the buyer. I f so, the term "perish" would 
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become correspondingly more important, for i t would not now e x i s t i n 
section 7 merely as an adjunct to r i s k . A section 7 f r u s t r a t i o n and with 
i t , since 1943, p a r t i c u l a r common law consequences, would apply only 
where goods are taken t o "perish". There being no special significance 
i n the use of the term " r i s k " i n section 7, the term would provide no 
assistance i n determining the meaning of the term "perish" and. a Court 
would be l e f t with no a l t e r n a t i v e but to determine, i n each and every 
case, whether or not goods may be taken to have "perished". 
A narrower ro l e for " r i s k " 
Yet a further approach i s to simply accept the view, without seeking 
t o make more of i t , that the term " r i s k " , as used i n section 20, i s a 
term which relates t o the l i a b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g from a loss caused by the 
perishing of goods. Following from t h i s acceptance, i t i s then possible 
to postulate that the concept of r i s k may be of no relevance whatsoever 
i n other instances of f r u s t r a t i o n . Thus, for example, where goods are 
requisitioned then, i f such an event i s not accepted as r e s u l t i n g i n 
the goods perishing, a contract for t h e i r sale w i l l not be avoided by 
section 7 of the 1979 Act. Any f r u s t r a t i o n of the contract must r e s u l t from 
common law principles and, r i s k being of relevance only where goods 
perish, the concept of r i s k w i l l be i r r e l e v a n t . 
What can one further conclude from this? One could suggest, with 
confidence, that the concept of r i s k i s , at least, l i m i t e d to situations 
i n which goods perish. One could even be bolder and suggest that the 
concept of r i s k i s relevant only to the s i t u a t i o n i n which the draftsmen 
of the 1893 and 1979 Acts have made i t relevant, that i s to say i n the 
section 7 s i t u a t i o n . This l a t t e r approach would then permit one to pro-
pose that there i s no reason why the passing of r i s k should prevent the 
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f r u s t r a t i o n of a contract of sale by operation of rules other than those 
contained i n section 7. This i s , of course, the view that was con-
sidered i n Section E of Part Three of the thesis. 
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